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CHAIRMAN ALAN ROBBINS: Please take a seat. 
We have a practice in this Committee of starting our hearings on time. With 
everyone's cooperation, we will conclude the morning portion of our hearing 
by noon, take a thirty minute lunch break, my apologies for the shortness of 
the lunch break, and then conclude the afternoon portion of the hearing by 
2:00p.m. And we'll get everyone out of here by 2:00p.m. 
I think there are enough seats for everyone. If need be, some of the 
seats we reserved for the press, can now be occupied. I would appreciate it. 
We have a long agenda and lots of people. So, if everyone could take a seat. 
Let me begin by introducing myself. I'm Alan Robbins. I chair the 
Senate Insurance Committee. With me, to my left, is Senator Dan McCorquodale, 
Senator Ed Davis, Senator Herschel Rosenthal, Senator Roberti will be here 
momentarily, I understand he's in the building, Assemblyman Pat Johnston, 
chair of our sister committee in the Assembly, Senator Cecil Green. 
A substantial number of California insurance companies have been scram-
bling in the face of the voter revolt, that broughtthe passage of Proposi-
tion 103, and they're trying to thwart the will of the people. 
While some companies, and we're going to hear from them as well, have 
chosen to play fair, have renewed their policies, are continuing to write 
policies for new business, other companies have chosen to threaten the 
voters, in retaliation for passing Proposition 103, they're going to stop 
writing business. A number of companies have used some tricks of the trade 
that I, personally, do not find very funny. There are several companies that 
we're going to hear from today, that I want to ask for particular full ex-
planations from those companies, that have gone to the practice of shutting 
down their regular company, starting, essentially, a second company or sub-
sidiary, premiums for that are 20-40% higher. It doesn't take a very good 
mathematician to figure out that if a company increases premiums by 40% by 
shifting the subsidiary that the business is written from, and then gives 
a 20% rate cut, what they've done is to try to take advantage of what was 
passed by the voters, to increase rates. 
In particular, State Farm Insurance has not only engaged in that practice, 
but is refusing, I understand, and I'll give them the opportunity to speak 
on this today, to allow new applicants for policies, to pay on a monthly to 
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quarterly basis, as it's been the history in California, and instead is re-
quiring that the premium be paid in full in advance. Thus adding to the 
affordability problem. 
A type of financial blackmail by many companies has been the type of 
thing that has been used that cannot be tolerated. The insurance industry 
has killed virtually every legislative effort over the past few years to 
try to bring down costs of insurance. Personally, I've had fourteen bills 
that would have reduced insurance costs or made it more available to Cali-
fornia consumers, they have been defeated. The insurance industry, the 
trial lawyers killed each of those fourteen bills. And when it comes to 
the question of sympathy for the insurance companies in dealing with the 
implementation of Proposition 103, in part it's a problem that's been cre-
ated by the insurance industry itself. 
'l'he Legislature cannot sit idlely by, and is not going to sit idlely 
and allow companies to threaten their premium held payers, and to allow 
companies to engage in tricky practices, to avoid complying with Prop. 103. 
Today, we're going to hear from 27 insurance companies. And it will 
give us an opportunity to differentiate between those companies that are 
playing by the rules, and those companies that are trying to play games. It 
is absolutely unconscionable today, when the California Supreme Court has 
said that companies can continue to write policies, and continue to charge 
the rates they were charging, it is absolutely unconscionable for any company 
to decide this is the time to leave the California automobile insurance market. 
One thing, in closing, that I want to make clear and particulary to all 
the insurance companies--those that are playing fair and those that are not, 
when we write the final lawsthat are written, we're not going to allow any 
company to profit or be at a better position, because at this critical time 
it took evasive action or treated its policyholders unfairly. When those 
final laws are written, any company that refuses to renew its policyholders, 
any company that makes the problem worse, any company that engages in the 
practice, of using a subsidiary as an excuse to increase rates, will wind up 
paying more in the long run. And the companies that treated their policyholder 
fairly will be treated fairly. But as long as I'm chairing the Insurance Com-
mittee, and as long as I have the support of the Members of my Committee, the 
companies that engage in the evasive tactics, the companies that engage in 
the l'ractices that make it worse, will wind up paying a substantial penalty 
for doiny so. The best economic course you can follow for your company, if 
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you want some unsolicited advice, is to be fair at this critical stage with 
your policyholders. 
We have an opening statement, as soon as Senator Roberti arrives, let 
me ask the Chair of our sister committee, Assemblyman Pat Johnston of Stockton, 
if he would care to make a brief remark. 
ASSEMBLYMAN PATRICK JOHNSTON: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and 
Members of the Senate. I appreciate the courtesy to include me in this hear-
ing and I primarily look forward to the information that will be provided 
today on the issue of availability of insurance during this interim period. 
I suspect some of the witnesses will wish to go beyond that to discuss other 
issues. I would hope that in this brief time that we have together, we could 
focus on the issues that Senator Robbins outlined. 
For the future, after the Court's action, it will be necessary for the 
Legislature to broaden the debate. Because Proposition 103 delivers the good 
news of insurance rate reduction, but essentially ignores the bad news of how 
to control cost in order to affect those rate reductions, it is that balance 
that this Legislature must look at in 1989. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Thank you very much. We've been joined by Senator 
Dan Boatwright. It's a pleasure to have you here, Dan. 
Senator Davis. Any Committee Member who wishes to, may make a very brief 
opening statement. 
SENATOR ED DAVIS: Mr. Chairman, I was on the losing side of this battle. 
I supported tort reform through no-fault. But, the voters rejected that and 
in a democracy even a rejection by one vote makes that the law. And so, this 
is the law. I think that the big issue for the insurance companies today, 
isn't here before this Committee, but before the Courts. And I can't see in 
the world how a law, like 103, that provides properly that you don't have to 
reduce rates 20%, if it's going to result in insolvency, can go in effect the 
day after it becomes law or the day it becomes law. That's just impossible, 
there is no new process in 103. But that issue is before the California 
Supreme Court, I'm sure they'll address it. I fully expect to see companies 
that petition the Court. The proper course for you today, is to petition the 
Insurance Commissioner and when the law becomes effective, then you get in 
line for your hearing. And one by one, I think you'll be released after you've 
had your hearing. But then, the most important thing like after Prop. 13, 
is that the law has been changed. We are going to enforce the law. And you're 
entitled to due process. And we cannot change the law in the Legislature, if 
-3-
you read the law in 103, we can only further the purposes of 103. We can't 
take away the provisions of getting rid of anti-trust and requiring approval 
for certain size of rate reductions, that's something that can be changed only 
by a vote of the people. And so, we may some day, supplement 103 or replace 
it, with a law that we put ... it'll have to be something that we put before the 
people. So, as Senator Robbins has said to you, in effect is, maybe he hasn't 
said it, your P.R. in the past has been lousy. And you rate right abou1 at the 
same level as politicians, in terms of public approbation. And, in fact, I 
have never seen an insurance executive, in the eight years I've been on this 
Committee, ever come and testify. I've asked why? Because the trial lawyers 
send in their guy who just won $8 million from you, and they'll testify. 
They'll subject themselves to cross examination. But never once do I remember 
an insurance executive coming before this Committee. 
So, we are going to enforce the law. The law is the law, is the law. 
And you might as well get that really straight and go to the Court, and go 
to the Insurance Commissioner and try to get your relief, and we'll take it 
from there. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Thank you. 
Let me ask our first witness to come forward, HarveyRosenfield. Harvey 
is the leader of the voter revolt. And in the tradition of Howard Jarvis, has 
become a genuine folk hero in our State. And Harvey, I have to tell you, 
when we sat in my living room and you told me what you were going to do on 
Proposition 103, and I told you that I thought it was a good idea, but I 
didn't think you could pull it off. Let me tell you publicly, in front of 
everybody, I was wrong and underestimated your ability to do it. It's a 
pleasure to have you before the Senate Insurance, Claims and Corporations 
Committee, and a pleasure, to have in effect in California a law that's 
fin<1lly going to produce the heat to do something about auto insurance. 
MR. HARVEY ROSENFIELD: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Com-
mittee. 
1 think a lot of people underestimated what the citizens of California 
would do on Election Day. 
My name's Harvey Rosenfield. I'm the Chair of Voter Revolt, the organiza-
tion which led the campaign for Proposition 103. 
Ten days ago, the citizens of California voted to approve Proposition 
103. A comprehensive and long needed reform of the insurance industry, de-
signed to lower insurance rates, and bring some measure of accountability and 
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competition to the insurance marketplace. Despite a $75 million campaign, 
most of which was delivered directly into the living rooms of the people of 
California, through their television sets, the citizens of California rejected 
the insurance industry's anti-consumer initiatives, rejected its baseless, 
groundless attacks on Prop. 103, and joined in a word-of-mouth campaign that 
involved over 175,000 volunteers, over a twelve month period. 
Yet today, ten days later, California voters are startled and angry to 
find that Prop. 103 is the subject of a massive insurance industry assault, 
which asks the courts to become in effect, a shield to protect the profits 
and privileges of the insurance industry against the sovereign will of the 
people. Even worse than the eleven lawsuits involving eighty attorneys 
against Prop. 103, what has really shocked and outraged millions of California 
voters, is the post-election behaviour of the insurance industry in defying 
the will of the people. In the days after the election, we have witnessed 
a very stark portrait of the insurance industry, its supreme arrogance and 
contempt for the voters of the State of California. In fact, we've seen the 
insurance industry employ a strategy, which it has used, or attempted to use 
in every single state in which the consumers or the Legislature, have risen 
up to demand reform of the insurance industry. It's a systematic creation 
of chaos and disorder through threats made by dozens of insurance companies 
to withdraw from the California marketplace, accompanied by efforts, if they 
do intend to stay to evade the provisions of Prop. 103, or even the current 
law in effect, now that Prop. 103 has been stayed temporarily by the Court. 
Why are the insurance companies behaving in this fashion? What they 
could not win through a $70 million campaign of distortion, the insurance 
companies now want to win by sheer intimidation and brute oppression. The 
freedom to continue to plunder the pocketbooks of the policies and consumers 
of California. What we are witnessing here, is nothing less than political 
blackmail and extortion by the insurance industry. 
I want to read to you some interesting quotes, I think the Committee 
will find these very fascinating. This is a statement by William McCormick, 
Chair and CEO of Firemen's Fund Insurance Company: "It's a disaster. And 
if it spreads to other states it will be a catastrophe." Here's a comment 
by the Vice President for Government Affairs at USF&G: "This is a Draconian 
onus measure." Here's a warning from a spokesperson for Continental Insur-
ance: "It has interferred with our ability to adequately price our product 
and we cannot justify taking on new business." Here's what Aetna has to say: 
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"The price rollbacks will force us into a money losing position and that 
makes it impossible to write any new commercial policies." Does this sound 
like familiar ... does this sound familiar? Yes, of course it is. But it isn't 
California, November, 1988. These are the hysterical statements of 
insurance industry executives r~sponding to a 40% rollback enacted by the 
Florida State Legislature in 1986. The Florida rollback passed a Constitu-
tional challenge by the insurance industry in the courts. It went into law 
and industry learned to live with it. Just as they will learn to live with 
Prop. 103. 
I think the key thing that we're facing here in the State of California 
is the claim that the insurance companies simply cannot afford to lower their 
insurance rates to comply with Prop. 103, to comply with the rollback. But 
have any of the companies that claim that they're going to go out of business 
under 103, taken advantage of the fact that 103 lets them exempt themselves 
from the rollback, simply if they open up their books, and disclose the rele-
vant information to the Insurance Commissioner? No. Not one company has 
opened up their books under Prop. 103, gone to the Insurance Commissioner 
ond said "We cannot afford the rollback." Why? Because they want to keep 
those books closed, because they can afford the rollback. Now, we haven't 
been able to open up their books, they won't let us do that. But when you 
pry them open a little bit, you find out for example, that they only pay out 
64¢ of every dollar that they take in,in premiums, for automobile. For pro-
~erty casualty generally it's generally 56¢ in every dollar. Why won't 
they open their books? Because the books will show tremendous waste and in-
efficiency. The books will show, that they don't compete, that they pay their 
aqcnts too much, they don't monitor the pay outs that they make, and they 
don't do anything about loss prevention practices. That would actual let 
them reduce their pay outs by reducing the number of their debts and injuries 
and hence claims. 
I think the important thing for the Committee today, is to asertain for 
itself, as all California consumers must, when will Prop. 103 be obeyed? The 
people of California waited too long for insurance reform, that's the first 
message of Prop. 103. The second message is, they want both long term relief 
and irmnediate relief, long term reforms, accountability, competition regula-
tion. They're also, and this is a very important message I think for the 
. /both . . f . d . . d h h d . . 1 insurance 1ndustry here 1n Call orn1a an nat1onw1 e, t ey ave ec1s1vc y 
rejected the pronosals of the insurance industry to restrict consumer pro-
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tection laws, or inhibit victims rights, or inhibit victims compensation, 
at least until the companies are forced to open up their books and prove what 
they've been saying for three or four years here in California, which is that 
lawsuits in the system of justice and legal rights are somehow responsible 
for high insurance rates. 
For the insurance industry, the choices today are two. You can either 
acknowledge the will of the people, as represented by Prop. 103, and join 
with consumers in a cooperative effort to implement the provisions of Prop. 
103. Or you can continue the present course, of defiance of the law, stone-
walling, and deliberately manufactured disorder. The fact of the matter is, 
it is no longer the wild west here in California. There's a new sheriff in 
town. The sheriff is Proposition 103. 
I'll be glad to answer any questions the Committee may have of me. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Well, let me ask you first of all, aren't you glad 
I talked you out of using the trojan horse analogy? Recognizing this week 
that that would have lost a segment of votes, that might have made ... 
MR. ROSENFIELD: That was a different initiative • 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: ... the difference. Senator Boatwright. 
SENATOR DANIEL BOATWRIGHT: Yes, the question I have is appended to 
your statement. There is a list of the top ten California automobile insur-
ance companies percent of premium dollars paid out for claims. I have a list 
with me, that's a little more comprehensive, than that that was compiled from 
the Insurance Commissioner's office. My question to you, were your's also 
compiled or based upon statistics given you by the Insurance Commissioner's 
office? 
MR. ROSENFIELD: No, they're compiled from statistics provided by Best 
Management Service. Which is an insurance industry information gathering 
service. 
SENATOR BOATWRIGHT: Do you know where their figures came from? Where 
their •.. 
MR. ROSENFIELD: Directly from the insurance industry. 
SENATOR BOATWRIGHT: O.K. The reason I say that, there's a little 
difference but not much. For example, State Farm you have for 1986, that 
they paid out approximately 65% of the premium dollar in claims, and I get 
a little different figure. And I was just wondering where yours came from? 
Because these are taken from the financial statements on file with the Cali-
fornia Department of Insurance, and a longer list than you have, but it 
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indicates basically the same thing, and that is that the insurance companies 
that arc doing business in California, and writing automobile insurance, are 
operating at a great profit from 1986. State Farm, with the figures from 
the insurance companies office, shows about $1.6 billion net income, and none 
of them show that they're losing taxes, or losing income. And as a matter of 
fact, only 6 of these various companies even paid any federal taxes, and all 
the others;ai~g~t 1¥ven pay federal taxes. So, I guess that accounts for1~1I­
fcrcncc. But this comes from the Insurance Commissioner's office an0 it is 
very close to yours, but not exact. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Well, we're going to have State Farm here. We're 
going to have the other companies here. You'll get a chance to ask them. 
, any questions you have for particular companies, when they're here, 
if you'll just send them up to me, we'll be pleased to ask them. And that 
goes for other people in the audience, or media, if there's any questions. 
We can always use good suggestions on ... questions thing. And we want to 
help the insurance companies ... who have a story to say, to be able to ... if 
there are companies that are fully complying with the law, and certainly 
one of the things we want to do today, is differentiate between the good 
companies and the bad companies. (chuckles) 
Harvey, you get off gently. 
ASSEMBLYMAN JOHNSTON: Mr. Chairman, let me just ask while Mr. Rosenfield 
is here. In your prepared statement, I appreciate your need to summarize it, 
you listed a number of questions that ought to be put, presumably by the Com-
missioner, to the insurance industry. Is your statement available to some 
of those insurance companies who will/¥~stifying? I'd like to have them 
re in general to the nature of your questions. 
MH. ROSENFIELD: r-1.r. Johnston, I'm embarrassed to say that we've had to 
make a public appeal for funds, at the beginning of this week, we couldn't 
afford Xerox more than twenty-five copies. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Tell you what we're going to do, Senator Roberti 
has an office in the building, one of his staff will Xerox additional copies. 
MR.ROSENFIELD: Or maybe we could take up a collection from some of the 
folks here? 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: It's O.K., Harvey. One of Senator Roberti's staff 
members will Xerox copies for the distribution to the insurance companies. 
'rhose, we'd like comments as people testify on them, if they wish to, then 
we can have a more extensive written response after the hearing to go for 
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the permanent record. 
Harvey, why don't you take a seat ... not too far away. 
MR.ROSENFIELD: Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Don Stewart, Executive Director, American Agents 
Alliance. Don's organization represents a number of agents, particularly in 
some of the hard hit urban areas of California. And, Don, we'd like a brief 
report from you on how it is out there in the trenches writing insurance 
right now. Then we are going to go to the insurance companies. 
MR. DON STEWART: Senator Roberti and Senator Robbins, and Members of 
this Committee, we thank you for calling on us, because we think you'll ap-
preciate our view, that's a little different, of what this does look like--
out in the trenches. 
As you say, I'm Don Stewart, Executive Director of the American Agents 
Alliance. With me is Mark Schmoekor, an agent from the trenches, from your 
city of Sacramento, in case you want some direct report. 
We haven't been as successful as Harvey has on this issue, reducing 
premiums to the insurers. Not that I'm certain he's going to reduce premiums to 
insurers yet, but we have in the Alliance worked on this thing for some seven-
teen years. We were the first producer organization to sponsor, or to sup-
port no-fault, and that was some seventeen years ago. Our path with the 
trial lawyers beat us back at that time and, frankly, we haven't succeeded 
in the years since then. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: No-fault had a bad day on November 8th. 
MR. STEWART: Right. At any rate, the public, although they don't 
realize it yet, desperately needs the help of this Committee, if we're to 
keep this whole situation from disintegrating into a total disaster. Now, 
we're just minutes, heartbeats, blinks, if you'll have it, on the part of 
some of these insurance companies from a state super fund. We couldn't be 
more certain of this from where we're sitting. And this could be the finan-
cial ruination of not only the State of California, but certainly the drivers 
and that's what we're interested in. How's that possible? First, let's 
look at something nobody wants to talk about. Prop. 103, we would say is a 
bad law. It's fiscally impossible. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Don, Don, Don. I'm not disinterested in your philos-
ophy, I am. What I would most like is a report on ... and the reason we gave 
you this part of the agenda, we did so you could give us a report on what's 
happening in terms of companies out there today, what success are your agents 
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, in terms of companies who write policies today, what practices are 
being done. 
MR. STEWART: 
to touch on that. 
Senator, and I'm simply going to say, we weren't going 
That we were going to bypass that whole issue, and talk 
to you exactly what concerns you. I think we must say, at this point, because 
it involves this, we are now convinced that we're going to see a 20-30% rate 
increase statewide, and up to 50% in the cities, in the inner cities in the 
next twelve months, no matter what happens with this Proposition in the 
Supreme Court. Now, we have, and have observed, that the companies simply 
cannot meet this 31-32% rate reduction. And the end result, is that they are 
in disarray. 
SENATOR DAN McCORQUODALE: Mr. Chairman. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Senator McCorquodale. 
SENATOR McCORQUODALE: Is he testifying for the insurance companies or 
for the agents? 
MR. STEWART: That's a fair question. We're not involved on behalf of 
the insurance companies, we don't get any money from them, we're talking 
really about how this prospectus is involved. But ... 
SENATOR McCORQUODALE: One of the issues ... One of the issues that we 
have a problem with is the data. I mean if you're really speaking for the 
insurance companies, if you're really willing to swear to that, I think you 
ought to give us that data you have and we'd have it. But, I wonder if 
you really ... are you using something they told you, or do you have indepen-
dent access to the data? 
MR. STEWART: Well, no. We don't, we don't have that kind of data except 
as , and our reactions though of what's happening in the markets, and 
this is what I was going to say. On Black Wednesday, we had nearly fifty 
listed as having, in effect, stopped writing new business. Some of 
them withdrew, some of them just stopped new business. And presently, how-
evf~r, the situation has stabilized somewhat. Some of the agencies statewide 
still have no insurance companies to operate with, other than assigned risk. 
And almost all agencies in the inner city are without any insurance companies, 
other than assigned risk to operate with presently. 
SENATOR DAVID ROBERTI: Are you telling me that the insurers ... the 
insurers have told their agents, to stop writing policies? 
MR. STEWART: Yes, indeed. 
SENATOR ROBERTI: In the inner city? 
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MR. STEWART: Yes, indeed. 
SENATOR ROBERTI: So that's much further than what we have been told, 
either by the Insurance Commissioner, or by the insurance companies in their 
public statements. That they are only tailoring around the edges the kind of 
changes. Some are leaving the State, not all. Some according to the public 
evidence or statements are not writing new policies, but are continuing old 
policies. You're saying that especially in the inner city, but statewide, 
the insurers have ... as far as their agents are concerned, pulled out. 
MR. STEWART: That's correct. I think Mark Schmoekor here, could answer 
that specifically in his own stance in Sacramento. 
SENATOR ROBERTI: Well, I think that's, I mean that's far and away 
much further than anything we've heard. And I don't think it's the agents 
fault, but I'm waiting for the insurers to come here, because it's absolutely 
outrageous. 
SENATOR DAVIS: Can you name those? Or do you have a list of those? 
MR. STEWART: I will furnish the Committee a list. I could name some 
off the top, but I would sort of just as soon not do this at this point. It 
might be unfair if we are inaccurate. I can say this, volumewise which is 
extremely important to that consumer, we see now about 5% have withdrawn from 
the State entirely. I'm talking about auto insurance premium volume now. 
About 5% have withdrawn totally from automobile. And don't hold us to the 
eenth degree. I'm giving this as clearly as I can give it. It is reflec-
ted by our members and our statewide collection of information. Twenty per 
cent of the companies withdrew from new preferred auto business. And this 
is very important. The reason that is, of course, is when a company with-
draws from preferred and it flows into its other carriers at a higher rate, 
what we have really seen is a rate increase. Example was the Allstate. 
GEICO for a while and GEICO, I understand, has withdrawn new business 
entirely. But, you saw a rate increase of 20-60% when the carrier stops 
this new business. Now 60% of the companies, and this is probably the thing 
that you will not hear about, in effect, have tightened up their underwriting 
standards. And I don't mean materially, I don't mean they're doing something 
illegal, they are no longer giving the benefit of the doubt on risks. 
CHAI&~N ROBBINS: They may be doing something illegal. If they previously 
had a set of underwriting standards, so that this was the standard, and if you 
were above that line then you qualified for low rate and if you weren't you 
had to pay a higher rate. And then they changed the standard. They're not 
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offering the same coverage, that they previously were offering and they 
very well may be in violation of the law. 
MR. STEWART: I can't, of course, speak to that Senator. And I C3n't 
prove that every one of these ... but our input from their agents, lead us to 
believe this. There are several companies that haven't changed one iota, 
that are doing things the same way as they did a month before. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: And we're going to have those companies here. And 
we're going to have some nice things to say about those companies. 
MR. STEWART: If you would like just a rough evaluation from us, we 
think that the public is currently paying between 5 and 10% more premium 
today, than they were paying on November 8th--averaged out. It does not 
mean every customer--averaged out. 
CHAIRMAN HOBBINS: I understand. Some insurance companies took it as 
a signal to increase rates. That was their reading of the election results. 
MR. STEWART: I think that that would cover our report just on that 
area, except in one particular area that's important. We're desperately 
trying to get some carriers to come in to California. Because we're going 
to have some future problems too. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: I under ... 
MR. STEWART: We're convinced they cannot meet these discounts. Out-
side carriers would at least keep us in the marketplace. So that penalizing 
the carriers doesn't really help in the long run because it will cause other 
carriers not to come into the State. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: The only ... yeah, when it comes to the long run, and 
we write the final legislation that gets written, the only carriers that are 
going to be penalized are the ones that have tried to evade the market, the 
ones that have tried to use, what we consider to be, unfair tactics to shift 
their policyholders into subsidiary's that charge them higher rates. We're 
not going to penalize the companies that comply with the law. 
MR. STEWART: May I make one suggestion? That from a producer's point 
of view, we're convinced that regardless of which one 103 goes, your help 
is just vital at the legislative level, to move in to what's going to be a 
vaccum. We have no reduction of losses under this Proposition. And your 
peop1e can step in, and they're going to have to face this problem, as you 
know, of dealing with the pain and suffering claims building issue and the 
fraud issues. Until they're dealt with we're not going to have reductions. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: If the trial lawyers are smart, and I think they 
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are. They're going to be ready to make some concessions and ready to deal 
with some things such as fast track arbitration for some of the cases, to 
bring down the cost of the system and to make on the long run make it more 
affordable for everyone. 
Let me thank you for coming. 
A quick question from Senator Roberti and then we're going to bring up 
the insurance companies that aren't writing business. 
SENATOR ROBERTI: What I'm interested in, because the point has been 
made, and I don't know if it's the case, that there may have been a conspiracy 
by the insurance companies to evade the law. What I'm interested in are when 
did you get these telephone calls? Were they not to write? Were they roughly 
within the same couple of hours, the same three hours, four hours? Because 
if there is a violation of the law here, it's very important to us, as to 
whether this is all independent action, or whether it was all taken. 
MR. MARK SCHMOEKER:As an insurance agent, we represent eight companies. And 
we got notices, some a few weeks before, some immediately after election, some 
a fews days after election. Out of eight companies, we have four that are 
still .not writing. Two have shut their doors, fired their employees, and 
have left the State, and two are offering renewal only, and no new business. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Thank you. Real quick if you want to get on the 
insurance companies. 
MR. HERB JONES I'm the Vice President of the Los Angeles Inner 
City Brokers and Agents. So I have direct knowledge of how it's affecting 
the inner city. In reply to the question, we received prior to the election 
we received notice from one company that ... not to write any business. That 
has been subsequently withdrawn. In the inner city the only markets that we 
have, as far as liability goes, is the California assigned risk. That's what 
90% of us are writing. The physical damage of the comp and collision is 
written through substandard companies. We had one of our substandard com-
panies, major carriers for us, to withdraw from the market prior to the 
election. Subsequently, they've come back in. This 103 is playing havoc 
with the inner city. And that's where the real difficulty of insurance is, 
and I can see that in the future, if the decision of the Court is adversed 
to the inner city, that's going to cause dire problems. Because there's 
problems out there that you gentlemen probably don't even know about. And 
we're the ones, the brokers and agents, out there fighting this. We hear 
all of this coming from different people about the insurance crisis, but 
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the insurance crisis actually is in the inner city, not out in the suburbs. 
You never hear of insurance problems in Humboldt, Bakersfield counties, up 
in there. They don't have the problems. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Trust me, we have them in the San Fernando Valley. 
MR. JONES You have a few of them. But the inner city is really 
hurting now. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: We have a lot of them. 
MR. ,JONES: And the companies are pulling out, gentlemen. The ... 
SENATOR ROBERTI: San Fernando Valley is a city now, it's not in the 
suburbs anymore. 
MR. JONES: ... inner city, in the inner city right now the assigned 
risk is our primary liability carrier. And take that into consideration, that 
we are going to need some relief in the inner cities. And as of now, I don't 
sec that 103 is really going to do that. 
CHAIHMAN ROBBINS: O.K. Thank you very much. 
We have the ... we've called ... scheduled the insurance companies in the 
order of what we understand companies are doing. There's been a lot of con-
fusion. That's why we have here ... and I'm particularly appreciative of the 
companies who have made major executives available in order to be able to 
answer questions today. Let me ask to come forward, and I think we can take 
them as a group, the companies which as we understand it, are not writing or 
renewing automobile insurance policies in California today. 
Travelers, there are six of these, Ronald Foley, Senior Vice President; 
Century Insurance, John Elsey, Senior Vice President; Pacific National, 
Peter Cazolla, President and Chief Executive Officer; American Home Inter-
national ... Sergeant, we'll need two more chairs, because there's six of these 
American Home International, Patrick Foley, General Counsel; National Union 
Insurance, Patrick Foley, General Counsel; California Insurance Group, Don 
Henderson, President and Chief Executive Officer. If those companies would 
please come forward. 
We have not singled you out to start first ... by announcing you weren't 
writing policies you've earned the spots on the seats that you have. They 
may be n bit warmer than those held by some of the other insurance companies. 
MR. DON HENDERSON: Senator, I'm Don Henderson of California Insurance. 
We are actually not renewing, we should be in the next group I assume. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: O.K. We'll move you down to the next group. Why 
don't you keep a seat in the audience. California Insurance Group. 
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Let me ... the question, it's the same question for each of you. Is 
your company today, at a minimum at least renewing policies for your existing 
policyholders, if not, why not? And how, since there's been a Supreme Court 
ruling that says that you may continue to write policies and may continue to 
charge the same premiums you were charging before the election, how can you 
justify in light of that, a decision not to renew for your existing policy-
holders? Is there a volunteer to speak first? Or shall I pick one? Because 
it's first on our list, Travelers Insurance, Ronald Foley. 
O.K. Sentry Insurance, John Elsey. 
MR. JOHN ELSEY: For the record, and for my father, my name is spelled 
E-1-s-e-y. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: My apologies. We've been working very hectically 
to pull this all together, and we want to get the information as accurate 
as possible. 
MR. ELSEY: Senator Robbins, it's no problem at all. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Is Sentry Insurance writing insurance? 
MR. ELSEY: No it's not. 
Sentry ... I'll read you my statement, let me do it that way, and then 
you can ask me any questions you wish to ask. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Hopefully, it's a brief one. We encourage brief, 
direct statements in this Committee. 
MR. ELSEY: I'll make it as brief as possible. 
During the last several years the Sentry organization has taken actions 
to strengthen its financial position. We've sold assets, such as buildings, 
business and property, and converted them to cash. We've consolidated oper-
ations and closed offices. We've improved efficiency, and made substantial 
reductions in staff. And we've withdrawn from markets and states that were 
unprofitable. California is one of a series of states, whereby the Sentry 
companies have withdrawn from the personalized marketplace. Discussions 
concerning California began well over a year ago. The decision to withdraw 
in September, and on September 26, 1988, we announced our decision that 
Sentry Insurance and Dairyland would discontinue writing all personal line 
business in California. At the time the decision to withdraw from persona 1 
line in California was made, we should notice that it was substantially prior 
to the election here, Sentry and Dairyland notified their policyholders 
of the decision. They also notified their policyholders, that they would be 
non-renewed on the expiration date of their current policy period. This was 
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done to afford them as much time as possible, to replace their market. For 
Dairyland it was necessary to terminate contracts with all their agents. 
Agents were given 180 days/g~ti~?mination. This is 60 days longer than the 
maximum statutory requirement. The additional time was granted to minimize 
market disruption and to allow the agent additional time for servicing their 
customers in locating other insurance. To assist agents, in the transfer of 
business to other insurers, Dairyland offered link, computer to computer 
with other companies willing to accept Dairyland business. During the 
past three years Sentry has ... excuse me ... sustained severe underwriting 
losses in California. Our combined ratios for automobile in 1985 was 119%. 
In 1986, it was 151%. In 1987, it was 121%. And during 1988, we've been 
running at 151%. Dairyland's experience, while somewhat better, 
it's been 118% for the first nine months of 1988, and it's deteriorating. 
Basically, so you'll know the trade ratios that I'm talking about for esti-
mation sake, basically means, for every dollar we take in, we're paying out 
$1.51--so you'll get an idea of what are losses were. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Here, let me ask a question, that may move us on 
very quickly to someone else. 
MR. ELSEY: Sure. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Your decision to leave the market was made prior to 
election day, and announced prior to election day ... 
MR. ESLEY: Yes, it was, September 26th. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: ... well in advance, was something that was something 
that was going to take place regardless of what the election results were. 
MR. ELSEY: That's correct. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Is either of your companies engaging in the practice 
of switching people to a different subsidiary owned by the same ownership? 
MR. ESLEY: No, sir, because we would not have cancelled 1200 agents, 
laid-off 50 direct writing, of our direct writing sales force, and unfor-
tunately laid-off 30 of 32 employees in the State of California, if we were 
to continue that practice. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: O.K. Therefore, really, it would be an objective 
statement to say, really, that you're not on our good guy or bad guy list. 
You wcr out of the market before the election, it was announced before the 
election, and it was not in any way reaction to Prop. 103. 
MR. ELSEY: Let us suffice it to say, we didn't want the cheese, we just 
wanted out of the trap. 
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SENATOR ROBERTI: Well, I'm not going to let you off quite so easy. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: Mr. Chairman. 
SENATOR ROBERTI: I'm not going to let you off quite so easy. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Senator Roberti and then Assemblywoman Waters. 
SENATOR ROBERTI: September 26th the polls were all being taken. 
body had a pretty good idea of which way the election was going to go. 
Every-
So 
I put you on my question mark list. I really think that at that point, 
and we're talking about lots of policies and lots of money, your decision 
was influenced by what you thought the election returns were going to be. 
MR. ELSEY: Senator, if that's what you think. I can't stop what you 
think. 
SENATOR ROBERTI: I said I'd put you on my question mark list. 
MR. ELSEY: O.K. 
SENATOR ROBERTI: But, as an individual ... 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Trust me, the question mark list is not a bad spot 
to be right now. Stay there. 
MR. ELSEY: O.K. 
SENATOR ROBBINS: Maxine. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MAXINE WATERS: Two questions. 
MR. ESLEY: Sure. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: Under the conditions that you just described, 
what happened to your reserves? 
MR. ELSEY: What happened to our reserves? 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: Yes. 
MR. ELSEY: It's too early to tell. O.K. Because we made the decision 
in September, it takes a while for the reserves to run off. What we've been 
experiencing over the past several years is negative development ... excuse me 
... positive development in our reserves, increased loss ratios as a result 
of prior year development. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: So, what you just explained, if I can interpret 
that a little bit is, you have a reserve that has been invested, that has been 
earning. 
MR. ESLEY: Correct. But it's been deficient ... 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: ... just, just a moment. 
MR. ESLEY: Sure. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: The 151, or the 119% to 151% that you described 
over the past few years, is the amount that is calculated prior to your 
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inception of the reserves in that? 
MR. ESLEY: No. It is an amount calculated prior to considerations 
for investment income. But on personal line business, which is typically 
a short-tail business, to use an industry language, in other words we pay 
the claims reasonably quick in relation to other lines. The investment 
income is reasonably small. We're in the neighborhood of 3-5% at best. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: Well, I guess ... 
MR. ESLEY: So you can subtract 5% from that number if you wanted to 
do that. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: All right, so if you calculate, and I'm sorry 
to drag this out, if you calculate your loss as you have done, at this time 
that is not a stable calculation. What you have is a calculation to date, 
or to some point in time, and after you take a look at your reserve and its 
performance etc. and apply it, then you will really know what your loss is, 
or whether or not you really have a loss. 
MR. ESLEY: That's correct. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: All right, so that's very important and I want 
the Committee to understand that. And we should not put a period behind 
what you describe as losses at this point, because we have a whole question 
of what's happening with the reserve and the application of that reserve 
toward what ever the volume was. 
MR. ESLEY: I think it's an appropriate question, but where you can be 
more sure, O.K., is/tRe year's 1985 and 1986. Because we have set up are-
serve and that reserve has a period of time to run off. So that we've had 
the ability to say whether we guessed right at what we were going to pay 
in claims or not. And this case, in Sentry's case, we guessed wrong. 
We've had negative development. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: Well, we still ... the story is, the bottom line 
has not been written completely and I want to hold that in abeyance so that 
as we educate ourselves about your business we can understand a lot better 
what it means when you say loss, as opposed to something else. 
Now, let me ask you one other question. Prior to your making your 
decision, did you contribute to the insurance campaign at all, in an effort 
to either promote your position or defeat any other position? 
MR. ESLEY: Yes. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: How much money? 
MR. ESLEY: Sixty thousand dollars, I believe. 
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I do not know the exact 
number. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: Was the $60,000 taken from what would have been 
a little bit of profit, or I mean, where did you get that money? 
MR. ESLEY: Out of the general funds. If we happen to make a profit 
that year, I guess you could attribute it to profit. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Let me ask a question. If you are leaving, you con-
tributed $60,000 to I presume the insurance industry campaign for Prop. 104? 
MR. ESLEY: Right. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: If you are leaving, why did you contribute $60,000? 
MR. ESLEY: We are a member of the Alliance of Insurers, all right, and 
as a part of being a membership, or member of that organization, we're assessed 
for activities like this. And that was part of our assessment. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: Mr. Chairman, just one more question, which I hope 
will continue to shed some light as we look at how we operate here, and how 
we calculate losses and profits. Does the $60,000 expenditure fall into a 
particular category of expenditures for your insurance company that would help 
to give us some understanding about how you calculate your losses and your ex-
penditures. Are there other sums of money that would be spent that would fall 
into this category, that would cause you to perhaps, have losses considering 
that you've had losses when you write the bottom line? 
MR. ESLEY: They would end up in our expenses, probably in this case 
as association fees. They are a part of our expenses, yes. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: We'll continue on, I just want to suggest as much as 
possible, you may want to save your fire for the people who are just about 
to testify, are the ones that announced right after the election that they 
were leaving. But if want the question from Mr. Elsey, ask Mr. Elsey. 
SENATOR BOATWRIGHT: There's just a point that's unclear. Have you 
withdrawn your company from writing all insurance in California or just the 
automobile insurance? How about fire, homeowners, casualty, liability, all 
the others? 
MR. ESLEY: All personal. lines, not commercial lines. 
SENATOR BOATWRIGHT: How about homeowners? 
MR. ESLEY: Homeowners, yes sir. 
SENATOR BOATWRIGHT: You have? But when you say personalized, if a 
person has a business and they want to insure with you, you still insure 
them? 
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MR. ESLEY: We still will insure them, yes sir. 
SENATOR ROBBINS: Senator Davis. 
SENATOR DAVIS: How many states do you operate in? 
MR. ESLEY: Approximately forty, we're licensed in all states. 
SENATOR DAVIS: O.K. Have you applied the same criteria to underwrite 
all the lines, as you do in the other states? 
MR. ESLEY: Yes, sir. We withdrew from Louisiana and the state of ... 
and the District of Columbia for precisely the same reasons. 
SENATOR DAVIS: And why, why ... what's the opinion of the company on why 
it was unprofitable to do business in California? 
MR. ESLEY: Here's something I do whenever I visit a state, I enjoy 
riding with the taxi cab driver. First of all, they're probably the world's 
greatest experts on automobile insurance because they're on the road all day. 
Secondly, I also think the knowledge of the western world is vested in a 
taxi cab driver. So, last night on the way in, I asked the cab driver has 
there been any hubhub about insurance around here in the State of California? 
And obviously he had his views on it. But it's kind of interesting to say, 
and it is his statement, not mine, after driving in Los Angeles for a long 
time his opinion was that"drivers in Los Angeles,"not to pick on Los Angeles 
per se,"should not be insured, they should be treated.'' (chuckles) This is 
his quote now. To carry it a little further, what he was basically saying 
to me is, is sort of like when I use to work in Chicago and I had to walk 
from the train station to my office, because of the crowds and feeling like 
an ant, I was angry when I got to my office, the cars trying to run into 
you, bumping into people. You've got a very crowded situation in this city 
and people drive to work, I don't know how they can do it, and keep their 
sanity. I also asked the cab driver, had he seen any accidents that day. 
Fifteen. So, that's my feeling on ... 
SENATOR DAVIS: How does all that reflect into profit or loss? 
MR. ESLEY: Pardon me? 
SENATOR DAVIS: How does all that reflect into profit or loss? 
MR. ESLEY: The more accidents we have, and the more severe those acci-
dents arc, the more our loss cost go up. Therefore, we have to raise pre-
miums. Often the ability to raise premium is mitigated by public pressure, 
regulation, other items. So, we cannot get enough rate in many instances 
to cover our losses. 
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SENATOR DAVIS: O.K. Thank you. 
SENATOR ROBBINS: Thank you. 
Pacific National Insurance, Peter Cazolla. 
MR. PETER CAZOLLA: Yes, sir. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Is your company currently renewing the policies of 
existing policyholders. 
MR. CAZOLLA: Yes, we are. We are renewing our policies up until April 
lOth of 1989. Personal lines and homeowner. Excuse me, automobile and home-
owner. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: O.K. So, policies that come due between now and 
April 10, you are renewing? 
MR. CAZOLLA: Yes, sir. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Policies that come due after April 10, you're not 
renewing? 
MR. CAZOLLA: That's correct. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: When was this announced? 
MR. CAZOLLA: We made this ... we made the announcement on November 9th, 
1988. And what I'd like to mention to you, sir, and Committee members, as 
to why we did this. Over the past six years Pacific National has incurred 
operating losses in personal, our personal lines both to business, which 
includes both automobile and homeowners. The past six years, on an overall 
basis, our company has lost $17,413,000 and that is net operating loss, and 
that includes investment income. The continuing losses in these areas have 
caused management of Pacific National to continually reevaluate its partici-
pation in the personal lines marketplace in California. Similarly to 
Sentry, we made very significant consolidation efforts to reduce our expenses. 
We had branch offices located in Fresno, Los Angeles, San Diego, Santa Ana. 
We have since 1986 consolidated all those offices into one central location 
in Tustin, California. We do service the entire State, to reduce our opera-
ting costs. We have, also, looked at our experiences in our automobile and 
homeowner lines, and we have taken actions both, from an underwriting stand-
point to try to do a better job of selecting the risks that we underwrite, 
and commit our surplus to, so that we can attempt to make it, at worse, a 
break even. We also have increased rates, to offset the costs, increasing 
costs, with regard to claims that have been submitted to our company. The 
company recognizes that it has obligations to its policyholders and has at-
tempted to remain in these markets. However, Pacific National has obliga-
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tions to its stockholders, as well. Under the arbitrary rate rollbacks 
mandated by Proposition 103 there is no hope that results will improve for 
Pacific National. Proposition 103 would require Pacific National to reduce 
our automobile rates, including the 20% mandatory reduction, by 35%. And 
we would have to reduce our homeowner rates by 20%. The good driver dis-
count mandated by Proposition 103 does not take effect until November 9th, 
1989. And that would just further exacerbate our position as far as re-
duction and rates are concerned in the automobile market. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Let me interrupt and ask one question. 
MR. CAZOLLA: Sure. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: The California Supreme Court has stayed Proposition 
103. 
MR. CAZOLLA: Yes, sir. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: The California Supreme Court has said that you are 
free to continue renewing policies at the premiums that you choose to charge. 
With that in effect, since Prop. 103 is in effect, is not in effect and the 
Supreme Court has stayed it, what is the justification for leaving? 
MR. CAZOLLA: Well, if we go back to our prior experience, I did mention 
we have continually been reevaluating our position in the personal lines 
marketplace. Unfortunately, we have tried to get ourselves to a point where 
we can continue in the marketplace. A company, with the size of ours, with 
our surplus right around $12,000,000, this decrease that we could potentially 
incur betting on the Supreme Court ruling, there's no guarantee that the 
Supreme Court is going to rule in favor of staying the 20% rollback. They 
may decide that the 20% rollback is, in fact, constitutional and we will, in 
fact, have to rollback our rates. From a profitability standpoint, what that 
would do is compound the losses we're already experiencing in personal lines. 
And we did a quick calculation just based ... using our 1987 premiums, if we 
took that 35% and 20% rollback, it would cost our company 2n additional 
$1,825,000 profit. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: What was your total 1987 premiums? 
MR. CAZOLLP.: Our total 1987 premiums, sir, were in personal lines were 
$5,918,000. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: O.K. And you would therefore have approximately 
slightly over a million dollars in rollbacks? 
MR. CAZOLLA: Yes, sir. We would have a million ... it would cost us a 
rnillion ... well, our rollback, with the reduced premiums, it would cost us net 
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bottom line $1,825,000 in addition to loss, to our company under Prop. 103. 
We would still be losing money at current rates. We are losing money right 
now at current rates. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: O.K. What would happen, from an economic standpoint, 
if the final legislation passed, places a penalty assessment on any company 
that refuses to renew business, subsequent to the date of the election of the 
50% of premium amount and requires the company to offer a renewal option to 
policyholder, and if the policyholder has gone to a different company and 
paid a higher premium, to pay the policyholder the differential. What kind 
of economic impact would that have? 
MR. CAZOLLA 
business. 
Well, obviously, sir, that would put our company out of 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Wouldn't that be a worse impact than to continue to 
renew insurance for your existing policyholders? 
MR. CAZOLLA: Yes, however, we are again trying to anticipate what's going 
to occur in the future. Not understanding that, would be a potentiality in 
understanding, if that was a very significant potentiality, we probably would 
withdraw from the marketplace completely. Because it would be, as far as an 
officer of this company, senior officer of this company, I could not commit 
the stockholders funds, as well as, the company assets to a proposition where-
by we would actually be losing a significant amount of money. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: But, the point I'm trying to stress, gently, is that 
by making the decision to not renew, and all be it yours being a small company, 
by making the decision to not renew, you may be placing your stockholders at 
greater economic jeopardy, then if you continue to write policies. Because 
I have to tell you in terms of the assumptions to make, the political momem-
tum in this State is in the direction of implementing the will of the people. 
And as Senator Roberti and I announced a week ago, and I presume you may be 
aware of our announcement, that the companies that did not resume ... at a 
mininum renewing the policies of their existing policyholders, would face 
a penalty assessment of up to 50% of premium dollars, in addition to being 
required to either renew the policies or to pay the policyholder the dif-
ference, if he's paying a higher premium with a different company. 
MR. CAZOLLA: I was not aware of that announcement. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Well, I guess, David we didn't have enough press 
attention on that, but we did make that announcement a week ago today. My 
apologies that you weren't aware of it, but I would urge you to give some 
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consideration as to what you want to do. 
Senator Davis. 
SENATOR DAVIS: I'd just like to say that I seriously disagree with 
trying to penalize people retroactively, it's unconstitutional, and to 
coerce people into doing business in California and I want to tell you 
there would be a lot of legislators who would not vote for such a law, and 
I think we have a Governor who would veto such a law. 
SENATOR ROBERTI: Fine, fine, Senator, then let them not vote for it 
and let the Governor veto it. I would/Egg16~; however, that your district 
voted for Proposition 103, and in the last analyses they are the bosses, the 
people, not the Governor, not our colleagues. And I want to get back to 
a point that Mr ... I'm sorry I forgot your name ... Elsey said and also in re-
sponse to this gentleman. The perspective I would say is, from my 
vantage point, incorrect. You spoke about the taxi driver, and I agree, 
they are repositories of an awful lot of intelligence in our society. My 
wife's back has been dislocated, so I've been doing the shopping. The woman 
in the shopping line, also, is a repository of a lot of intelligence in our 
society. You know what galls them, and bugs them more than anything? It 
isn't the insurance rate now, it's the arrogance and arbitrariness of the 
insurance companies and of those legislators who totie to them all the time, 
even when their districts vote the other way. They're tired of it. They're 
tired of it. You know, I voted against Proposition 103--I hate to say it, 
but I did. That's not the point now. I have a responsibility to try to 
lement what the people have indicated they want, in some areas overwhelm-
ingly, the ballot box has to be the integral aspect of running a democracy, 
the people in the last instance are the bosses. And for this attempt by the 
insurance industry, with those billions of dollars to try and intimidate the 
voters because they happen to see it differently, I mean it absolutely con-
me. And it confounds, I think, the taxi driver and woman in the 
line every bit as much. And we have to respond to them. I can't 
understand this desire to punish so quickly, while you're even going to 
court, you're trying to implement your part of the democratic system, but 
you don't want the public to have its right in the democratic system as well. 
Sc1, L as a legislator, and I don't know what the outcomes going to be, I'm 
going to do every bit as much as I can, as the leader of the Senate, r'm 
going to let my colleagues know how I stand on this issue, when they vote 
for me, if they don't want me, they don't have to vote for me. That the 
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time has come to implement the ballot box. It has nothing to do with pre-
miums. It has something to do with premiums, but more, it has to with our 
democratic system and how we're going to respond when our constituents vote 
one way, Senator Davis, and then we want to do something else. I want to 
know what your program, Senator Davis, is going to be get at these insurance 
companies that are leaving the State. Or is it going to be business as 
usual? 
SENATOR DAVIS: I would ... I'll respond. I will never vote for anything 
that forces #1) that has price control, and #2) forces people 
to do business. They are totalitarian states that do that, this is a consti-
tutional democracy. 
SENATOR ROBERTI: Only in totalitarian states, is when the people speak 
and the people who are in the governments, like the supreme Soviet, don't do 
what the people want them to do. That's a totalitarian state. 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: One comment, Mr. Chairman, if I may? 
SENATOR ROBBINS: Yes, to a ... to help move our good friends, who in the 
end both have a very fine view ... both voted no on 103. Both want to implement 
the law. Both will work with us and the people to do that. 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: Yeah, I need to ask a couple of questions. 
First of all, 103 does permit you to open your books, and if in fact, 
you are losing money, you don't have to continue to abide by 103. How do 
you respond to that? 
MR. CAZOLLA: Well, sir, when you take a look at 103, the actual implemen-
tation of 103 becomes a very, very difficult administrative task to immedi-
ately,as of November 8th, we had four initiatives on the ballot, that as a 
company such as ours, and of our size, would have to put all of the administra-
tive mechanisms in place to respond to that. We are now preparing our-
selves, and we are prepared, to do whatever the judgment of the Supreme 
Court rules. We felt that we could not take that rollback and again imple-
ment it that quickly. We felt a more common business sense, and maybe just 
human logic would tell us that, we need some time to get the gears in place 
so that we could administer it. As far as the rollback is concerned, I think 
again, it does ... during that period of time we have ... if I understand the law 
correctly, and I know there's a lot of still questions about interpretation, 
we would have to take the rollback immediately, and then we would file for 
our relief from the rollback. However, during that period of time, we would 
in effect, have to be incurring, the way we understand it, that loss until 
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iudgment is passed, as to whether we can in fact, not ... or receive exemption 
from the rollback. So that was our concern there. 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: Did you indicate that until April of '89, you were 
renewing those policyholders •.. 
MR. CAZOLLA: Yes, sir. 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: ... at the same rates? 
MR. CAZOLLA: Yes, sir. We are ... 
SEANTOR ROSENTHAL: So you do have time? You requested a period of time 
in order to administratively handle that situation, but you've already in-
dicated that you've already given yourself some time, because you've agreed 
to renew policies until April. 
MR. CAZOLLA: That's correct. 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: The other question I'd like to ask and when each 
of you, and I don't want to have to ask each one of you individually, but 
would you also tell me whether you're going to stay in the State of Cali-
fornia for any other insurance? Or, for example, could the Legislature say 
to you, if you don't sell auto insurance, 'cause maybe we can't force you to 
stay in business, you can't sell anything. How do you respond to that? 
MR. CAZOLLA: Well, sir, it's happened in other states, and it's a real 
issue and if it's in the judgment and the wisdom of the legislators of this 
State to rule that way, then we would have to make a business decision accord-
ingly. 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: Would you a •.. 
MR. ELSEY Same, same thing. 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: Same thing. O.K. Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: O.K. Senator McCorquodale. 
SENATOR McCORQUODALE: I still don't think that ... we keep asking it, but 
I don't really think they've said it. On November 8th there was an election. 
On November 8th, 9th or shortly after that you knew what the results were. 
And you indicated that you were making the changes, administrative changes 
to live with the regulations that have come out of this. 
MR. CAZOLLA: From November 9th forward. 
SENATOR McCORQUODALE: Right. 
MR. CAZOLLA: We are making arrangements for those, we do write com-
mercial lines as well, and we are making arrangements for the commercial 
lines book of business. 
SENATOR McCORQUODALE: But if you ... but on November 9th you could of 
-26-
filed an application with the Commissioner to review your rates to see if 
you'd be losing money at the 20% reduction. But you haven't done that, now 
why didn't you do that? 
MR. CAZOLLA: We are in the process of doing that, sir. 
SENATOR McCORQUODALE: Well, you didn't indicate ... you actually are 
doing the work that's necessary to file? 
MR. CAZOLLA: Yes, sir. 
SENATOR McCORQUODALE: And have you notified the Commissioner that you 
intend to file? 
MR. CAZOLLA: No, we have not yet, sir. 
SENATOR McCORQUODALE: Have you notified the ... 
MR. ELSEY: Sir, we left the State prior to the law. 
SENATOR McCORQUODALE: ... oh, so you were not ... so you don't intend 
to come back anyway. 
It just seems to me though, that the ... it's not that clear, that you're 
saying that you intend to provide the Insurance Commissioner with the data 
necessary to make that rate reduction. And if that's the case, and you really 
are losing money, you're sure you're going to be losing money, then I don't 
understand why you wouldn't go ahead and be renewing long term rates. 
MR. CAZOLLA: Because we've taken the marketing tact, with regard to 
continuing operating in the commercial lines marketplace. We're really ad-
dressing two lines of business, two classes, the commercial lines versus the 
personal lines or automobile and homeowner. We've made the decision in the 
automobile and homeowner line, we just cannot afford to continue writing 
those types of business ... that type of business. We cannot do that profit-
ably. 
SENATOR McCORQUODALE: Then if you can't, then you don't have to. If 
you really can't, then you're not going to have to. You can change your 
rates, you can increase your rates. Understand? 
MR. CAZOLLA: Yes, sir. But retrospectively, we still ... we were losing 
business, we were evaluating our personal lines results prior to the election, 
and we were borderline getting out of the marketplace. However, we felt that 
we would wait ... wait until the outcome of the election, to determine whether 
we could live under a different scenario, other than the Prop. 103, which is 
a very drastic arbitrary rollback for us, in the way of reducing income. 
Which was, more or less, kind of like the straw that broke the camel's back 
from our perspective, in looking forward prospectively. 
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CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Under Prop. 103, Section 1861.02 ... Sub. B, reads 
in part: An insurer shall not refuse to offer and sell a good driver dis-
count policy to any person who meets the standards of this subdivision. 
Would it be your interpretation of that language, that your company under 
Proposition 103, if you continue to be a licensed insurer in the State of 
California, can deny coverage to anyone who meets the good driver require-
ments of that section? 
MR. CAZOLLA: No, sir. No, sir. If Prop. 103 passes intact, we would 
comply with those renewal policies we are renewing up until April lOth. And we 
would also apply those standards to our automobile book of business. So, no 
we do not have intent not to comply. We are not insinuating that. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: O.K. And I appreciate your statement that you will 
be evaulating the ..• your decision to not renew. My advice to you is, in the 
lonq run, if you want my political prognosis of where it will go, the type 
of penalty assessment that Senator Roberti and I have been talking about 
will pass. And that the best economic decision would be to continue to 
renew policies and to work within the law. 
'rrave1:;rs Insurance. Ronald Foley, Senior Vice President. 
M.R. RONALD E. FOLEY: Yes, sir. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Travelers is a fairly large company. Are you at 
this time renewing policies, automobile insurance policies, for your drivers 
in the State of California? 
MR. FOLEY: No, we are not. We are not writing new business, and we 
are not renewing policies. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: O.K. And as of what date did you cease renewing? 
MR. FOLEY: We commenced that action on November 7th. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: The day before the election? 
MR. FOLEY: The day before the election. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Was that ..• was that action in any way related to 
the fact that the election was the next day? 
MR. FOLEY: That action was related to the fact that we understood 
California law prior to the election. And we decided that it was in our 
interest because of the threat of 103 to execute every option we could to 
protect our shareholders. We began the withdrawal process on November 7th. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Did you announce publicly on November 7 to your 
policyholders and did you inform the Insurance Commissioner in the State of 
California? 
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MR. FOLEY: We informed the Insurance Commissioner of the State of 
California, on Monday morning ... 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Monday morning, November 7th . 
MR. FOLEY: ... Monday morning, November 7th, that we would not renew--
that we were going to start a nonrenewal process for our California custo-
mers. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Did you announce it publicly? ... 
MR. FOLEY: No, we did not. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: ... so that the voters would be able to know ... 
MR. FOLEY: No, we did not. We had no press release. We did tell our 
agents. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Pardon? 
MR. FOLEY: We did tell our agency plant a) on Monday afternoon. 
Would you ask him to speak in the mike? 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Yeah, if you could ... the State of California's poor 
too, so we have a poor mike system. 
MR. FOLEY: We did tell our agency plant on Monday afternoon, that we 
had come to that conclusion. But we had no public announcement. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: O.K. So if I were a Travelers policyholder and my 
policy came due on ... came up for renewal on November lOth, what would you 
have done? 
MR. FOLEY: I think the earliest policies that we nonrenewed had effec-
tive dates of about December 25th, December 26th. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: That's because of the provisions of the Brown-
Robbins Consumers Insurance Act? 
MR. FOLEY: Exactly. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: O.K. So, therefore, you could not legally without 
being in violation of California law, commence nonrenewals earlier than that. 
It wasn't, it wasn't ... being a good guy. 
MR. FOLEY: We are complying with the law in terms of the notification 
that we give our customers for nonrenewal. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: In light of the fact that the California Supreme 
Court has issued a stay on Proposition 103, has that in any way caused you 
to reevaluate your decision? 
MR. FOLEY: It hasn't. That certainly has thrown more uncertainty into 
the equation, and we believe that the risk that we face in the event that 
Proposition 103, is indeed, constitutional that we cannot entertain that 
risk. 
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CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: O.K. What is .•. what's the annual premium volume 
that you do in the State of California in auto? 
MR. FOLEY: In 1987 we did $47,000,000. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: You are continuing to write other lines of insurance 
in the State of California? 
MR. FOLEY: We are continuing to write some lines. We have withdrawn 
from the personal automobile business. We are not writing homeowners bus-
iness. And we are not writing some commercial lines, mostly at the low end 
of the scale. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: But you are still writing substantial commercial 
lines? 
MR. F'OLEY: Substantial commercial lines, employee benefits, life insur-
ance, that's true. 
1987? 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: What was your combined premium volume on those in 
MR. FOLEY: $1.35 billion. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: So, you're a fairly large company? 
MR. FOLEY: Yes, we are. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: What is the total shareholder value of the company? 
MR. FOLEY: About $4.3 billion. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: O.K. So, you have a $4.--with a $4.3 billion share-
holder value--r think it's a fair statement/t~arga~Ef.avelers is a solvent 
company. In fact, very solvent. 
MR. FOLEY: Indeed we are. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: And since you are continuing to write in excess of 
a billion dollars a year of premium in California, you clearly continue to 
be under the jurisdiction of the laws of the State of California, as passed 
the California Legislature. 
MR. FOLEY: That's certainly true. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: And if the legislation Senator Roberti and I 
are promoting, that will place a penalty assessment on those companies that 
not renew ... that are refusing to renew after the election, that would cost 
your company a very large amount of money? 
MR. FOLEY: It would. I believe that each line has to stand on its own 
merits. I do not believe in subsidizing lines of business. I would not ask 
our customers across the country to subsidize the California auto problem. 
And I would not ask our ... your people in California to subsidize other states. 
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But the fact that we are ... we will lose money in auto, we will lose money 
in homeowners, tells me that the responsibility I have to our shareholders 
that I cannot continue to do business in California under 103. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: Mr. Chairman. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Assemblywoman Waters. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: The statement of this gentleman relative to 
each line standing on its own merit--some quest:ions I've been raising about 
reserve and some other kinds of things, I think will help to get us a clearer 
picture. How much do you set aside in a reserve? How do you calculate that? 
Could you describe that? And describe it in terms of what you set aside for 
reserve for each line, or do you reserve one amount for all lines? How do 
you do that? 
MR. FOLEY: I don't think this is the forum for discussion of reserve 
techniques. I will tell you ... 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: Just a minute. I don't want you to give defini-
tion to this hearing and whether it is, or is not a forum for. One of the 
things that I'm convinced about is, the fact that, this Legislature under-
stands far too little about insurance companies and how they operate. Some 
into 
of us who have been delving/the questions of profitability and how it all 
works, thinks reserves are extremely important. And particularly since 
you've made the statement, each line must stand on its own merit, than I 
think it is more than proper to talk about reserves and understand that, in 
relationship to how much you set aside for each line, or how do you do it, 
and how much is it? In general terms ... I don't want a specific amount. 
MR. FOLEY: I understand the question. We set aside the amount in 
reserves that we ultimately think that we will have to pay out in terms of 
claim costs. It's an ultimate estimate on our part based on statistical 
data about what the ultimate claim ... 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: What is the relationship between the percentage 
that you set aside for personal lines, as opposed to the other lines? 
MR. FOLEY: It depends on the underlying loss data. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: Which means in lay terminology, that you are 
setting aside a generous portion of your so-called profits in the personal 
line in the reserve accounts? Right? 
MR. FOLEY: No, no, what we are doing is, we are establishing reserves 
to meet our obligations to policyholders, in the event ... 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: Well, then a reasonable person could conclude 
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based on everybody's statements about your so-called losses and your risk 
in the personal lines, that you protect yourself well with what you set 
aside in the reserve. Is that ... could a reasonable person conclude that? 
MR. FOLEY: I think a better conclusion would be that we are trying 
to protect our policyholders. We provide policyholders ... 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: O.K. Whoever you protect, you do protect them 
with that reserve set aside. 
MR. FOLEY: You bet. We need to have that money in the event the year 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: All right. Well, let's take a look at that. If, 
in fact, you consider your personal lines high risk, and you set aside the 
appropriate amount of percentage in the reserve for that, in that override 
reserve you invest that reserve. Is that correct? Or you could. You 
do. 
MR. FOLEY: No, that's correct. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: All right. When you invest that reserve do you 
then break down the profit from that investment, so that you would apply 
the appropriate amount to the personal line, because of ... which means that 
MR. FOLEY: Yes, we do. Yes, we do, ma'am. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: ... you should be getting more back, because you've 
got a disapportionate amount of money on the personal line side invested in 
that reserve, is that correct? 
MR. FOLEY: I wish it worked that way. It doesn't work that way. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: Why doesn't it work that way? 
MR. FOLEY: I run the writing losses in California last year in the auto 
line, over the past three years, for about $12,000,000 and our investment 
income was just barely sufficient to off-set that $12,000,000 underwriting 
loss. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: Well, I don't want to get into a discussion on 
how good or bad you are at investments. I mean, you may make the decision 
to do anything from invest in high risk portfolios to jumbo certificates, 
I don't know that. I do know that the history of the State of California 
shows us that in a period of time when your investments were real bad 
and you lost money, the premiums went up. We know that. And I don't want 
to discuss whether or not you're good at that, whether or not you do a great 
job at that. What I want to discuss is, if you have a disapportionate 
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amount of money in your reserve fund in order to protect the high risk 
of your personal lines, do you allocate to your personal lines, the appro-
priate amount of the profit to offset the losses in that line? That's 
all I want to know. 
MR. FOLEY: The reserves that we establish, in all of our businesses, 
we think are adequate. They are not overstated, they are not understated, 
we believe that they are adequate. When we do our profitability analyses 
and when we report our data to the State of California, the investment 
income that is attracted by those investments of policyholder reserves is 
allocated back to the appropriate line. That is, indeed, how we measure 
profitability. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: One more question on the, and it's only fair--
you weren't here, I asked it of the first gentleman that testified. Did 
you contribute to the the campaign to either promote your position or to 
fight against one of the other propositions that you did not support--or 
you wanted to see defeated? 
MR. FOLEY: Yes, we did. We ... 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: How much did you contribute? 
MR. FOLEY: $1.2 million. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: $1.2 million? Where did that money come from? 
Could you describe in terms of how you look at the categories of expendi-
tures,/~Bet~u~ot~~u~~~%eh~~~p~~fue from? Would that have come from what 
would be under general category of profitability? 
MR. FOLEY: That would be included in profitability. It's a cost of 
doing business to defend our right to do business in this State under an 
environment that we want to participate in. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS. So, if you then make your calculations on your 
personal line and the appropriate amount of loss was assigned to personal 
lines, if you were losing 19¢ on a dollar, or 20¢ on a dollar, and you spent 
money, you'd have to assign part of that expense also to the personal line, 
because that's a cost of doing business. 
MR. FOLEY: Part of that expense would be assigned to my profit center 
in personal lines, that's exactly right. Let me tell you, as well as that 
$1.3 million we spent, and we spent that because we wanted to compete in 
California. We do not want to leave California. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: You really don't have to. 
MR. FOLEY: We believe that under 103 that we are compelled to compete. 
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f icult as the decision is for us to make. But, yes, we did 
$1.2 million. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: What was that a Freudian slip? You said under 103 
you feel you're compelled to compete? 
MR. FOLEY: No, compelled to leave. I'm sorry. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: No, I think that perhaps that could be a correct 
statement. As you know, we do have a system in California that allows the 
kinds of decisions to be made that you've henrl described here , about 
a number of companies making certain decisions ... but go ahead. 
MR. FOLEY: But what I wanted to tell you, the real issue here is the 
issue of costs. And indeed we did spend $1.2 million supporting our pro-
position in terms of no-fault. But I want to tell you that, also, over the 
past two years at the Travelers we have spent $45 million strengthening 
our c staff so that could bring to customers, better service and lower 
costs, so that they can get their cars back on the road quicker, so they aren't 
as inconvenienced, and we have spent that money as well. So, while we have 
our position, which we have every right to do, we have also in-
vested heavily to improve our customer service and lower claim cost for our 
customers. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: Listen, and I don't take issue with you and let 
you describe that you have done over well in your company. Let me tell you 
what I take issue with. I take issue with the fact that this Legislature 
does not understand what profitability is. I take issue with the fact that 
do not understand--such as I was attempting to go through with you 
about your reserves, what percent is set aside for those reserves are, how 
you invest them, what profit you make, how much of the risk and/or the pro-
is assigned back to your personal lines--that's what I take, I have 
ions with. And the reason I have great question with it is, because 
am not convinced that the information that we would like to have from you 
has ever been forthcoming. As you know, we attempted to put together a 
to that information in the California State Assembly the 
Rules Committee. Insurance companies did not cooperate. I am not convinced 
that the Insurance Commissioner has the data, or the understanding in my 
estimation, about how to evaluate what you call profits or no profits. And 
that's my ... and when I start to ask you about how much did you contribute 
can't think of everything that can fall into the category of expenditures 
for you, whether it's investment, whether it's buying a new building, I 
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don't know what it is. But it is very difficult, first of all, for me to 
believe that you have continued to do business at a great loss. It is dif-
ficult for me to believe or understand, that you have assigned to this 
line of insurance the same ability to earn money, as perhaps to other por-
tions of the insurance company, the commercial lines etc. This information 
is fuzzy. I don't think it's well understood by anybody. And it is hard 
for us to look at the bottom line, and to see for example that you in 1986 
had $196 million in net income, and you paid no federal taxes. And I should 
feel sorry for you? 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Mr. Foley, Senator Boatwright has a question and 
then I have a comment. 
MR. FOLEY: Yes, sir. 
SENATOR BOATWRIGHT: I'm trying to get to the point on this, and get 
some answers out of you. 
What is the correct name of your company? Is it Travelers Indemnity 
Company? What's the correct ... 
MR. FOLEY: Our umbrella corporation is called the Travelers Corporation, 
and underneath that corporation we have a whole variety of insurance 
subsidiaries. 
SENATOR BOATWRIGHT: Is there one called Travelers Indemnity Company? 
MR. FOLEY: The Travelers Indemnity Company is one of them. 
SENATOR BOATWRIGHT: O.K. Is that the insurance company in California 
that writes automobile insurance? 
MR. FOLEY: That's ... that's one of them. 
SENATOR BOATWRIGHT: O.K. Based upon, again, the figures from the 
California Department of Insurance, it shows that at least in 1986 your net 
income was $306 million plus dollars. Does that sound about right? 
MR. FOLEY: In that particular legal entity? 
SENATOR BOATWRIGHT: Yes. 
MR. FOLEY: I don't have that statement in front of me. 
SENATOR BOATWRIGHT: What is your ... what are your total surplus accounts, 
as of the end of 1987? Just now, just this one company. Not all of 
Travelers, just Travelers Indemnity Company. 
MR. FOLEY: I don't know that number. 
SENATOR BOATWRIGHT: What about $1,361,000,000 sound about right to you? 
MR. FOLEY: If that's what the statement says, that's what it was. 
SENATOR BOATWRIGHT: And that includes your surplus account, that in-
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eludes your reserves, does it not? 
MR. FOLEY: That's our equity account if you're calling that surplus. 
That's our capital account. 
SENATOR BOATWRIGHT: All right, your capital account. Let me say this, 
it seems like we can see a pattern developing here--you don't want to write 
automobile insurance in California in compliance with Proposition 103. 
But it seems like even the company that is totally withdrawn, hasn't really 
totally withdrawn because they want to write business insurance in California. 
And there's lots of lines of insurance in California that you're still in. 
There's fire, there's homeowners, just a small list that occurred to me 
while I was sitting here, liability, life, mortgage, disability, commercial, 
and other kinds. But you don't--you want to stay in those businesses, but 
you don't want to stay in the business of writing automobile insurance under 
103. And I don't understand that because if you go to the Proposition it 
says, "No rate shall be approved or disjunctive remain in effect which is 
inadequate." And it tells the way that you can go in and show that it's 
inadequate before the Insurance Commissioner. And prove your point and get 
the rates that you need, so that they aren't inadequate, which will not lead 
to insolvency. For the life of me, I don't understand, except for the reason 
of not wanting to reveal your books to the Insurance Commissioner, why you're 
not willing to do this. And I'll tell you what/thtgie~mmittee, Mr. Chairman, 
should do. I think the answer here is this, no company that was doing busi-
ness, and we pick a date sometime this year, because when they saw it was 
going to pass, you know like Travelers did it on November 7th, Century did 
it September 21st, I think we ought to pick a date and say, you can't write 
any kind of insurance in the State of California unless you comply with the 
provisions of Proposition 103 and write automobile insurance. Because they're 
taking the lucrative market here, and don't tell me fire isn't a lucrative 
market, look at it. I can't think of a home, I know they burn, but now with 
the waitings of the American Fire Bureau and how far a fire station has to 
be, and the equipment that has to be there, and the sprinklers, and the new 
doing away with shake shingles, I mean there's a lucrative market out there 
on life insurance, where you're guaranteed a rate of return, you're abso-
lutely guaranteed a rate of return under our provisions here. So, I say 
this, let's pass a bill that if you want to do business in California and 
on a date that we pick, say September 1st, 1988, you were writing automobile 
insurance, you can't write any insurance in California, unless you comply 
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with the provisions of 103. Because you can't take the good and leave the 
bad. And I think that would be a damn good bill for this Committee to 
sponsor, and that will solve a lot of problems. Then if you don't want 
to do business in California, and want to give up the lucrative stuff, 
because you did make a profit here in 1986, $306 million--Travelers Indem-
nity--then I say, fine, go somewhere else and give up the lucrative market. 
I think that's the answer. And I'll be glad Mr. Chairman if you'll sponsor 
that, I'll go on as coauthor. I think that would solve a big problem. 
MR. FOLEY: Senator Boatwright, I would just want to remind you that 
the profit number you read was a country wide profits and not just Cali-
fornia. I also want to tell you that we have done more than withdrawn from 
the auto line, we have also withdrawn from the homeowners line, under 103. 
SENATOR BOATWRIGHT: The fire? 
MR. FOLEY: Homeowners. 
SENATOR BOATWRIGHT: Fire? Fire? I want an answer from this gentle-
man because I've been dealing with him, just like Ms. Waters, for 16 years 
and I've never gotten an answer directly from him yet. 
Fire? 
MR. FOLEY: We have withdrawn all lines, all forms, for the Travelers 
Indemnity Company in California. 
SENATOR BOATWRIGHT: All ... everything? You're not writing mortgage 
insurance? 
MR. FOLEY: In the Indemnity Company, I don't believe we wrote mortgage 
insurance. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: But the total premium dollar of the lines that 
you're continuing to write in California, if I correctly understood what 
you said before, based on 1987 premium is still in excess of a billion 
dollars a year? 
MR. FOLEY: That's true. 
SENATOR BOATWRIGHT: Mr. Chairman. 
The real key here is this is a subsidiary of an umbrella company. And 
what they do is that they segment it, Travelers Indemnity will write one 
line, another subsidiary will write the homeowners, another subsidiary will 
write life insurance, and we've got to make this bill apply to subsidiaries 
and all their parents, and all their affiliate subsidiaries. And by God, 
I'll guarantee you they'll come in and write automobile insurance, because 
this is a lucrative market for all the other forms of insurance. And you 
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know it, and so do I. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: Great, I want to be a coauthor. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Good. 
Mr. Foley, a number of ... a few years ago Travelers Insurance triggered 
the malpractice crisis in California when it pulled out of the malpractice 
market for doctors and hospitals. As a result of that malpractice crisis 
there were a number of insurance reforms, while virtually everything we 
advocated was defeated. One of the few that was passed, was the provision 
that prevented you from ceasing to renew before the election, which is the 
45 day notice provision on nonrenewals. As a result of that, all of your 
nonrenewals are going to take place after ... based on dates that will have 
been after the election. The legislation ... and I also want to say that I 
don't think Travelers should be proud of the fact that it's made an effort 
in the auto insurance field, and homeowners, to sneak out of the State the 
day before the election, without issuing any kind of public statement. If 
you notified the Commissioner, the Commissioner certainly didn't notify 
the public. I'm not going to do the same thing on our legislation. I'm 
going to tell you exactly what I'm going to do, and when I'm going to do 
it. The bill is going to be introduced on Monday, December 5. It will have 
an easy to remember number--it will be Senate Bill 103. The bill will, 
as Senator Roberti and I outlined aweek ago, apply to companies that decline 
to renew policies that have renewal effective dates between the date of the 
election and I'm not sure what the final date will be, but either the date 
of ... but it will be some date in 1989. It will require, with respect to 
those policyholders, that you either give them an offer to renew or if they've 
renewed with another company, the higher premium that you pay their increased 
premium cost. And, we'll have a penalty assessment of up to 50%, and 25%, 
and 50% of the premium dollars involved. With the premium volume that your 
company is continuing to write in California, of an excess of a billion 
dollars, clearly you will be within the jurisdiction of the State. With 
$4.3 billion in shareholders equity, I don't think you'll be able to claim 
poverty. The bill will be introduced on December 5th, we're not going to 
waive any rules. The bill will have its policy hearing before the Senate 
Insurance, Claims and Corporations Committee in Sacramento, on Wednesday, 
January llth, at 1:30 p.m. Presuming it receives an affirmative passage 
from that Committee, and approval from the fiscal committee if necessary, 
we will bring it up on the floor for final passage in the Senate on January 
18th. I'm telling you the dates. We're not sneaking up on you. We're not 
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going to try to do the type of sneak tactic that the Travelers used in 
trying to pull out the day before the election. You know what we're doing. 
We're coming. And engage whatever high powered lobbyist you want to engage 
to block it. Make whatever political contributions you want to make. But 
know it loud and clear, Mr. Foley, I'm coming. Senator Roberti is bringing 
and has committed, the full amount of the political clout that he has as the 
President of the Senate, to work with me. Other members of this Committee 
and of the Legislature are going to be a part of that. I don't think that 
you're going to be able to stop it. I don't think you're going to be able 
to find a lobbyist powerful enough to stop it. I don't think you're going 
to be able to make enough political contributions to stop it. 'Cause 
we're coming. And these nice people with the cameras, and the nice people 
with the pads, are going to be paying very careful attention to the efforts 
that you make to block it. My suggestion is to Travelers Insurance, as 
big as it is, should give some consideration to the fact that it made a 
wrong decision in trying to sneak out of California the day before the 
election, because it's not going to work. 
MR. FOLEY: Sir, we did not try to sneak out. We have competed for 
business in California since 1878. That is 110 years that we have been doing 
business in this State. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: And you've made a lot of money in that 118 years. 
MR. FOLEY: And we cannot make money under 103 in auto and homeowners 
and small commerical accounts. And we don't feel it would be fair to force 
us to do business where we cannot make money. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Well, then you'll have the opportunity to appear 
before the legislators and to make your case, that it will not be fair to 
you. 
Senator Roberti. 
SENATOR ROBERTI: I'm sorry at this opening panel--State Farm isn't 
here. Because ... 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: They'll be here shortly. 
SENATOR ROBERTI: I know they're coming. But, now that you have raised 
the point, I think that their actions get the reward for being the most 
reprehensible of all. Because it engages in a complete subterfuge, if 
they're still writing in the State. When they're not writing in the State 
and they're trying to avoid the realities of Proposition 103 by passing on 
to a subsidiary company, what amounts to a rate increase for all their 
-39-
policyholders. It's the subterfution evasion in trying to get around the 
law all in one package. Their actions have been the worst, because they 
write the most insurance in this state and have made the most money off the 
people of California. And now when they have to tie in their belt just a 
little bit, and I'm waiting to hear what they have to respond to, they're 
planning to leave the State because it's just not quite lucrative enough 
after all fueseyears. So, Senator Robbins has said that he's going to have 
this bill, all I can say is, I'm going to do everything that I can--that 
bill is going to get out of Committee--you can lobby, because that's the 
democratic system, but I want you to know that bill is going to get out of 
Committee. And we're going to try to put up as much heat as we can. It's 
going to get out of the Senate. And we're going to try to get it passed, 
because, I cannot emphasize more the issue doesn't have to do in my mind 
with, that much, with actuaries. It hasn't got that much to do with profit 
and loss, because I think you've profited quite well. Senator Boatwright 
hit the nail on the head, the insurance companies are still writing the lucra-
tive business in California. We have a responsibility to dispel a certain 
degree of cynicism about the Legislature, andsome of it is justified. And 
we have a responsibility, more than that, to implement the will of the 
people and not let the people get run over one more time by the insurance 
companies, this time after they voted. The worst possible aspect of this 
is, is that people have voted, and you still try to run over them. We have 
a responsibility if we as legislators are willing to fight for our consti-
tuents. That bill's coming out of Committee and I'm going to do everything 
I can to make sure it passes the Senate, as well. The actions have nothing 
to do with where you were, or not,on Proposition 103. It has to do with the 
arrogance of the insurance companies and we just can't tolerate any more of 
it. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Senator Davis. 
SENATOR DAVIS: Just a brief request for my colleagues who are going 
to author this legislation, that they give serious consideration to putting 
in this legislation some tort reform that would reduce the cost of adminis-
tering insurance in California. The trial lawyers have, in the eight years 
I've been there, have totally thwarted every meaningful attempt at tort 
reform in the Legislature. And, because there's a panic now about insurance, 
we shouldn't lose our perspective and our objectivity. There are some things 
that all of us know that would reduce the cost of insurance if we could allow 
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;t8~£ reform to get through. If the leaders who are here today would 
sponsor that as part of that bill, I think you have a winner, and I would 
go on as a coauthor. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Senator Davis, I try not to ... I try not to lose my 
objectivity. And I have certainly said repeatedly, that the only long term 
solution to both bring down rates and to make the system work, and to make 
it more efficient, is to have some type of tort reform, some kind of fast 
track arbitration, various changes in the system to make the system more 
affordable. The legislation we're offering is not going to be that long 
term solution. The part of what we're going to have to do, and in some 
other bill we're going to need to do a long term solution. Allwe're trying 
to do with that legislation, is to say that the companies that try to have •.• 
to get out and have nonrenewals that are effective and I would say, as a 
matter of fairness, that we would have to pick as the effective date, one 
week ago today, which was the day we made the announcement since no one 
knew about it before then, so that would be ... today is the 18th, that was 
the 11th, it would apply to policies coming up for renewal between 
November 11, 1988 and the cutoff date in 1989 that we picked for this temporary 
legislation. And all it will do is zero in on those companies who decline 
to renew during that period and make them, both make the policyholders 
whole, as well as to pay a penalty assessment that will create what will 
become a very substantial fund to subsidize those motorists who can't afford 
auto insurance in the State of California. But I agree with you, and on 
the subject of needing some kind of tort reform, needing some kind of fast 
track arbitration, and I think that you will find that the only long term 
solution is going to be that, because, once you get through that one year 
period under Prop. 103 where it goes to a regulated system of insurance 
rates, no Insurance Commissioner is going to be able to keep down rates on 
a long term basis unless they can find some method of savings to be part 
of it. 
Senator Roberti. 
SENATOR ROBERTI: I have to reiterate what you're saying, that there's 
two issues here, and I don't want to digress from the two issues, so that 
people get confused as to what the differences happen to be between the two 
issues. Issue number one, which is before us right now, are the threats of 
the insurance companies to leave the State especially during this interim 
where they're not even being impacted financially, where they've won their 
-41-
i California Supreme Court, and to punish the voters 
leave the State. In my mind, it's a very unwise move, both in terms of 
a public policy and ifinsurers' only concern were politics would be an 
unwise move ... was an unwise move politically. That is an issue far and 
away different from the issue of insurance reform. Punishing the voters 
is the one thing that we absolutely can't tolerate. The other issue of 
insurance reform is always going to be with the Legislature, is still with 
the Legislature. I am going to wait and see what the court has to say 
before I talk about any long range solutions because I don't think it's for 
us to say that one hundred and three isn't an important and lasting solution 
because that's how it was drafted, and the public spoke and they voted on it. 
As far as the lawyers are concerned, the lawyers received bitter medicine 
from the public two years ago when joint and several liability was eliminated 
in the State. And I might state that the Legislature didn't at that point 
go around flailing about trying to see how we could save the lawyers. They 
lost, even though they had won many times in the Legislature, they lost, the 
public spoke and that was it. I don't understand now when the insurers lose 
all this flailing about is taking place to try to change what the people voted 
on. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Is there anything else you would like to add Mr. 
Foley? We know you've had a rough few minutes here. 
MR. FOLEY: Thank you for the opportunity. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Thank you. 
No relation I presume, Patrick Foley, General Counsel, American Home 
Insurance and you're also the General Counsel for National Union Insurance. 
MR. PATRICK FOLEY: That's correct. I'm very happy to see that the 
Foley clan is well represented this morning, they usually can take a good 
beating. 
I am the Senior Vice President, General Counsel, of the American Home 
Assurance Company and the National Union Insurance Company. We're both 
members of American International Group. With me this morning is Robert 
Sandler who is the Senior Vice President of these companies, and the chief 
actuary. We're appearing at your request in conjunction with this hearing. 
You've requested us to describe what we have done. Well, first I want to 
tell you that these two companies, between them write approximately a million 
dollars in private passenger automobile and total writings as a group probably; 
are a little under $25 million. 
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CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: You're a little, tiny company in comparison to 
Travelers? 
MR. P. FOLEY: I never said that. I said what our writings were. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: I didn't mean ... I didn't mean to ... 
MR. P. FOLEY: Well, I'd like to be able to finish my statement if I 
can, and you can ask me any questions you want. Mr. Sandler will respond 
on your rating questions. We have not nonrenewed any private passenger 
automobile business because of the initiative. We had two highly unprofit-
able agencies which were nonrenewed before November, for reasons wholly 
unrelated to the Proposition. We are not accepting new private passenger 
automobile applications at this time. Because of the effect of Proposition 
103 had on our policyholders and shareholders, we do not believe we should 
continue to offer automobile insurance under California law if Proposition 
103 is declared constitutional by the Supreme Court. First, the 20% roll-
back is not supported from a rating point of view; my associate will describe 
the impact on the rate rollback in greater detail. I submit that no company 
forced to compete in the marketplace, be it a grocery store, or a steel mill, 
or an auto manufacturer, can absorb the kind of reduction in pricing that's 
requested here. Additionally the Proposition bears rate relief of any kind 
for one year, no matter how much loss the company incurs, unless the company 
is threatened with insolvency on a national basis. What this means for us 
is that our policyholder surplus, made up ultimately of the retained earnings, 
and the premiums of our policyholders in all states and 130 foreign juris-
dictions must first be dissipated for the benefit of California policyholders 
to fund the operation of this new law before rate relief is available. There-
fore, in order to avoid thishemorrhage of surplus, we would be required to 
try and raise our rates to other states to subsidize Californians. There is 
no policy argument that can support such an action. In the case of auto-
mobile insurance,the Proposition forces companies to remain on policies 
indefinitely, no matter how much money the company loses. Since we're not 
prepared to write at a loss in the first place, we are certainly not prepared 
to write at a loss forever. This forces us to act at once to protect our 
policyholders and shareholders. The Proposition mandates an additional 20% 
rollback for safe drivers, where the definition of a safe driver is so 
broadly drafted, that an individual with a fresh conviction for drunken 
driving may qualify currently. Finally, however, inadequate the rates, 
beginning in November of 1989, companies must accept at radically discounted 
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rates any applicant who qualifies under the ill conceived standards of the 
initiative. We'd be required to sell forever at a loss. The loss would 
worsen in '89, and maybe in the future. And we must expand our writings 
without limitation. Under such conditions, we do not desire 
to continue to write such line of insurance. Proposition 103 sets up a 
rate hearing procedure which is truly cumbersome and Byzantine, and is one 
that must be heard on a case-by-case basis with no time limits in the 
proceedings so that one can know when one will have a determination. This in-
creases the hazards that continue writing under the circumstances of when 
it's losing money. When rate hearings become political, they usually are 
unfair. All one has to do is look at the medical malpractice rate hearings 
in New York for the last eight years. Where the company is sufficient to 
the tune of a billion dollars, and the Legislature in its wisdom, they had 
decided you couldn't declare insolvent, so the law does not work well many 
times. In addition, we have an obligation to our shareholders to protect 
their investment. It is possible to invest in government backed risk free 
securities at almost 9% return. Risk taking, such as insurance policies, 
should yield a greater rate of return to compensate for the increased risk. 
Proposition 103 would result in a negative rate of return, and investors 
will not accept the negative rate of return on their investments, nor 
should they be asked to do so. The Proposition's proponents describe it as 
a voters revolt against high insurance costs. While we understand, and I 
fully sympathize with their frustration, because nobody likes to pay an auto-
mobile insurance premium--the proponents of the initiative have failed to 
distinguish between cause and effect. The high cost of insurance in Cali-
fornia is a result of factors entirely outside the control of insurance 
companies. There were initiative proposals which would have attempted to 
address these causes, all of them were rejected, so be it. This self des-
cribed exercise in vengeance is misdirected, inappropriate, and we believe, 
unconstitutional. It fails to address the root cause of insurance costs 
in California, and seeks to repeal the laws of economics. Under these cir-
cumstances, we will not remain an insurer writing private passenger auto-
mobile in this state. 
Thank you for your consideration. I would like to add a few statements 
to that, as a result of the hearing. One, we do not belong to any national 
trade association, we stand by ourselves. We believe in competition. We 
compete everywhere and everything, when there is a chance to make a profit. 
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And it is no crime to make a profit. When you are going to address the 
problems that have come about because of Proposition 103, if it becomes 
law, and if it doesn't, please do the voters of this state a favor and 
exercise your ability as legislators to address the problem wholly, not 
in piecemeal bits because it's what politically expedient. Do what's 
right for the citizens of this state. I would urge you all to read this 
morning's New York Times editorial, "The Only Real Fix for Automobile Insur-
ance". Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Let me ask you if ... I'm pleased that you have a 
small cheering section. 
MR. P. FOLEY: I don't have a cheering section with me. Maybe they 
believe what I say. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Maybe they're insurance company executives. O.K. 
Will all those people who are applauding Mr. Foley's remark, who are not 
employed by an insurance company, please raise their hands ... who are not 
employed by an insurance company, who are not employed by an insurance com-
pany? For all those people who are applauding Mr. Foley's remarks, who 
are not employed by an insurance company, raise your hands ... or 
who are not brokers? Who are not earning your living from life insurance 
industry? 
MR. P. FOLEY: Senator, all the people of this state are involved in 
this problem. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: O.K. All right. O.K. Fine ... there are three 
people who are not employed by the insurance companies or brokers are ap-
plauding you. 
MR. P. FOLEY: Would they have jobs in this state in many instances, 
if it weren't for insurance companies, or for the brokers, or for the risk 
managers, or the clients, or the lawyers who settle the claims, or the claims 
adjusting companies. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: I understand. Mr. Foley you said that Proposition 
103 is clearly unconstitutional. 
MR. P. FOLEY: I said in my opinion it's clearly unconstitutional. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: O.K. If in your opinion it's clearly unconstitutional 
MR. P. FOLEY: And when the courts decide, then we'll abide by what the 
courts say the law is. We're always law abiding. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: O.K. All right. Are you currently writing policies--
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renewing policies at this time? 
MR. P. FOLEY: I believe that some of the companies in the group are 
renewing insurance. These two companies are not. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: O.K. If you believe that Proposition 103 is going 
to be held unconstitutional by the courts, and since the court has said that 
right now the companies are free to continue writing at the rates they were 
charging before, your decision not to cease renewing was announced on what date 
MR. P. FOLEY: We did not announce it to the public, we announced it 
to our producers. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: On what date? 
MR. P. FOLEY: The day after the signing of the stay order. I don't 
remember the date, I don't have a copy of the order with me. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: O.K. Let me help you out. The stay order was is-
sued on November 9. Ira is that right? Was it November 9 or 10? November 
lOth. O.K. The stay order was issued November 10, so the day after that 
would have been November 11th. Why with the stay order in effect is it 
necessary to refuse to renew your existing policyholders? 
MR. P. FOLEY: Because we're losing money, and we assume that this is the 
appropriate time to take the necessary actions to protect our shareholders 
and policyholders, and other states. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: O.K. How many companies do you have in the State of 
California? That do auto insurance? 
MR. P. FOLEY: Licensed for automobile insurance and writing it, I 
cannot tell you. They all write it. Some of them are licensed because 
they write reinsurance only. But the Commerce and Industry, the American 
Home, the National tlnion, the Birmingham Fire, the State of Penn, the 
New Hampshire, the Granite State, the Landmark, Transatlantic Reinsurance, 
we have just received a new license for another reinsurer, and that's 
all. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: O.K. How many is that in the State? In California? 
MR. P. FOLEY: Nine, or ten. I'm not sure the effective date of the 
license. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: All right. So, you have nine companies that are still 
renewing ... 
MR. P. FOLEY: I didn't say that. Not all the companies write auto-
mobiles. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: O.K. All right. How many companies do you have that 
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write private passenger insurance in California, that you own, that are 
still renewing? 
MR. P. FOLEY: I believe only four companies in the group are writing 
private passenger ... I'll defer this question to Mr. Sandler, our actuary. 
MR. ROBERT M. SANDLER: There are really only two sources of private 
passenger auto writings from ... 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Give him your mike, so they can both answer questions. 
No, go ahead. 
MR. SANDLER: One of them is the New Hampshire insurance company which 
operates through the traditional agency system. The other is a mass marketing 
operation, which writes out of Wilmington, Delaware. The combined writings 
of those two entities are something under $25 million a year. From the 
period 1983 through 1987 our best estimate at this point is that those two 
organizations have written to a combined ratio of approximately 140%. By 
that I mean, simply, that for every dollar of premium we've collected we 
estimate we're going to pay $1.40 in losses. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: All of your companies have been losing money for 
years and you've been sacrificing terribly, and it's only because you're 
good citizens, you've been advertising in the past to get business. 
MR. SANDLER: Well, I don't think a company our size writing $25 million 
of premium in the State of California is an example of usaggressively looking 
to expand that kind of business. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: O.K. But you have two companies then that 
are still writing auto insurance, in California? 
MR. SANDLER: Not as of right now. 
MR. P. FOLEY: They're not taking new business. You asked me about re-
newals. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: 
you have two companies that are renewing. 
MR. P. FOLEY: They may be renewing some business. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: You're not sure? 
O.K. On renewals 
MR. P. FOLEY: It's up to the underwriters, they were given their 
authority. We have two companies that are not renewing, we have two com-
panies that are not writing. Most all of the companies are not writing 
new business. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: I understand that. But you have two companies 
that are renewing? 
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MR. P. FOLEY: On the underwriting authority, if they decide to renew, 
they can. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: O.K. You have two companies that have ceased re-
newing. 
MR. P. FOLEY: That's correct. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: O.K. Now, what happens if someone who is a policy-
holder in one of your companies that is refusing to renew,wishes to go to 
one of your other companies and renew? 
MR. P. FOLEY: That won't happen. 
MR. SANDLER: That can't happen. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: And the reason it can't happen is because ... 
MR. SANDLER: We simply don't do business that way. 
MR. P. FOLEY: Senator, you have to understand the American Agency 
system. The renewals belong to the agent. He takes them where he wants to 
go. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: I under ... 
MR. P. FOLEY: Or to the broker. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: I understand ... 
MR. P. FOLEY: And we are not an agency company, 
we are primarily brokerage. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: I understand the agency system. I've been in the 
California Senate for 16 years. And I've chaired the Senate Insurance Com-
mittee for over six years. I understand the agency system. I also under-
stand that ... let me ask you a question. The premium of the two companies 
that are not renewing, what was their 1987 annual premium? 
MR. SANDLER: Approximately $25 million. 
MR. P. FOLEY: No, the .•. 
MR. SANDLER: American Home-National Union ... No, less than a million. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Less than a million dollars. The total premiums 
that your company wrot~ nationwide, in 1987, were how much? For all kinds 
of insurance? 
MR. P. FOLEY: Senator, I didn't bring those figures. I'll tell you 
what we wrote in California. It was $1.2 billion. 
ance. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: O.K. in Cal ... O.K. you wrote $1.2 billion of insur-
MR. SANDLER: And that's about 14% I think of our total writings. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: In California? 
MR. SANDLER: No. 
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MR. P. FOLEY: No, no. Nationwide. 
MR. SANDLER: California is about 1.23. I believe that's about ... 
MR. P. FOLEY: Fourteen percent of our national writings. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: O.K. 
MR. P. FOLEY: But Senator, we also write--when you take those total 
numbers--in 130 foreign jurisdictions in some of those companies. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Senator Roberti. 
SENATOR ROBERTI: Hearing all those insurances being written just under-
scores in my mind Senator Boatwright's comments and I think the more and more 
I hear, the more and more they have a great deal of validity. And that is 
that insurers who refuse to write the less palatable types of insurance, say 
auto insurance ... 
MR. P. FOLEY: Senator, we'd write it if it was a rational thing to do. 
SENATOR ROBERTI: Well, let me continue please ... should not be allowed 
to make profits on those kinds of insurance, like life, fire, and whatever, 
where they can skim the cream off the top of the milk, but not have to do ... 
MR. P. FOLEY: For the record ... 
SENATOR ROBERTI: Do anything that's more difficult for them. Yeah. 
MR. SANDLER: For the record, we have in aggregate, we have not made 
a profit in the State of California. 
MR. P. FOLEY: Underwriting. 
MR. SANDLER: Underwriting. 
SENATOR ROBERTI: Well, I appreciate your point of view. I won't let 
it bother me again. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: From in aggregate meaning from when you first started 
writing business. 
MR. SANDLER: I mean for the last five to eight years. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: How many years have you been writing business in 
California? 
MR. SANDLER: Oh, probably a lot longer than that. But I wouldn't know 
what the record was prior to that. But five to eight years is a pretty long 
period of time and we have not achieved an aggregate in underwriting profits 
over that period. So, I hardly think we're creaming off the better risks 
in favor of ... 
SENATOR ROBERTI: Well, I feel very strongly that the selective writing 
of insurance cannot no longer be allowed in the states. And I'm going to 
do everything that I can with, and get your figures as much as I can, because 
I'm open to your suggestions as to what you feel. But the selective 
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writing of insurance, where these huge amounts are being written, yet people 
can't write automobile insurance, because they don't quite make the same 
profit--that's just intolerable, and it's intolerable to the people who are 
policyholders in this state. So, Senator Boatwright, your suggestions an 
excellent one and I think it should be put in legislation. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Any other questions? Senator Boatwright. 
SENATOR BOATWRIGHT: Did you say that from all of your companies under 
the American International Group, Inc., that you did not make a profit in 
California over the past seven or eight years? 
MR. SANDLER: I believe that to be correct. 
SENATOR BOATWRIGHT: Well, according to the financial statements that 
you filed with the California Department of Insurance, that is absolutely 
not true. It shows that at least in 1986 that you made a profit. 
MR. SANDLER: I have no idea what you're looking at. 
SENATOR BOATWRIGHT: See, that's the problem. Let me tell you what 
the problem is. You won't let us into the books. You won't let the Insur-
ance Commissioner into your books. 
MR. P. FOLEY: Where did you get those records, if we wouldn't let you 
into the books? 
SENATOR BOATWRIGHT: You, wait. You deny you made a profit in Cali-
fornia. You just sat there and said "We haven't made a profit in the last 
seven or eight years." 
MR. P. FOLEY: (Inaudible comment) 
SENATOR BOATWRIGHT: Wait, let me finish. You had your say, I didn't 
interrupt you, you let me finish and you can have the floor again, O.K.? 
You said you didn't make a profit for the last seven or eight years. I 
have a sheet here from the insurance office that indicates that in 1986 
you made a profit, and in trying to get to that, now, this gentleman says 
"I don't know." Which is correct? What you file with the Insurance Corn-
missioner's office or what you said that "you didn't make a profit" or "I 
don't know"? Which of those do you want to latch on to and say is correct 
now? 
MR. SANDLER: It is my belief that we have not made a profit in Cali-
fornia over the period of time that I mentioned, based on the data that I 
have in my availability. I have no idea what sheet of paper you're looking 
at, so I can't comment on it. However, I'd be very happy to review it at 
some point, and give you an honest answer. 
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SENATOR BOATWRIGHT: How about letting us see your spread sheets for 
1986? 
MR. SANDLER: We have ... the Insurance Commissioner of California has 
always had the right to go in and look at any of our books, that they want 
to go into. 
SENATOR BOATWRIGHT: How about letting us, this committee, have your 
spread sheets for 1986? From the American International Group, Inc., that 
includes all your companies doing business in California. 
MR. P. FOLEY: We have no problem giving you the report. 
SENATOR BOATWRIGHT: All right, Mr. Chairman, they say they'll make 
those available. 
MR. P. FOLEY: We'll make it available. 
SENATOR BOATWRIGHT: For 1986. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Our Committee staff will follow up on that. 
Thank you. 
California Insurance Group, Mr. Don Henderson, is the last person in 
this group. Mr. Henderson why don't you take Mr. Elsey's seat. He already 
got it warmed up a little bit earlier. And Senator Roberti, why don't you 
take care of this for a moment? 
SENATOR ROBERTI: Mr. Henderson. 
MR. DON HENDERSON: As I mentioned earlier, when I came down, I'm 
actually in the next group. I'll start off with ... 
SENATOR ROBERTI: Fine, so you get to start off. 
MR. HENDERSON: Should I start? 
SENATOR ROBERTI: Yes. We would like to know what your current status 
of writing policies is in the State of California? 
MR. HENDERSON: Our present status is that we are not writing new 
private passenger automobile business. We are writing new, in other lines, 
and we're renewing all of our automobile policy business in the same pro-
cedure. 
SENATOR ROBERTI: So, you're not going to be writing new policies? 
MR. HENDERSON: We are not writing new policies right now. On November 
9th we suspended the writing of new business. 
SENATOR ROBERTI: Now, what do you mean by new business? Is that a 
new policyholder, or is that ... 
MR. HENDERSON: That would be a completely new policyholder, not been 
insured by us before. If we picked up another member of the family, who 
suddenly became a driver, we would insure that car. 
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SENATOR ROBERTI: You would? 
MR. HENDERSON: Yes, we would. 
SENATOR ROBERTI: So, you're not writing new policies, that means 
new policyholders. 
MR. HENDERSON: That's correct. 
SENATOR ROBERTI: So, that means a young driver who is new to the 
State of California could not get insured by your company. 
MR. HENDERSON: Not unless we had, previously had his family insured. 
Then we would pick him up as being a new driver and part of that family 
unit. 
SENATOR ROBERTI: What's the total number of premiums that you write 
in the State of California? 
MR. HENDERSON: We're a California only based company. We write up 
approximately $70 million in California. We started in 1898. And about 
one-third of our business is personal, fire and homeowners. About one-
third is personal auto and one-third is small commercial. We just got 
into the automobile business approximately four years ago, as a new venture 
in California. 
SENATOR ROBERTI: Do you write any other policies in the State? 
MR. HENDERSON: Yes, we write about one-third of our business, we have 
about 126,000 policyholders and about 15,000 are automobile policyholders. 
SENATOR ROBERTI: And what are the others mostly? 
MR. HENDERSON: Yes. We don't write outside of California. 
SENATOR ROBERTI: What are the other policies mostly? 
MR. HENDERSON: Homeowners is our biggest line of business. We have 
approximately ... 
SENATOR ROBERTI: Are you writing new homeowner policies? 
MR. HENDERSON: Yes, we are. 
SENATOR ROBERTI: So, if you have a new homeowner who has never previ-
ously had a policy, you will write a policy for them. 
MR. HENDERSON: Yes, we will. 
SENATOR ROBERTI: But you will not do the same for a new policyholder 
who is an automobile? 
MR. HENDERSON: That's correct. 
SENATOR ROBERTI: That's because you find homeowner policy more pro-
fitable? 
MR. HENDERSON: We took this action the day after the election on 
November 9th, really to sit back and take a look at what was happening to 
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us. And I think that I would like to share with you what our numbers 
look like at nine months, both with and without auto. We've heard a lot 
of talk about '86 and '87 ... 
SENATOR ROBERTI: O.K. We'd be glad to hear it . 
MR. HENDERSON: ... but I'd like to talk about '88. Nine months of 
'88, and these numbers include investment income, we had a loss at nine 
months of $89,426.00. The results of our automobile line of business were 
a loss of $3,031,000. So that the balance of our lines actually produced a 
profit of $2,942,000. I think that when you realize that 15,000 out of 
125,000 of our policyholders are automobile, it can put the number in per-
spective for you. We further looked ahead, and have just done this 
recently since our moratorium, and we have not gone back to reexamine our 
position, took a look at what our position would have been had 103 
already been in effect at nine months of this year. And on that basis our 
loss . 
$89,000/would have been $7,183,341 or 29.5 percent of our surplus, wh1ch 
at the present time is approximately $32 million. Now, what this means to 
a company our size that has a surplus of 32, when you have that kind of a 
drop, is basically we're almost out of business. We have an A and Best 
rating of A plus six. The first thing that a rating body like Best looks 
at, is what is happening to your surplus. And they want to see a ratio 
of approximately two to one. That is your premium writings, to your avail-
able surplus, should be around two to one to maintain an A rating. Inter-
estingly enough, our largest line of business is homeowners. Approximately 
half of the mortgages, bankers tell me in the United States, are handled 
by Fannie Mae. They require a company to have an A rating in order to 
insure homes that they provide mortgages on. We were visited with the 
Best people a week before the election and visited, talked about, and of 
course they were concerned what was happening out here. And they made it 
quite plain that, you know, anything that would threaten the surplus to 
the extent that apparently this law requires, they would look on, and it 
certainly ratings of California companies, if nothing else would be condi-
tional upon what was happening. And I could see, in looking ahead, I'm 
very concerned about what happened to a company our size. We have 
no place else to go other than California. We've been here ninety years. 
We've only been in the automobile business four years. We got in it ... 
SENATOR ROBERTI: But, even with the automobile, you're saying you 
have a significant surplus. 
MR. HENDERSON: A significant surplus? 
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SENATOR ROBERTI: That seemed to be what you have indicated in your ... 
MR. HENDERSON: Well, ... 
SENATOR ROBERTI: ... testimony. 
MR. HENDERSON: ... maybe I can clarify. What I was saying is that with a 
20% rollback on all lines of business that our surplus would be eroded by 
the end of nine months of this year, by 29.5%, had it been in effect. 
SENATOR ROBERTI: In terms of dollars, how much is that? 
MR. HENDERSON: $7,183,000. 
SENATOR ROBERTI: So, how much are you still left with? 
MR. HENDERSON: I am then left--you can subtract that from $32 million. 
SENATOR ROBERTI: So, you're left with about $25 million surplus. 
MR. HENDERSON: But, but, just a second. 
SENATOR ROBERTI: And you were saying that, and that I think is because 
of the 20% rollback, which you're not going to have to experience a second 
time. So, I personally ... 
MR. HENDERSON: Except that one year hence I then must go ahead and 
give an additional 20% to "definition of a good driver." 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: But at one year hence you're at a point where the 
matter has been turned over to the Insurance Commissioner, and the Insurance 
Commissioner has a mandate by the statute to establish rates and to not 
estab--and to establish rates that are reasonable. And, you know, while 
regulation is a tough pill to swallow and it wasn't what you planned to 
face in November of 1988, the reality is, that the voters of the State of 
California gave it to you. 
MR. HENDERSON: I understand from where you're coming from Senator. 
I don't disagree with you. But there is no time limit at all that I've been 
able to see in 103, that my rate request could be acted on in any kind of 
a timely fashion, to the point where I would actually be driven out of busi-
ness. Certainly a company that only has 2/10 of 1% of the market is not 
going to be a very high priority for a hearing. And in truth, we're the 
kind of a company in the marketplace that drives the competition, and com-
petes well with the larger company, and is able to survive. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: And that's why by your pulling out of the market, 
it has an unhealthy effect on the market. 
MR. HENDERSON: I think that I have to restate my position. I did 
not pull out of the market. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: O.K. Are you as of this date renewing policies 
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for your existing policyholders? 
MR. HENDERSON: Absolutely. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: In auto insurance? 
MR. HENDERSON: Yes, sir. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: O.K. Did you at some earlier date pull out? 
MR. HENDERSON: No, sir. 
CHAIR~N ROBBINS: O.K. So the report that you were pulling out was 
an inaccurate one? 
MR. HENDERSON: Absolutely. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: O.K. That's the purpose of this hearing, is to be 
able to differentiate. And I apologize, I did leave the room for about 
60 seconds. So, I missed that part of your testimony in the first place. 
That's the purpose of to testify, as to who are the companies that have 
pulled out, who are the companies that are still writing business. 
SENATOR ROBERTI: We have an obligation to implement 103, and that in-
cludes that these hearings have to take place in a timely fashion. With 
the amount of staff actuaries or what not, that are currently in the Depart-
ment of Insurance, I would agree. That would be very difficult happening, 
because the Department of Insurance is not structured to be regulatory 
over the insurance industry at all, and to implement 103, we have to see 
that that takes place. So, I think your fear that the State just 
absolutely can't adjust, is really rather premature. The reason why the 
Department of Insurance is so understaffed, has something to do with the 
insurance industry not wanting too much staff there. So, I tend to feel 
that once that is alleviated, and it has to be by the Legislature, these 
timely hearings you speak of, will take place. 
MR. HENDERSON: Senator, the Insurance Department is in my office 
now for the triannual review. They were in my office nine months of last 
year completing a market conduct study, in which they gave a report. They 
just finished leaving my office six weeks ago where they did a claim conduct 
study, to see how we were operating in that marketplace. So, from my 
perspective, they•re very active. Even in a company my size that they're 
in looking at exactly at what we're doing and spending a lot of time doing 
it. 
SENATOR ROBERTI: The amount of actuaries and staff that we have in 
California, compared to say, what is in New York, is abysmally small. 
And New York usually is always touted out by all sides, certainly by 
the insurance industry, as the premiere example of what should be done. 
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But New York has a Insurance Commission that's far and away much more 
sophisticated than ours. So they may--the one's that are there I'm sure 
are active, because they're overworked. But, I don't suspect that they 
are active to the point that they're a real regulatory body. 
SENATOR BOATWRIGHT: Mr. Chairman. Could I just give a little suggestion 
to the people here? I think, you've dug yourself a hole with the people 
and with the Legislature certainly, and I did not support 103. I was on 
record in opposition to it. But it now seems to be the law. I think you 
ought to take a close reading of the text of 103, because there are ambig-
uities. I will agree with you. For example, you're familiar with the re-
duction and it says between November '88 and November '89 that the rates 
that are reduced may only be increased 
in silency. But if you go over to the approval of insurance rates section, 
1861.05, I think that's contrary, and certainly can be read as contrary to the 
automatic rollback because it says "no rate shall be approved or remain in 
effect which is excessive, inadequate, unfairly discriminatory, or other-
wise in violation of this chapter. In considering where the rate is exces-
sive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory, they have based it on the 
insurance companies' investment income." And then it goes on to say that 
you must, in order for them to meet that test, file certain material under 
sections that aren't in here, but sections that have been in the code for 
many years with the Insurance Commissioner. And the Insurance Commissioner 
must approve your application within sixty days, except for certain excep-
tions that are listed. I think you really ought to have your attorneys 
take a close reading. If I'm still practicing law, and incidentally I 
did defense work and represented insurance companies. I would suggest to 
you that you ought to immediately start testing this particular provision, 
instead of just throwing up your hands and literally screwing the people 
of the State of California, by withdrawing from the market, which basically 
is what's going to happen. Then we're going to retaliate, and the people 
are going to retaliate, and you're going to get hurt. I would suggest that 
you read this and try to abide by it because I think it's ambiguous enough 
that there's some loopholes here that with time, possibly 60 days, but 
possibly 120 days if the Insurance Commissioner will expedite this, and I 
would suggest we can give them more staff immediately to expedite these 
hearings. I think you have an out here. If you can in fact show that the 
rates are "inadequate". And that doesn't have anything to do with the other 
section that speaks to insolvency, that's a different section. And I think 
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that you should, instead of just fighting what the people have asked, 
'cause we're going to fight you right back if you do. I think you ought 
to look to stay in business in California and try to abide by this section 
because I think it's big enough to protect you, if you will just take a 
reasonable look at this. Now, this is just one attorney's viewpoint, but 
it's worth going to court over if necessary I think. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: O.K. Let me--I, I ... 
MR. P. FOLEY: May I respond to that please? 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Well, it wasn't specifically directed at you, and 
I . . . 
MR. P. FOLEY: It was directed at all of us, and I would like to 
respond it it's permissible. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Very briefly. 
MR. P. FOLEY: Senator, all we are doing, are exercising our consti-
tutional rights to get the type of interpretation we want. We are not 
trying to punish anybody. And I get very nervous when a legislative body 
talks about punishing people. It doesn't sound like the right thing to do, 
that's all. 
SENATOR BOATWRIGHT: But you withdrew from the market. Why didn't 
you stay in the market until the Supreme Court rules? 
MR. P. FOLEY: Senator, it might be too late then. 
SENATOR BOATWRIGHT: So, you're going to kill that goose that laid 
the golden egg for so many years for the insurance industry, across the 
board, fire and everything else? And you're big in this state, you're the 
fifth largest company doing business in the State of California, all your 
companies. And you know what, you, according to what you filed, you did 
make a profit. You have been making profits. And you won't be doing 
business in California very long. 
MR. P. FOLEY: Senator. Mr. Sandler said he believed that we had made 
a profit for five to eight years. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: O.K. We'll get--the spread sheets are coming. 
I . . . 
MR. P. FOLEY: We will provide you with the data that you're asking 
for. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: O.K. 
MR. P. FOLEY: Believe me, it is not a rational decision to stop 
writing business when you're make money. I don't know of anyone, whether 
they sell widgets, or matchbooks, or whatever--we have to make a rational 
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decision about what's in our best interests, just as other companies have 
to make their own judgment about that. 
SENATOR BOATWRIGHT: And we have to make a rational decision as to 
how to keep you in the market. 
your profit on other things. 
If you get out of it, how to take away 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: O.K. Let's go on to a different group of insurers. 
Thank you very much. What I'd like to do is to, I want to be sure we get 
to City Attorney Jim Hahn, and County District Attorney Ira Reiner before 
we take our lunch break. I'd like to also--we've dealt mostly with 
insurance companies that are out of the market, I'd like to hear briefly 
from some insurance companies that are in the market, 'cause I don't want 
this to be an all bad news hearing. And then we're going to deal with ... 
Let me--let me get a couple companies up here that are writing, so we can hear 
some good news. Mercury Casualty, George Joseph--George, I know I saw you 
in the room--Farmers Group, Leo Denlia; is a ... O.K., Allstate Insurance, 
Michael Velotta; Southern California Auto Club, Lawrence Baker; Northern 
California Auto Club, Barry Schiller; Twentieth Century Insurance, Rick 
Dinon. O.K., those will be ... pardon ... John Martin~ Aetna Life and Casualty. 
There are other companies that are also writing insurance--we'll take those 
in the second group, later. Have a seat. Have a seat. The one's that are 
up here now, will be the first group. Our reports are, that are on the 
companies I've just listed, that each of you is ... that you are renewing the 
policyholders that you have, that you are accepting new policies, appli-
cations for new policies, and major underwriting criteria. That is the 
type of fair play that I would expect from a fine group of groups of good 
citizens. And you're not being invited up here to be on the hot seat, and my 
suggestion would be that each of you, if you'd like to make a brief state-
ment on affirming what I've just said, to do so, and then if you have more 
extensive statements, what I'd like to do is have the two local law enforce-
ment people, Ira Reiner and Jim Hahn, and then to take our thirty minute 
lunchbreak and then we'll hear on the more extensiVe statements. This group 
I think I'll have probably an easier time of finding a volunteer--who 
wants to go first. 
George, you're the senior dean of auto insurance writers in California 
and some people say Mercury Casualty knows more about what's going on with 
auto insurance than anyone, so you're elected. Are you currently renewing 
your policholders and are you currently accepting new applications for people 
who meet your underwriting criteria? 
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MR. GEORGE JOSEPH: Yes, we are. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: That's appreciated. Who else wants to answer next? 
It's a short--this is the easiest question you're going to get all day 
long. And they say we're mean to everyone, David. 
MR. RICK DINON: Rick Dinon, representing Twentieth Century. We are 
in fact, basically doing business as normal. But, I want to bring to the 
Committee's attention, that the stakes are extremely large. In fact, by 
taking this action, which we consider to be responsible, we have also raised 
the stakes with respect to Twentieth Century dramatically. Very, very 
quickly, Twentieth Century with respect to the California marketplace is 
about as simple as a hotdog stand. Our investment income is derived here, 
our losses are paid here, our premiums are written here, that's all we 
are is a California insurance. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: You're local, you're based in San Fernando Valley, and 
you're not going to leave the State. 
MR. DINON: That's correct. That's pretty reasonable. I have the 
summary of the last twelve months of performance of Twentieth Century, this 
is actual numbers. These numbers represent ... 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Oh, let me ask Harry Miller, Coastal Insurance, 
please come forward and join this group. We're running out of chairs, but 
that's ... while you're.coming forward, we're going to be getting you a chair. 
Go ahead. 
MR. DINON: ... these numbers represent the actual filed on file perform-
ance of Twentieth Century, including investment income filed with the State, 
they are statutory numbers over the last four quarters. We lost $9 million 
on the insurance business, the pure insurance business itself, but made 
$40 million bottom line. To the right of the exhibit ... 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: So, it isn't all ... and you did that by the money 
you made on--if you had lost $9 million underwriting, where did you make the 
rest of it up? On? 
MR. DINON: It was on investment income. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: O.K. So, just because there are underwriting 
losses, doesn't necessarily mean that a company's in poverty. 
MR. DINON: Of course. Absolutely. We, to the right of that is 
Proposition 103 overlayed on that twelve months performance, and a literal 
application. We now lose $91 million bottom line, including investment in-
come, rather than posting a $40 million gain. And the reality of that means 
that you take $91 million times three, which is about the amount of leverage 
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you're permitted, and that reduces our ability to write insurance premiums, 
by that figure. In the second year of enactment, Prop. 103 requires good 
drivers to receive an additional 20% cut, and obviously that's most of our 
policyholders. We now have a loss of $160 million in the second year. 
Ninety-one million dollars and $160 million ... 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: That's if the Insurance Commissioner does not ap-
prove any of your applications for rate modifications. 
MR. DINON: That is correct. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Based on the other provisions of 103. 
MR. DINON: That's absolutely correct. The only point in that 
is when? As you can see, potentially--because we don't know what the appli-
cation is back to November 8th or prospective from that point in time. 
That's a very, very critical risk to our company. We can't literally wait 
very long in--without knowing an answer to the constitutional question of 
Prop. 103's cuts number one, and secondly, we have filed with the Department 
of Insurance to request a hearing under Prop. 103's provisions. But it 
appears to be unlikely that we will get to that stage until there's a 
Supreme Court decision. What it amounts to is that we are in a room with no 
doors, we're in a box. So, the risk is tremendous with respect to Twentieth 
Century. If those losses were in fact to be incurred, it only comes out of 
policyholder surplus. I said that we have $251 million worth of loss in 
two years. We have $205 million worth of policyholder surplus. That's all 
there is. I think it's clear that this scenario, frankly, is so grave and 
so bad, irrespective of anything else, that as it relates to Twentieth 
Century, we have a strong reason to believe that we will prevail in both 
the constitutional aspect and frankly, perhaps, would indeed get an exemption 
from the cuts under the provisions of Prop. 103. The critical point is the 
timing. 
will be? 
How long can we wait until we know what the business environment 
And I suggest to you that's our Board of Directors who have been 
kind enough to permit us a reasonable period of time. But it's a decision 
that, frankly, we have to make in reasonable short order. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Assemblywoman Waters. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: I'd like to at least take this opportunity to 
to all of the representatives sitting at the table, that I for one am 
very appreciative for the fact that you are still writing, and that you 
have not opted to use some of the tactics that are being used by some of 
the other companies. And as I understand it, those of you who are sitting 
here now for the most part, automobile insurance is your exclusive business. 
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Am I to understand that? 
MR. DINON: A large part of ours, most of it. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: Major--exclusive, exclusive, Mr. Joseph? The 
others? Major? 
MR. DINON: It varies. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: Which I suppose we can conclude for those people 
who see this, as a legitimate business and have put their time and effort 
there, they appear to be the ones remaining and those who appear to be 
doing well on other lines are the ones that either not renewing and/or not 
writing, which tells us something. And as we look at legislation we need 
to think about that and perhaps be very creative,and maybe these gentlemen 
are deserving of a tax credit or something even, we'll have to think about 
those who continue to write. We can be good and we can be punitive, and I 
have no problems with applying the whip both ways. Let me just ask a question 
here. Would you explain for me, you had two categories that I saw on your 
display, one was listed as loss expense incurred, what does that mean? 
MR. DINON: Combination of loss and paid. 
SENATOR BOATWRIGHT: I can't hear him. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: That's actual or not actual? Estimated. 
MR. DINON: It's a combination of losses actually paid ... 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: Uh, huh . 
MR. DINON: 
of both. 
... plus reserves for losses unpaid. It's a combination 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: What percentage is estimated, or unpaid? Well, 
not unpaid. Are we talking about unpaid, or are we talking about estimated? 
That's two different things. 
MR. DINON: Estimated unpaid. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: (Chuckles) 
MR. DINON: It is. I mean we don't know what the final result would 
be. If ... 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: All right. What percentage of that category is 
loss expense incurred is estimated? 
MR. DINON: About one-third. In other words ... 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: O.K. And I don't want to challenge that. Let 
me tell you why I'm asking some of these questions. Because, again the 
Legislature for the most part, in my experience, does not understand how 
you do business, and how you word things, and what you mean when you say 
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these things. And ... 
MR. DINON: Oh, let ... 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: ... so, when I ask these questions, it is to raise 
to the light of the day, the meaning of these categories. And I'm not simply 
i for you, but it's important for the Members of Legislature to under-
stand that loss expense incurred, could be in somebody's books 100% esti-
mation. Your's could be a third, but the fact of the matter is, it hasn't 
been paid yet. 
MR. DINON: Well, the--if I might respond very briefly. The fact of 
the matter is, is that automobile insurance in a personal line, the amount 
of money that you put aside for reserves, is expended very rapidly. So, 
you know if you're right or wrong in very, very short order, those claims 
are paid very quickly. In fact, if you were to take a look at--and I'll be 
happy to leave you--a copy of our reserving exhibit, it will show you that 
for each accident year over the last ten years, we in fact, when all the 
claims were really paid, did not have a totally adequate amount of money 
in reserves. And now that--I guess we're a pretty good example of that. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: But you can't, you can't operate, you can't 
operate in the State of California without a prudent reserve. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: You know what they did was they made the money up 
on investment income, that exceeded their losses and that made up for it. 
Is that a correct ... ? 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: No. 
MR. DINON: Well, to the degree that you're short 1 in the final analysis, 
of you paid and what you've reserved, it comes out of some place and it 
comes out, in fact, out of surplus. In fact, my company in 1986 went to the 
market and got additional capital so that we could have enough surplus to, 
as a matter of fact, write this ... 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: How much do you set aside? What percentage do 
you set aside for prudent reserve, and the difference between that and what 
the Insurance Commissioner of the State of California requires, and how the 
practice varies from insurance company to insurance company? 
MR. DINON: I can't say that specifically, frankly, it's in the exhibit, 
I'll be happy to give it to you. But, I will say this, and that is that we 
been examined twice in the last three years. As a matter of fact, even 
as we talk, we're under examination. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: But could you put, could you put away 50% of 
your premiums into reserve? 
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MR. DINON: Not without going to the point that you get to be what's 
called redundant, or have an excess amount. We in fact, as a result of 
Proposition 103, or the impending result of Prop. 103, called in an outside 
independent actuary to certify our reserves for us at the end of the third 
quarter. But the certification was that the reserves appear to be neither 
excessive, nor insufficient, that they appeared to be essentially dead on 
the money. And that is, we did that because our shareholders had concerns, 
under how we would operate under 103, and additionally we wanted to be able 
to establish independently the reserves were proper. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: That's an important statement. Are you saying 
that you have already looked, and the reason that you are able to continue 
now, and your Board has allowed you to do that, is it appears that your 
reserves are sufficient to implement 103? 
MR. DINON: No. Our re ... you have an ongoing obligation to your share-
holders ... 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: Of course, you do. 
MR. DINON: ... to the regulators to have adequate reserves. That's 
an ongoing obligation. With respect to Prop. 103, the exhibit that I just 
showed you says, we can't. If we are literally required to rollback the 
rates to the degree mandated under Prop. 103, we cannot conduct automobile 
business in California. It's an economic impossibility. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: But you've chosen to deal with that by continuing 
to renew, continuing to write policy, proceeding through legal means in the 
courts, and proceeding through application procedures allowed under Propo-
sition 103 with the Insurance Commissioner. 
MR. DINON: That's correct. Based upon the best legal advice that we 
can get as it relates to our unique situation in California, we don't think 
that those cuts will apply. However, it's a ... we're sitting on a ticking 
time bomb, and frankly, by continuing business as much as possible. Normally, 
we're literally raising the stakes every single day. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Oh. I join with Assemblywoman Waters in commending 
you for your positive action. 
MR. GEORGE JOSEPH: Senator, could I ... I think I get the distance award. 
I carne here from Hartford, Connecticut today. So, I'd like to go next, if 
I might? And I also went to the effort to prepare some exhibits which I 
would also like a colleague of mine to help us go through. 
CHAI~~ ROBBINS: O.K. What I would like to do--my problem is in 
terms of time one. Is I'd like to do just a ... at this point, a quick ... 
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MR. JOSEPH: But I think, I think my comments will be germane to 
sorne of the reserving issues. And I'll try to keep this short. I think 
it will help shed some light on the relationship between the underwriting 
end of this business, the reserving end of this business, and the invest-
ment income associated with it. And I agree ... 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: I'm not dis .•. 
MR. JOSEPH: ... I agree with Assemblywoman Waters, that there is not 
--there is not enough knowledge generally, about how the arithmetic works 
in this business, to the extent that we've been responsible for that in 
the industry, then fine. But, I think the solution is for us to share this 
information with those of you that have to make some very fundamental, some 
very important ... 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: We want, we want you ... 
MR. JOSEPH: ... decisions affecting the people in this State. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: We want you to share the information, my problem 
is a time one. It's 12:15 p.m., and I promised both our District Attorney 
and our City Attorney that I'm going to get them on before we take our ... 
the break for lunch. So, that means what I need to do is limit this portion 
of it, to just the question of whether you're writing and then we'll be 
delighted to listen to the explanation, which is very important and I agree, 
immediately following our lunch break, and it's only going to be a thirty 
minute lunch break. We're going to take that, hopefully, right at 12:30. 
Can I just ask you the two questions I asked ... 
MR. JOSEPH: You're running this Committee, you can do whatever you 
want. But I would like to make a statement. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: I want you to make the statement, I just prefer that 
you made it at 1:00, instead of right at this moment. 
MR. JOSEPH: I'll be back at 1:00 or 4:00 ... 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Otherwise, crime ..• 
MR. JOSEPH: •.. I'm going to make this statement someplace ... 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Good, no, no ... 
MR. JOSEPH: ... before I go back to Hartford. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: No, no, no, no. You're going to make ... You'll make 
it here. Otherwise, if we don't get our City Attorney and District Attorney 
our crime will run rampant in Los Angeles. These are the ... these two men 
are the thin blue line protecting all of us from getting robbed and mugged 
as soon as we go outside of the State Building. Let me ask you though the 
two questions. Now, first of all, you are ... 
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MR. JOHN MARTIN: I'm John Martin, with Aetna Life and Casualty. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Ah, the two questions are 1) are you renewing 
your current policyholders? 
MR. MARTIN: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Are you accepting business that meets your under-
writing criteria? 
MR. MARTIN: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Good, we like you. And we'll listen to--and we 
want to ... 
MR. MARTIN: I would reserve judgment on that, Senator. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: I will too. I will too. I will too, and we'll 
listen to your--I want to go through your further statement at 1:00. 
Southern California Auto Club. Are you currently renewing your policy-
holders? 
MR. LAWRENCE C. BAKER, JR.: Senator, my name is Lawrence C. Baker, Jr. 
I'm Vice President and Manager of the Inner Insurance Exchange of the Auto-
mobile Club of Southern California. We are renewing our policyholders. 
We are writing new business pursuant to our usual underwriting standards 
in reliance on the stay order of the Supreme Court of the State of Cali-
fornia. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: O.K. Northern California Auto Club. 
MR. BARRY H. SHILLER: Mr. Chairman, and Senators, Barry Shiller 
representing the California State Automobile Association. We, too, are 
writing new business, and renewing existing policies. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: O.K. Coastal Insurance. Give--Harry why don't you 
take--well, you've been offered a seat. Now, if I correctly understand 
what's going on, I think Coastal may have received a bad rap in some of 
the reports, and some of the reports may have been inaccurate. And I know 
November 8th was a rough day for you. Are you currently renewing your 
existing policyholders? 
MR. HARRY MILLER: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Are you currently accepting accepting applica-
tions that meet your underwriting criteria? 
MR. MILLER: Yes, we are. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Were the, were the media reports that put Coastal 
on the list, saying that you weren't inaccurate? Is there ... 
MR. MILLER: No, they were accurate in part. What we actually told 
the press was a correct fact. And that is that we expected to acquire 
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another insurer, and to put all of our business into that insurer, because 
Coastal doesn't have the ability under State law to get a charter modifi-
cation to write comp and collision, so we have to write in two carriers 
which increases our costs. But that not only was not a device to try to 
avoid 103, in fact, we would have been subject to a new insurer to 103. 
We don't know whether we're going to be able to carry through that aquisi-
tion, so we continue to write at Coastal. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Well, we appreciate that your writing and I may 
have responded, because I was asked I think some questions by the press, 
of what did I think that Coastal wasn't writing and I basically said I 
didn't like it. And I have tried to be as careful and as cautious in making 
statements as I can be. If I erred in contributing to the spread of the 
misinformation, I wish to make up for that by very definitely extending 
information that Coastal is renewing and is writing policies. 
MR. MILLER: Thank you, no apology is necessary because it was a very 
tense and hard time for us all. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: And when people call, we'll tell them to ask for 
Harry. 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: Mr. Chairman. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Senator Rosenthal. 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: Just a comment on this whole subject matter here. 
Most of the companies that we've heard from previously, and that we will 
hear from, have indicated that they've been losing money in the automobile 
insurance business per se. But that they have been making money on their 
total insurance business. That's not unlike a lost leader in a department 
store, or agrocery store, not unlike at all. So, when we begin to think 
about legislation in terms of how to deal with companies that want to get 
out of selling auto insurance, but continue to make a profit on their other 
business, that's one group. But it seems to me that our approach to com-
panies that are only selling auto insurance, ought to be placed, perhaps 
possibly in a different kind of a category, so that they do not lose money 
as a result of 103. Because they can't make it up any place else, since 
that's their whole business. What may, in fact, happen is that since they 
are now making money in the auto insurance business, and some of these other 
companies don't want to sell auto insurance, maybe these people will just 
make more money by selling auto insurance if we set it in such a fashion 
so they don't lose, or don't have the possibility of losing as a result of 
Prop. 103. Just a comment. 
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CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Well, one of our staff members did some quick 
calculations that the penalty assessment on Travelers Insurance, if they 
completely nonrenew their entire book of business and our legislation gets 
passed, would be something in the range of $25 million initially. That the 
•.. that would provide a pool of money to start with, to subsidize some of 
the people who can't afford to buy the insurance that the companies are 
willing to write offers. So, I don't think we're going to run out, run into 
a situation where literally there is no insurance available in California. 
We just all have to work together and stay calm to get this done. 
Let's see who haven't I called oni've been jumping around on my order 
here, Allstate Insurance. 
MR. MICHAEL J. VELOTTA: Senator, my name is Mike Velotta. I'm Assis-
tant General Counsel from our horne office in Northbrook, Illinois. Allstate 
appreciates this opportunity to appear, but more importantly to answer your 
two questions. Allstate is renewing its automobile insurance in the State 
of California and we are writing new business that meet our underwriting 
guidelines. I think it's important and I •.. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Good, your policyholders feel they're in good hands. 
MR. VELOTTA: Appreciate that, sir. I appreciate this exercise of the, 
if you will, the hunt for the guilty and the praise of the good. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Well, you know, it's been hard to sort out the facts, 
and we don't want all insurance companies to get brushed with the color of 
what some are doing, some are--you know, and certainly we want people to 
know the companies that are available, that are accepting applications, that 
are renewing their policyholders. Your policyholders want to know. 
MR. VELOTTA: I understand that, Senator. I think the larger issue 
though becomes no matter which way the Supreme Court decides on Proposition 
103 the fundamental issue to be addressed still, is how do we reduce the 
cost of the system to benefit the consumers. That is the issue to which we 
are dedicated to working with you, as we have in the past, because it's 
going to require some very creative solutions, something that's going to 
be fairly difficult to fashion, but one that we're committed to working on 
and seeing that it gets done. Because it has to be done no matter which way 
the Supreme Court decides on 103. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: The first thing we want to do, is make sure that 
everybody is going to stay around to be there to work together on the solu-
tion and then to forge what has to be a solution to bring down the cost of 
the system in order to make sure that on a long term basis the people get 
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what would hope to get. Now, I've been juggling my list and I don't 
... Century National. Is there anybody ... stay where you are you guys, I'll 
just ask the two questions. Are you renewing your current policies? 
CENTURY NATIONAL: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Are you accepting applications to meet your under-
writing criteria? 
CENTURY NATIONAL: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Thank you. And is there any Farmers ... have I asked 
anyone from Farmers yet? Ah. 
MR. EDWARD E. MATHEWS: You have not. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: My apologies. O.K. I've been--once I got off the 
order, it's been juggling. Are you cur •.. Is Farmers Insurance renewing your 
current policyholders? 
MR. MATHEWS: Our chairman was to appear to read a statement. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Would he like to come and appear at 1:00? We would 
be glad to have him then, if you prefer to have him answer the questions. 
MR. MATHEWS: We had told him that he would be here between 11 and 12, 
and we would call him ahead of time. Your staff told me that ... 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: I know, I know, we did. And we've been doing a 
little bit of juggling. 
MR. MATHEWS: Yes. I will submit his statement. And let me simply 
say that we have enough faith in our constitution and our courts that this 
piece of impossible, irresponsible legislation will be changed by the Court. 
In addition to that we have enough faith in the Legislature to believe that 
we can work with you, together with consumer groups and the rest of the public 
to address the cost problem that have to be addressed if we're going to have 
lower rates. The people have spoken. They want lower rates. We want to 
have them--we want them to have lower rates. We want to work with you and 
the Governor, and the consumer groups, and the lawyers, and all other inter-
esting par ... interested parties to get legislation enacted. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: I agree. But at the current time, yes, you're re-
newing your policyholders, yes, you're accepting applications to meet your 
underwriting criteria. 
MR. MATHEWS: Yes, and yes. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: And you're still providing no smoker discounts? 
MR. MATHEWS: We cer ... we certainly are, yes. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Good. George, I've already asked. O.K. Is there 
any other company that wishes to at this time speak, to say that they're 
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are renewing policies and--that is on the list? Because not all the com-
panies--O.K. great. O.K. If we got a double yes you get to ... 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yes, I would like to (inaudible) 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Are you currently renewing your policies? 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yes, we are. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Are you accepting applications? 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yes, we are. (Inaudible) 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Good. 
(Inaudible comments) 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: O.K. I think you made our good guys list. O.K. 
One more and then I'm going to our City Attorney and District Attorney, 
everybody else is going to be after lunch. 
CAL FARM INSURANCE: You have us on the third list under Commercial. 
We're actually more of a personal lines writer. We're continuing to 
write business. 
CHAifu~N ROBBINS: Good. Thank you. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: Mr. Chairman. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Assemblywoman Waters. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: Could we have the staff to put together a 
typed list of the companies that are renewing ... 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Yes. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: ... and accepting applications, because it's 
very important for the public to know ... 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: We will have that by end of day. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: ... we can disseminate that to all of the press; 
hopefully, they can share that information in their news reports, and some 
of us will do some special reports for that news media ... 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: O.K. Yes, yes. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: ... who would like to have that information. 
MR. JOSEPH: I would point out that my company is trying to operate 
on a business as usual basis. I'm not at all anxious, Congresswoman ... 
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I mean Assemblywoman Waters to pick up everyone else's scraps in this 
State. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: If we sit back and let them leave, we're letting 
them dump their scraps on you. 
MR. JOSEPH: You betcha. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: We're not going to let that happen. 
MR. JOSEPH: Well, O.K., but my company wants to meet its legitimate 
obligations to the consumers in California because we, too, think this 
thing will eventually be overturned. There is a constitution, we think 
it works, and we think the Legislature is now stirred up enough about this 
so that it, too, will do what it needs to do, and we'd like to be part of 
that process. But I don't want to mislead people. I don't think any com-
pany is--I'll speak for my company--my company is not willing to write 
significantly more business in this uncertain climate. What we're willing 
to do, is to do what we've been doing right along, and that is to meet 
as to write our share. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: That's all we ask for right now, is business as 
usual. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: Let me just ask a question ... 
MR. JOSEPH: I don't need a lot of cheap publicity. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: ... Mr. Chairman, I know you're trying to break 
for lunch and 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: We're going to have Ira Reiner and Jim Hahn before 
lunch. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: ... from what I can understand, the preferred 
customer so to speak, I'm not talking about customers who present so called 
risk for any reason. As I understand it from these companies who were up 
here today, are not writing--they're not even writing for their so called 
preferred customers. Is that correct? 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Well, that's a different group of companies. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: No, I know. Is that--am I to conclude that 
for those companies who are discontinued, they're not even writing, and some 
not even renewing for their preferred customers? 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: For the companies that have testified so far, pri-
marily yes, but there are some tricks that we haven't gotten to yet, which 
is basically the trick of--you stop writing in one company, and you write 
in another company. We're going to get to that as the ... in the afternoon 
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portion of the hearing. Let me thank each of you. You will have--anyone 
who wants additional time--you're at the first, you're going to be the first 
one. Sal Bianco will stay during lunch to schedule your additional time, 
and he'll take his lunchbreak later. Let me thank you at this moment you're 
welcome to come back and have more time to speak this afternoon. Let me 
ask District Attorney Ira Reiner and City Attorney Jim Hahn to please come 
forward. 
O.K. Let me ask--this is only going to take a very few minutes. Please 
if you're standin~ leave, if you're sitting stay seated long enough to not 
interfere with our testimony of our two witnesses. I'll get through them 
in very short order. They're going to make brief statements. I appreci-
ate you both making time out of your schedule to be with our Committee today. 
Which of you shall I introduce first? 
MR. IRA REINER: I might--I just put my notes down here and they're 
soaking wet from the table. You must have ... 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Do it ad-lib. Do it ad-lib, Ira . 
MR. REINER: 
soaking wet. 
... made them sweat quite a bit. The table here is just 
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Membersof the Committee. Proposition 103 
is a long overdue and much needed reform of the many abuses and failures of 
the insurance industry. The key here is that the prevailing system before 
Prop. 103 offered neither the benefits of healthy competition, nor the 
protections of a real system of regulation. Proposition 103 corrects both 
of these failings. It puts in their place a system featuring precompetition 
and the protection of an open fair system for controlling excessive and un-
justified rate increases. The consumer protection division of the D.A.'s 
office will use the public standing provisions and the law enforcement tools 
that it provides to ensure that Proposition 103 is fully implemented. For 
many years the insurance industry in this country has fought to exempt itself 
from the riggers of free enterprise in competition. Over forty years ago 
the u.s. Supreme Court declared that the business of insurance was subject 
to the antitrust laws. The insurance industry went to Washington and within 
a year obtained passage of a complete exemption of insurance from the anti-
trust laws. California and all fifty states followed suit and passed sweet-
heart laws which purported to regulate insurance. But, in fact, were simply 
passed to ensure antitrust exemptions for this industry. Since then insur-
ance companies have been able to collude and conspire together regarding how 
to compete with one another and what rates to charge customers--consumers. 
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In most other industries this would be criminal. Ironically we now hear 
from the insurance industry complaining about an errosion of free enterprise. 
When this industry has fought for more than forty years to remain free from 
the pressures of competition, and it is of course competition which best 
protects consumers from overcharges and abuses. In fact in California 
consumers have had the worst of both worlds, neither the protections of the 
f k · t. . h . f 1viqorous 1 ree mar et ln compe ltlon, nor t e protectlons o a proconsumer regu atory 
system. Proposition 103 changes all of that. In place of the current lose 
lose situation for consumers,the initiative injects competition in this 
marketplace and also provides for a regulatory check on unjustified rate 
increases. The insurance industry is now subject to California's laws 
against monopoly and restraints of trade, including price fixing and agree-
ments to limit competition. It further requires that rate increases be 
subject to public hearing and regulatory approval. Some say that this form 
of rate regulation eliminates competition. Don't believe it. The initiative 
only prohibits excessively high rates, not lower competitive rates. The 
Proposition permits and encourages ~gressive price competition among insur-
ance companies including discounting among those firms that chose to do 
so. And it would put an end to collusive agreements which eliminate 
competition. In approving Proposition 103 the people of California expressed 
their belief that competition and not collusion should govern the marketplace 
for insurance. The D.A.'s office through its antitrust section plays an 
active role in enforcing antitrust and unfair practice laws. But until Proposi-
tion 103 those laws could not be enforced against insurance companies. Now, 
they are no longer exempt. And today I'm serving notice to the insurance 
industry that as District Attorney I will most certainly enforce these laws, 
these new laws for the first time which are applicable to their industry. 
Civil and criminal charges will be filed against insurance companies which 
violate State laws prohibiting collusion. But fraud is another question 
that the insurance industry has brought up, insurance fraud as one of the 
primary causes, if not the principle cause of the high premiums. But until 
they were faced with a limit, on how much they could hike their premiums, 
they never really cared about insurance fraud. Until Prop. 103 they were 
able to pass on every dollar of fraud to the public. The insurance companies 
never paid for the fraud, the public did. Insurance companies felt that 
fraud wasn't their problem, it was the public's problem. And why should 
they care, fraud didn't hurt them, it only hurt the public. For years now 
the D.A.'s office has tried with little success to encourage insurance com-
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panies to cooperate in the criminal prosecution of fraud. By in large all 
we got from them was posturing. I might just make a side here, there is 
just one principle exception, and that's the Southern California Auto Club 
which standing pretty much alone among insurance companies, has tried to 
deal with insurance fraud. A year ago, I proposed a simple program to the 
insurance industry that would have greatly reduced fraud. We suggested 
such basic things as not writing policies on cars without first examining 
the car. We sent these recommendations to every insurance company in the 
State, and with only a handful of exceptions, the insurance companies chose 
instead to simply pay fraudulent claims and forget about it. And why not? 
As I said fraud wasn't their problem, it was the public's problem. But now 
under Prop. 103 that they can't hike their premiums without limit, they've 
suddenly become concerned and that is solely because of Prop. 103. Now the 
insurance companies are also alarmed at the prospect of having their rates 
regulated. Under Prop. 103 any insurance company has the right to argue 
for a rate increase. They will not be denied justifiable rate increases. 
However, under Prop. 103 it is now a fair and open fight, with open hearings 
before the Insurance Commission. And on behalf of the consumers in Los 
Angeles, the D.A. 's office will appear before the Insurance Commission to 
oppose any increase which is excessive or unjustified. 
Now, in conclusion, the voters of California have spoken with force 
and clarity. They do not believe that the California insurance system of 
today serves them well. Among a number of alternatives from all quarters, the 
people chose Proposition 103. The people have spoken for greater competi-
tion, greater protection from excessive rates, and greater openess to the 
public. The mandate is clear. Proposition 103 must be implemented promptly 
and vigorously, and the people of California expect nothing less. Thank 
you very much, Mr. Chairman. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Thank you. I have a question for the two of you, 
but I want to hear first from our City Attorney, and then I'll ask the two 
of you the question. Our City Attorney was one of the few politicians who 
did actively endorse and support Proposition 103, and in fact you even sent 
more money to it than my campaign committee did, so your political judgment 
is certainly not in question. Our City Attorney, Jim Hahn. 
MR. JAMES HAHN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We spent the last four months 
listening to the insurance companies $75 million campaign against insurance 
reform, and trying to package their no-fault as the salvation for us. And 
we spent the whole morning listening to them say how 103 is going ruin 
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them and destroy them if it's implemented the way the people passed it. 
I think Proposition 103 can be implemented,especially in what we've heard 
today. A point brought out by earlier testimony that it's also known from 
a national insurance consumer's organization that the insurers actually 
paid out only 61¢ from every dollar they collect. Now, you heard them 
mention that l/3--that would work out to maybe 67¢ to 33¢, is kept in 
reserve for future claims that may have happened that year, but might not 
be paid for another year. So if you take that money, that leaves them all 
that money for reserves and for overhead expenses, including executive 
salaries that often exceed $1 million a year. We know how they make the 
money, they said that they make the money on their investments. They invest 
our premium dollars and beat that financial benefits before they ever have 
to pay out the claim, which may take several years to go through the courts. 
And you know those reserves they were talking about, that allows them to 
show a loss even though the money hasn't left their hands yet. Those 
reserves they just don't keep under a mattress either, they invest it. I 
don't have any quarrel with that, that's a good business practice. But I 
do have a quarrel with the constant whining by this greedy industry that 
reaps millions of dollars in profits, use these accounting gimmicks to 
show losses that actually are not occuring, and pays their insurance execu-
tives more money than most people earn in a life time. We have yet to see 
the companies that do business outside California really open their books 
and show us the investment income that they can allocate to their Cali-
fornia figures. They keep telling us that they're losing money in Cali-
fornia. Well, you know, I understand that there are some network cameras 
here, so I would like to hear from the insurance industries which states 
are you gouging by excessive rates to make up for the losses you're incurring 
in California? We look at the figures, Insurance Commissioner Roxanni 
Gil1espiesaid that insurers had posted an average return on their net worth 
at 10.3% during the past five years, that's including their accounting 
gimmicks shown in their losses, and 11.7% just last year. Last year the 
insurance industry had a total profit of $868 million. Now, we watched 
them raise all their rates before the campaign. Some insurers were raising 
them 15% and 25% getting ready for Proposition 103. So, they've already 
socked that money away. You know what has galled me, is that they fought 
every single attempt by the Legislature to get--enact meaningful reforms. 
Reforms that you proposed, Mr. Chairman, Assemblywoman Maxine Waters to 
try to do something about redlining. You know my mother has been driving 
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for forty years, she has never had an accident that was her fault. She 
has never had a moving violation. But she lives in zip code 90043 and she 
pays $2000 a year to insure a 1980 Oldsmobile. Now, if that isn't excessive 
' 
I don't know what is. The insurance companies say that they're losing money, 
I think what we need to see that reforms are implemented through 103. And 
one of the things that is going to have to happen, is how the Legislature 
implements it through the structure of the new elected Insurance Commissioner. 
That office and the way it's defined by the Legislature will be the founda-
tion on which long term insurance reform will be built in this State. Eleven 
other states have elected insurance commissioners, and their influence has 
been used to stabilize rates, and to keep rates down. The key to maintain 
the will of the people as expressed in 103, is to allow the insurance com-
pany to have the authority and the resources to police this industry. The 
new office should be adequately staffed with qualified actuaries, qualified 
auditors, and other professional staff who can wade through the different 
sets of books kept by the insurance companies. I urge you to make Cali-
fornia the home of the best regulated and fairest insurance industry in the 
country. And I also urge you not to swayed by the unsubstantiated cries 
of wolf from the insurance company, as they attempt to persuade you that 
they're going out of business. Make them prove it to you. Ask them about 
the way they use the accounting gimmicks, like these inflated reserves. 
They are coming dangerously close to proving the case that Ira Reiner is 
going to need in showing that they are in violation of antitrust laws, anti-
boycotting laws, and unfair business practices. I might add that our City 
Attorney's office has a consumer protection division that will be looking 
to see that insurance companies doing business· in the City of Los Angeles 
are not committing unfair business practices. Finally, I urge consumers 
to fight back against this insult to the democratic process by paying close 
attention to the conduct of all the companies who are testifying here today 
and watch what they do, watch what they say, and make your choices in pur-
chasing insurance by seeing how responsible the insurance companies behave. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Thank you. I said I'd have a question for the two 
of you, and I'm certainly pleasedthat Los Angeles has two top law enforce-
ment officials who both understand and are involved in the insurance issue. 
My reading of current California law pre-103, 103 clearly repeals any anti-
trust exemption that the insurance companies have, is that current Cali-
fornia law gives the insurance companies an exemption from the antitrust 
laws for the purpose of exchanging rate information. The justification for 
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it historically was, so that insurance companies could set fairer rates 
and it is a practice that has been in place a number of years. That's 
repealed by 103. So, clearly their exempt on any discussions they've 
had up 'til 103 is put into effect on questions of rates. However, if we 
correctly read the law, current California law, the exemption does not apply 
to any discussion or collusion with respect other than to rates and the 
decision to cease doing business is clearly not a determination of rates, 
because if you're not doing business, you're not--there's no involvement 
of rates. 
MR. HAHN: As you know the California Attorney General has filed suit 
against several insurance companies who have refused to provide liability 
insurance to cities, basically accusing them of boycotting small cities 
in terms of insurance, and that is filed under antitrust law so I agree with 
you, Mr. Chairman. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: What I would--you know, my question to you, my sug-
gestion to you is if you agree with our reading of the law perhaps the two 
of you would be interested in working jointly to assist the Attorney General 
with respect to the question of whether or not there--with respect to any 
collusion to leave the market, to not write business, there has been a viola-
tion of existing California law. Needless to say, once the Supreme Court 
puts into effect the 103 provision, you have a much broader law to work with. 
MR. TOM PAPPAGEORGE: Senator Robbins, my name is Tom Pappageorge. I 
assist Mr. Reiner. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Yes, we've talked before. 
MR. PAPPAGEORGE: We've talked before and I supervise the--what I call 
the crime units of our office, including our anti-trust and consumer sections. 
I think your understanding is precisely correct and it raises an issue of 
some importance. The current anti-trust exemptions--those which were repealed 
by 103--protected the industry from anti-trust prosecution for some behaviors 
that could amount to collusion to leave a marketplace, or collusion to boycott 
certain classes, or groups of customers. This is the essence of the Attorney 
General's and many states current lawsuit against a number of insurance com-
panies that/}~f¥ed as a group to eliminate competition by refusing to do 
business with certain consumers. To the extent that there is collusion for 
an agreement today to leave the California marketplace, I think at the very 
least this raises an important anti-trust question. Unilateral decisions, 
decisions by one firm by itself are one thing, an agreement by a group to 
take action to leave a marketplace, or boycott a certain group of clients 
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raises a real anti-trust question. 
in which 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Well, we know the dates/they made their decisions, 
with the exception of one company, those dates were all between November 7 
and November 10. It would certainly seem to be an area that the two of 
you may have an interest in working together to assist the Attorney General 
on. 'Cause there's certainly some--I'm not, you know I have no information, 
no one has given me secret file of meeting of insurance executives that took 
place at Perino's, but it certainly would seem to be something that your 
two offices may wish to do some looking at. 
SENATOR DAVIS: Mr. Chairman. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Senator Davis. 
SENATOR DAVIS: I'd just like to say to the insurance companies, the 
next elected Insurance Commissioner might well be sitting at the witness 
table. I would therefore suggest to you that you work cooperatively with 
Roxanni Gillespie in the intervening time. 
(Chuckles) 
MR. REINER: So that there may not be any misunderstanding 
Senator Davis, I don't know who you're are talking to, you're not talking 
about me. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: If there are no further questions from the Com-
mittee we will take that promised thirty minute lunchbreak. There's a 
cafeteria on the second floor for those who are dashing. We will resume 
at twenty minutes after one for one hour of Committee hearing. 
-LUNCHBREAK-
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Please take a seat. As promised we are going to 
wrap up our afternoon portion in one hour. We're going to use approximately 
one-half of that time for insurance companies and then we're going to use 
half of it for the other groups, that are very important groups that are on 
our agenda. If one of our staff could--or somebody in the back of the room 
could flip the light switch, we'll be--it will light up my life. No, I 
meant flip it the other way. Mr. Martin, I promised you time earlier, and 
I appreciate your allowing us to bifurcate your presentation to the Com-
mittee. We thanked you earlier for saying ''Yes, you're writing policies," 
and "Yes, you're renewing," and "Yes, you're accepting applications for 
people who meet your underwriting criteria." You had something further 
you wanted to say to us, and I promised you we'd listen. 
MR. MARTIN: Thank you very much, Senator. My name is John Martin. 
I'm president of Aetna Life and Casualty's personal financial security 
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division. I'm glad that you invited me to this meeting. We want very much 
to explain to you and the voters of California our reaction to Proposition 
103. First, let me summarize our present position. We believe Proposition 
103 is fundamentally flawed, as a matter of law. We believe that it will be 
overturned. There is a constitution and because we believe so strongly in 
the correctness of our legal position, we are continuing to write and renew 
new business in California, including private passenger automobile business. 
We are not going to be run out of this business. We're not willing to turn 
our backs on almost half of the State's electorate, who when offered a free 
lunch, said "no, thanks." All that said, I'd like to devote my remaining 
comments to an explanation of why we do so poorly out here, particularly in 
the private passenger automobile business. But I want to say that we don't 
consider ourselves to be above the fray or below the fray. We have a common 
cause with our customers, our agents, and the 2500 people,/CNtifornia 
citizens who work for Aetna Life and Casualty. We have always wanted to 
reach a common ground. Unfortunately, I think we would all agree that the 
noise got to loud and the voices have been blurred. Therefore, I start with 
a message of regret from Aetna to our customers. Obviously, we have been 
unsuccessful in explaining fully what makes the insurance product we sell, 
the automobile insurance product that we sell, so expensive, how it could 
be made less so, and why Proposition 103 is not the answer to the problems. 
Let me do that now. Like any other business the price of the insurance pro-
duct is determined by the underlying costs, the costs of medical care, auto 
repair, legal fee~ etcetera. Those costs for Aetna are increasing more 
rapidly in California than in the rest of the country. Mr. Nader's asser-
tions of exhorbitant profits aside, we just don't make money in the private 
passenger automobile business in this State. They are--his statements are 
simply not correct. Let me show you our experience with private passenger 
automobile in California since 1984. I have a colleague here who has some 
charts. I think all of the Members of the Committee have my statement and 
have these charts available. If you don't, I have ... well ... 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: One of the sergeants can distribute those. 
MR. MARTIN: We will see that ... I think we supplied enough for each 
Member of the Committee. Now, I'd like you to look at this one first. 
Jason,do you want to do this? I'm talking about private passenger auto-
mobile for Aetna Life and Casualty in California only. If you look at our 
experience in California over the past four years, you'll note that we lost 
a total of $12 million. That number is after all investment income, on 
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loss reserves, unearned premium, filling charges, and anything else. That 
includes all of our revenue and all of our outgo. Now, if you take a look 
at the next one, very quickly, the next chart breaks our revenues down. 
It shows our premiums and how the premiums and other revenue and expenses 
are distributed. I think more telling than those, perhaps, is the third 
one ~h shows our loss costs. I'm not talking about the industry, I don't 
know about the industry. I know about Aetna Life and Casualty. Our loss 
costs and the increase in those loss costs in California versus the rest of 
the country. Our California loss costs have increased by 60% between 1984 
and 1987. In 1987 Aetna paid an average of $9700 for each bodily injury 
claim in California. The nationwide figure was $5850. I think most people 
are aware that the ... 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Let me just--I'm, you're on bodily injury claims ... 
MR. MARTIN: Yes . 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: ... or is this the chart you're on? 
MR. MARTIN: That's loss--no. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: No, o.k. 
MR. MARTIN: That's a separate statement. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: O.K. Is--does he have the chart on this, or ... 
MR. MARTIN: No, but we can--we can ... we know where to ... the 
charts. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: O.K. No problem, I just wasn't finding the chart, 
now I know why. 
MR. MARTIN: All right. O.K. We experienced 30% more auto theft claims 
in California than the national average. So, as you can see, we've consis-
tently lost money on our private passenger auto insurance in California. 
The bottom line, there is no exhorbitant profit. The facts are, there's 
no profit at all. Proposition 103 does nothing to reduce the costs that 
are driving up insurance rates. If those costs are not brought under control, 
then rates must continue to increase. We can only go to the 103 well so 
often. What we really need is not more initiatives by public referendum, 
but rather more legislative initiative with thoughtful input from all of 
the parties that are interested in this process. Aetna strongly believes 
that a no-fault system as it exists in other states will have the greatest 
impact on costs, and thus the greatest benefit for the consumer. Other 
avenues need to be exploredsuch, Senator, as you have indicated as mediation 
of bodily injury claims, reducing unnecessary use of the health care system, 
and ways to better uncover and prevent insurance fraud and automobile thefts. 
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This is a flexible and fluid legislative agenda. My company is prepared 
to work with you, your colleagues, and all of the other parties of interest 
to develop a consenus and an agenda that addresses the cost issues and puts 
this system back on its feet. Thank you very much, and I hope you have 
some questions for me. 
SENATOR DAVIS: Can I ask a question? 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Senator Davis. 
SENATOR DAVIS: A fast question, what percentage of your policies have 
a claim during the year for personal injury? 
MR. MARTIN: Senator, the number is in the 10% range, I don't know 
precisely what it is. But the point I would make is, that our obligation, 
and I think you would agree with us, our obligation to people who don't have 
claims is at least as important to those who do. Because it's their money 
that we're spending. And I think, I think companies can do a better job. 
I think the system can be improved. But clearly the result is lousy, and 
we need to fix it. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: O.K. But the--I don't disagree with you on that, 
and I certainly want to be especially kind to anyone who's writing policy 
and accepting renewals. 
MR. MARTIN: And I appreciate that, Senator. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: You're--clearly, you know, you're records show you're 
losing money. Over the last few years, how high a priority have you made it 
to push in Sacramento for the changes in the system, to make that system 
more efficient to make the system more affordable for the insurance companies 
and for your new partners after Proposition 10~ the policyholders? 
MR. MARTIN: That's a hard question to answer, you know. How much 
priority have we put on it? Aetna writes 1% of the private passenger auto-
mobile market in California, and the reality is that our smack is not as 
great as some other companies. But I think our level of interest and our 
activity in a bunch of reform, system reform, kinds of activities goes well 
beyond our market share in this State and others. I would submit that we 
have been a fairly active participate in efforts to make the system better, 
to control the cost. I listened to the District Attorney and I do not agree 
with his assessment of the situation in terms of the responsiveness of the 
companies. My company stands ready and willing to work with him or anyone 
else, to do something about a system that really, really does need a lot 
of repair. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: No, no, question about that. Senator McCorquodale. 
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SENATOR McCORQUODALE: Mr. Chairman, Mr. Martin, the atmosphere in 
the Capitol where you say that we ought to go back and deal with the problems 
there has been one that's driven by whatever forces, the insurance companies 
have been in one corner and the lawyers in another corner and the citizens 
in another corner, and ... 
MR. MARTIN: Until I would just--excuse me, Senator, but until 103 
passed the citizens haven't been involved at all, I would ... you know, I 
think the citizens, I think 103 does one thing. It elevates the role of 
the citizens appropriately, that's the only good thing I can say about 103. 
SENATOR McCORQUODALE: They've certainly been involved, but they've 
been manipulated. 
MR. MARTIN: I think you're right. 
SENATOR McCORQUODALE: And--but for the insurance company to come, for 
you to be here, and to say that nothing has been tried, I mean, the Chairman 
himself has introduced more than a dozen bills dealing with this issue. 
But there's several legs to this whole issue. One leg that we can't ever 
get anybody to deal with is the ability of people to get insurance. I 
think that was a large motivation to driving 103, was not necessarily the 
people who could get insurance and it goes up, because that's a factor I 
have to pay a little more, but it's not near that big a problem. But for 
a small business company, a brand new realtor, as an example, who can't 
buy their insurance, I mean they react negatively to anything dealing with 
insurance. Because all that's important to them is to be able to get a 
policy covering their liability, they can't get it, and therefore they have 
a negative reaction. Until we can deal with the issue on a broader basis 
of the availability of insurance, a reduction, and we just can't con-
tinue to say that the answer is no-fault. Because first of all the citizens 
had that chance, and they spoke against it. 
MR. MARTIN: Yeah. 
SENATOR McCORQUODALE: Because me listening to my constituents, they 
aren't too excited. Say that attorneys can't take cases on contingency fees 
when you're using our policy dollars to hire a bank of attorneys that are 
there every day, twenty four hours a day if you need them, all day. The 
claimholder isn't going to be able to get an attorney. That's not the 
answer. 
MR. MARTIN: Senator ... 
SENATOR McCORQUODALE: It's going to be relied a great extent on your 
ability to put together a proposal that's reasonable, because these folks 
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proposals they can sell to 
a proposal that can sell? 




all, I 't to 
all those answers. You make a number of very good points. And you 
more about the State of California than I do. I think I can tell 
some degree of confidence, that the prob that you're now 
deal , and they're very s , are not to Ca i 
Some them have been dealt with fair effect in uri 
tions. I thinkit makes sense to try to turn the temperature down a tad bit, 
and take a look at these problems. And for us to come proposal, 
I think our stature as an industry, is pretty damn low in this public 
opinion environment right now. I think this is something that needs to 
done cooperatively by all of the parties at interest. And I think all of 
us have to be willing to give up a chunk of our hide. This win-win, win-
lose mentality is going to cost all of us a bunch of money and the public's 
esteem for a long time to come, I think. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Senator Rosenthal. 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: Yeah. Added to what you said, is that people had 
an opportunity some time ago to vote on a Prop. 51, in which they were told 
by the insurance industry that not only would insurance be lower as a result 
of it, but that it would be available. And we found out that it wasn't 
available to local government, it wasn't available to the nursing home, it 
wasn't available to the child care operation, and so you fooled people then. 
You cou 't continue to fool them. That's the thing that's coming through 
to me at least. 
MR. MARTIN: And I don't want this to sound like a cop-out, 
ause my primary area of responsibility is on the personal line side ... 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: Yeah, I understand. 
MR. MARTIN: ... You're getting in to some commercial issues now. My 
perception, however, Senator is, that those coverages have been fairly 
ly available in California recently. There was a farr~bleak period 
s industry, a bleak period for everyone I might add. I think, my 
is, that Proposition 51 resulted in some relief and some improve-
But probably didn't meet the level of expectations that was generated 
ing the campaign. I would say that's a more accurate assessment of the--
Proposition 51 ended up. 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: The •.. yeah ... I just lost my train of thought. 
MR. MARTIN: In fact, could I make one comment on this issue of 
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of reserving? The reserving of personal lines, lines of business, is not 
all that mysterious. Because as someone pointed out earlier, the duration 
of those claims tends to be a lot shorter than some of the very long tail 
commercial lines of business, medical malpractice, and products liability. 
To the extent that my company can help this Committee better understand 
how that process works, we are more than happy to do that. We really are 
willing to open the kimono, because this thing just doesn't work. This 
intrigue doesn't do anybody any good. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Let me ... Assemblywoman Waters. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: Let me just maybe make a statement, raise a 
question. But, you have talked about reform and a willingness to work with 
other legislators, et cetera, to reduce these costs. That's important. 
Because as you talk about the fact that the costs of insuring has gone up 
because of all of those factors, the health costs, the cost of automobile 
repair, etc., etc., surely you must understand, as we understand, that there 
is a saturation point, when people cannot afford to have what the law 
mandates them to have. 
MR. MARTIN: Yes, yes, I do. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: All right. And you know, when you, and if you 
say that you simply have to increase your cost because that's the nature 
of the business, and you know, the premium cost will continue to go up 
then you're right. Not only do we have this confrontation, but people 
won't buy it anyway, because they can't afford it. Now, what have you done, 
or have you thought about it, and when I say you I mean the industry, to 
look at reduction in cost other than just come in and do the confrontational 
thing on tort reform, us versus them, the lawyers and the insurance com-
panies squaring off. What about repair? Automobile repair? What about 
other kinds of things in the system? If we have all of these problems, I 
mean, I don't know but it seems to me that there needs to be some creative 
attention given to how we reduce the costs? 
MR. MARTIN: And I agree with you. And there are programs that work 
in other jurisdictions that I think could be applied here, having to do 
with the relationship involving bodyshops, insurance companies, and cus-
tomers ... 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: That's what I want to hear, and I haven't 
heard any of that in the state. 
MR. MARTIN: O.K., yeah. And I think, and I'm not the Aetna authority 
on all of those. But we have programs like that and they work pretty well 
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a of states. And Aetna Life Casual I'm sure is not 
in that effort. We have arson spec lists in each our 
c operations and we've done lots and lots s, as I've 
before Senators, to make sure that we spend the premium dollars that have 
been entrusted to us by the people who don't have claims, to make sure 
we spend those as prudently as we can. Are we perfect? 1, no. 
Can we better? Sure. But I submit you can too and I'm 
to to help you and I want you to help me. I 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: Question. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Senator Rosenthal. 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: Yeah. It slipped my mind what I was ... Would you 
interested, I mean, as one of the ways of dealing with smaller cases 
for example, I once suggested at a Committee hearing in which representa-
tives of the attorneys were sitting here, and the insurance were sitting 
there, and I said "what about the idea of a threshold below which there 
wou then be binding arbitration." And the attorney said "we'll go for 
that." And the insurance says "no, that's no good." 
MR. MARTIN: Well, I certainly would not take anything off the table. 
I think when you look at binding arbitration, you have to take a look at 
the process by which it works. But am I unalterably opposed to binding 
tration? The answer is no, I'm not. 
same 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: O.K. I might ask that same question of some others 
enting other companies. Because it seems to me that, you know, we've 
hearing about the 90% of all the cases that are below a figure 
we eliminate the problems of lawsuits and what have you for things, 
small amounts of money. 
MR MARTIN: I think you make a good point. And I think that's the 
int that the Chairman made earlier. We call it different things. 
But, we're talking about disposing of relatively small claims efficiently 
kly. Not only does that save money, but it gets the money into 
the hands who, of the people who deserve it quicker. And it seems to me 
to be part of our objective too. It reduces expenses, but it 
to have a process Senator that is fundamentally fair to all of the 
es at interest. So I ... 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: You've got two parties, they select the arbitrator. 
MR. MARTIN: O.K. 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: That's the way those things usually happen. The 
answer I got from the insurance industry was/~Hgt were not willing to do 
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I'm talking about the representatives. 
MR. MARTIN: I ... I don't know. 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: O.K. 
MR. MARTIN: I 1 m just telling you what I think. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: O.K. Well, we thank you for coming all the way 
here from Connecticut. We thank you for bringing us the good news, that 
you're renewing and still writing policies. We're going/~~udy your existing 
suggestions. What you might want to do, and I think we're going to survey 
all the insurance companies, is to ask your people to submit, brainstorm, 
and submit all suggestions of the things that the Legislature could do to 
let's . down the cost of the system. And let's get and/see what we can f1nd 
on the list that can be implemented. 
MR. MARTIN: Aetna Life and Casualty will be a substantial contributor 
to that list. Thank you, Senator. 
CHAIP~N ROBBINS: Thank you. I want to get on to some of the other 
agencies, besides insurance companies. So, if we're only going to hear 
from two other insurance companies today and the rest of the insurance com-
panies will get to repreive 'til we resume our hearing and we've reserved 
two dates, Tuesday, December 13 and Wednesday, December 14. Tuesday, 
December 13, Van Nuys State Building. Wednesday, December 14, here in this 
auditorium. The two that I would like to hear from at this hearing are 
USF&G and State Farm. 
Laura Sullivan, Vice President, Counsel and Secretary of State Farm. 
And on behalf of USF&G,Carl Swanson and Richard Profenberger. 
home. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: Where is State Farm? You State Farm? 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: They're going to be up here momentarily. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: I was over to visit them yesterday, they weren't 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: (Chuckles) That's why they weren't home, because 
you were over to visit them. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: Just wanted to say "Hello." 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Let me, let me start with USF&G, because my ques-
tions to you will be quicker. 
My understanding of what my staff advises me, is you are renewing your 
existing policyholders? 
MR. CARL SWANSON: That is correct. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: But, you're not writing new policies in the State 
of California? 
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. SWANSON: That correct. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: O.K. My is, USF&G has an extens te e-
campaign going, including on Ca iforn a say 
that--I won't try and redo the jingle for you, 'cause I never to 
a tune, I don't even do happy birthday very well--but the g of t 
is auto, home, business insurance--we're USF&G. Am I correc sum-
zing the TV commercial without the talent of- s one of you 
musically inclined than ... 
MR. SWANSON: I believe you're right with that comment. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: O.K. 
MR. SWANSON: But, I'm not musically inclined either. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Shouldn't something be done, since you're not ac-
cepting new applications, shouldn't you change your advertising in Cali-
ia? If nothing else, have the California stations run a print over on 
screen that says "not accepting auto applications California"? 
MR. SWANSON: I'm not sure I can address that specifically. What I 
wou like to do is read a statement that I have concerning our actions 
in California, if I might. 
SENATOR McCORQUODALE: Checked by the attorney. 
MR. SWANSON: I'm sorry. 
SENATOR McCORQUODALE: Checked by the attorney. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: No, we don't want the statement. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: I'll make it easier for you since we're short on 
If you'll just look into that one issue for us, and get back 
to at the next hearing. And perhaps if, I mean it just seems like 
save a lot of convenience for the people who are out there looking 
auto insurance. And, I mean I don't, you know. I am pleased 
're renewing your existing policyholders. I am not ecstatic about 
your refusing to accept new applications. But, at least you're not making 
tho lem any worse. If you're not accepting new applicants for your 
rent policyholders, it would seem that putting something on your Cal 
TV commercials would becr benefit both to the people who are out 
e looking for auto insurance, it saves them the trouble of calling, 
also for your agents who write insurance through USF&G, it saves 
the trouble of getting the call saying "I just saw the TV ad, I need auto 
surance, can you give me a quote?" So, if you could look into that and 
k to us, we'll consider your participation for today as having 
and give you--let you enjoy the rest of the afternoon while we grill State 
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Farm. 
MR. SWANSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We will take that message to 
our executives and have an answer for you. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: O.K. Thank you. State Farm. Miss, Ms. Sullivan? 
MS. LAURA P. SULLIVAN: That's correct. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: There has been--State Farm is renewing ... 
MS. SULLIVAN: That is correct. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: ... its existing policyholders and they are, if I'm 
correct, on existing policyholder~ if they've been allowed to pay on a 
monthly basis, a nine pay plan in the past, they're being allowed to con-
tinue paying on the same plan they were paying previously? 
MS. SULLIVAN: That is correct. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: O.K. State Farm, as has been reported to us, is 
doing two things that seems to be creating a problem. One is, on new ap-
plications, you take new applications, but am I correct that you no longer 
allow new applicants to pay on a monthly basis and you require them to pay 
the full annual premium in advance? 
MS. SULLIVAN: If I might, I would like to also give a statement, the 
same courtesy that has been extended to other witnesses, and I will respond 
to that question as part of that. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: O.K. Let me give you a second question, which to 
also respond to as part of your statement and that is, that what I under-
stand is that State Farm is no longer allowing its policyholders to be 
written through State Farm--now, State Farm Mutual is the name of the 
preferred company? 
MS. SULLIVAN: That is correct. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: And the other State Farm company is? 
MS. SULLIVAN: State Farm Fire and Casualty Company. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: O.K. That what State Farm is doing is that no 
one is being allowed to renew within State Farm Mutual? 
MS. SULLIVAN: That is incorrect. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: O.K. I didn't say all the information that's out 
there is correct. 
MS. SULLIVAN: All right. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: And that the policyholders are being required, who 
are in State Farm Mutual are being required to write their policies through 
State Farm Fire and Casualty which generally means a premium increase of 
20-40%. 
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MS. SULLIVAN: That is also incorrect. 
RMAN ROBBINS: O.K. Why don't you tell us is correct? 
MS. SULLIVAN: All right. State Farm is st wr oi auto-
le insurance in the State of California, insuring more than three 
ll California vehicles. The size of our policyholder family this 
State reflects our substantial interest in the subject of these ings. 
licyholders are as concerned as Cali 's about the ri 
st of automobile insurance and the future of the surance lace 
in this State. There are many studies, including some by your own staff, 
emphasize that claim cost drive premium rates. Several factors 
cause claims to be higher proportionately in California than in the rest 
of the country. And in the interest of time, I will not go through all 
of those items because many have been covered earlier. State Farm has been 
concerned about the affordability of automobile insurance since its founding 
1922, by a retired farmer in Illinois who felt there ought to be a way 
to e the cost of insurance for his rural neighbors and to eliminate 
some of the inefficiencies in the insurance company operations. As a result, 
he and his neighbors formed State Farm as a mutual insurance company. And 
from the beginning State Farm has determined its own rates, independently 
from other insurers, developed its own policy forms, and its own rating 
ifications. State Farm began doing business in California in 1928. 
established its first office outside of Bloomington, Illinois in 
l , California in that same year. Although State Farm has grown 
1 1 d · h . 1 . d . 1indCalifornia11 . dramat a y an lnsures over tree ml llon rlvers to ay, lt stl remalns 
to its founding principles. As a mutual insurance company, 
Farm is owned by its policyholders, rather than by shareholders. 
ing results are better than expected, dividends are paid to 
lders, rather than to shareholders. Since 1971 State Farm has paid 
, totalling more than $1 billion to its customers. The most recent 
was this year, when more than $157 million was returned to policy-
s in eighteen states and the District of Columbia. In 1987 the com-
more than $201 million .•. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Was California one of the states? 
MS. SULLIVAN: In 1987 the company paid more than $200 million to 
customers in twenty states. Dividend decisions are based on the experience 
f state separately and California was not included in these recent 
announcements because of the enormous underwriting losses the 
has experienced in this State. I would add that in the 1970's 
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over $58 million was returned to policyholders in California in the form 
of dividends. State Farm's auto insurance operations in California have 
an underwriting loss in each of the last five years. The amount 
of c losses has ranged from $46 million in 1984 and 1986, to $207 
million in 1987, and $361 million for the twelve months ended June 30, 
1988. For the twelve months ended September 30, 1988, the underwriting 
loss has grown to $399 million. The magnitude of these California under-
writing losses certainly exceed any and all investment income, which could 
be attributed to California. Through June 30, 1988, State Farm's under-
writing loss was 20.2% of earned premium. Countrywide investment income 
for all lines and all states, from all sources, would have been about 12% 
of earned premium. Even after investment income is considered, State Farm 
is losing dollars on every car insured in California, and the situation is 
growing worse. The cost of auto insurance is determined by the operating 
expenses and the claims expenses of an insurance company, and State Farm 
works at controlling both internal and external costs. Evidence of this 
is as follows. State Farm's operating expenses are among the lowest of all 
insurers when compared to its total premiums. For your information, State 
Farm's general expense is 17.5% of earned premium, compared with 25.9% 
industry wide. That does not include our claim adjustment expense of 11.6%. 
Similarly, claim adjustment expense was not included in the industry wide 
number. State Farm has nearly 2100 claim employees and 61 claim offices, 
more than 2000 agents in California. These individuals are trained 
to handle claims quickly and fairly. Some of these are in a network of 
in claims service centers that provide speedy one-stop service for 
policyholders and claimants. State Farm has programs for managing costs 
and the quality of care in injury claims. Including such things as special 
rehabilitation services, and monitoring hospital costs. State Farm claim 
representatives are trained to spot and to investigate suspicious or 
fraudulent claims. State Farm supports the Insurance Institute for high-
way safety, which is devoted to reducing the cost of human and economic 
damage from motor vehicle accidents. I've had the privilege to serve as 
Chairman of that Institute for the last two years. State Farm supports 
the National Automobile Theft Bureau, which helps locate and identify 
stolen vehicles and prosecutes thieves in all fifty states. State Farm 
helps fund the;tPfM£~F~vention Institute, which attacks insurance fraud 
by prosecuting swindlers and publicizing prosecutions. And State Farm 
works cooperatively with the fraud bureau of the California Insurance 
-89-
Department and with other law enforcement officers in is State. State 
been instrumental in breaking monopo control of 
stribution, and pricing of automotive crash parts. resul com-
ion, in that industry, has lowered prices for these parts and has 
he to reduce claim costs. State Farm supports strong laws to control 
under the influence of alcohol and other drugs. And prov s 
for such organizations as the Mothers Drunk Dr , and 
Against Drunk Driving. We that many factors cause cl to 
so expensive in California. Many are included in the report that was 
by the staff of this Committee, and published of this 
year. The high cost of claims relfect the congestion on your freeways and 
met litan areas, the type of cars Californians drive, more cars with 
higher claim cost proportionately, and fewer cars with lower claim cost 
ionately, higher than average health care costs, and significantly 
more lawsuits related to auto accidents, particularly in Los Angeles County 
the rest of the country. These are serious and complex problems. 
are problems that all of us, consumers, legislators, and insurers share 
They are problems which should bring us all together to seek 
ful and considerate solutions. Certainly on behalf of State Farm, 
I'm telling you today that we are committed to sitting down and working with 
and your staff at any time and place to work on solutions to pro-
b I've already enjoyed the opportunity to visit with staff of this 
in Bloomington, Illinois, opening our books to provide a variety 
f answers to questions you asked. State Farm is committed to 
le insurance and to protecting our policyholders when claims are 
f ed. We need your help to address the problems identified earlier. P 
and passage of solutions to these problems, State Farm has had 
to act now to protect its current policyholder group. For that reason, 
Farm announced Monday, that it will remain in the Californ auto 
ranee market. But we cannot continue to except new customers at the 
rates currently charged by State Farm Mutual automobile insurance 
State Farm Mutual will continue to renew policies at existing rates 
company will continue to write new cars, and new drivers, at existing 
rates in the Mutual company for current State Farm policyholders. Similarly, 
State Farm policyholders moving to California from other states will continue 
to be underwritten in the Mutual company. State Farm will also continue to 
new applicants through its affiliated company, State Farm Fire and 
Casualty Company where the rate charge will be based on drivers experience. 
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State Farm Mutual typically writes 10,000 new cars in a week's time. Of 
that number, 5500 are vehicles newly acquired by current State Farm policy-
holders, and those cars as I have indicated earlier will continue to be 
written at State Farm Mutual. Also, State Farm Mutual policyholders moving 
to California will continue to be written in State Farm Mutual. Similarly, 
State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, which has been doing business in this 
State since 1960 for automobile insurance, and which typically writes about 
4000 new cars each week, will continue to treat applicants as they have been 
for the last time and prior to the election. The only change is that new 
customers coming to State Farm for the first time will be considered only for 
coverage in State Farm Fire and Casualty Company. State Farm's decision 
reflects the commitment to provide insurance to its current policyholders 
and to provide a market to other drivers in California. At a time when other 
carriers are considering withdrawing from the California market, State Farm 
is taking actions that will enable it to continue to keep its promises to 
its current policyholders. It's a fact, however, that State Farm must stop 
its burgeoning losses in California, we have to remain able to pay legiti-
mate claims. We seek your help and commitment to addressing the causes of 
those claim losses. With regard to your earlier question about the accept-
ability of monthly, or timely payments. Policyholders in State Farm Mutual 
will continue to be able to take advantage of various time payment programs. 
Policyholders who have been with State Farm Fire and Casualty for at least 
a year have full access to those programs as well. And that will apply to 
new customers. But new customers who are corning to us for the first time, 
and I would have to say I was out in California last week after the election, 
and with the initial turmoil in the insurance market I noticed every news 
cast began with "who's doing business as usual" and State Farm's name was 
at the top of the list. Our agents were getting a lot of inquiries, we--
the company reached a management decision, enough is enough with the losses 
we have faced, and on that basis have implemented what/~~lieve is a 
responsible and reasonable short term position with regard to the current 
problems. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: O.K. Let me see if I understand that short term 
position. And I guess, in essence, what we're all talking about are short 
term positions, because we've got to get through the short term before we 
can get to any kind of long term approach. 
MS. SULLIVAN: Right. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Typically what is the differential in rate? 
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Between rate for a given driver 
Farm ... Is it State Farm F 
zip between State Farm Mutual 
and Casualty? 
MS. SULLIVAN: That's correct. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: State Farm Fire and Casualty. 
MS SULLIVAN: Within State Farm Fire and Casualty we two pr 
classifications and this will have to be modified as all insurance 
must be, because will apply to different classes 
But essentially someone who comes to State Farm F and Casual 
have some traffic convictions, or a chargeable accident, would be 
wr at the base rate of State Farm Fire and Casualty for all dr 
classif ations combined is about 60% higher than the rates in State Farm 
Mutual. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: See, I was wrong when I said was 40% more. 
MS. SULLIVAN: When--if a driver who--that is for a driver with, who 
not be eligible for consideration by State Farm Mutual. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: I understand. O.K. 
MS SULLIVAN: For a driver who has a record that does not have charge-
ab accidents and serious traffic convictions, they may qualify for what 
we call the standard discount rate which for all driver classifications is 
ly 20% higher than the rate charged in State Farm Mutual. I've 
the qualification because it will vary, for example, for a youthful 
dr it might be 13% higher. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: O.K. So, therefore, the--for the new applicant, 
e 
who not currently have any relationship with State Farm by sending thatnew 
1 to State Farm Fire and Casualty, rather than State Farm Mutual, 
the rate is on the average probably 20% higher then. Is that a fa , a fa 
. SULLIVAN: A fair approximation. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: O.K. Now, has State Farm made any change in its 
ing criteria on renewals, as to whether a person who's currently in 
State Farm Mutual gets renewedin State Farm Mutual, or in State Farm Fire 
Casualty? 
up 
. SULLIVAN: There has been no change. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: O.K. Based upon what you've told me, and I've 
judgment and I know that Harvey Rosenfield has a statement he wants 
make, and I believe Senator Roberti may have some questions. But, based 
you've told me it sounds like State Farm needs to do more beefing 
public relations department, then its fraud investigation depart-
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ment because it would appear that the information over the last few days 
of what State Farm is doing, has not been fully and completely reflected 
in the reports that have been in the news media. 
MS. SULLIVAN: I know our public relations department has been very 
busy responding to questions from the media, but I confess they're not 
perfect either. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: But •.• let's--why don't we move on, some Committee 
Members have some questions. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: What is, is it GEICO that is being referred to 
as a subsidiary of State Farm? 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: No, they're not--they're, they ••. (chuckles) They 
would not like being referred to as a subsidiary of State Farm. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: I'm sorry. I remember quickly reading some-
thing about one of their subsidiary companies and it was in the initial •.. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: No, it's State Farm, it's State Farm Mutual and 
State Farm Fire and Casualty are the two companies that are involved and 
I apologize for the fact that we're not going to have time to get to GEICO 
today. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: Then they're the other scoundr--I mean the ones 
that are charging their rates, higher rates. That's what I like--and active 
insurance company--we're going to have fun out there. 
SENATOR ROBERTI: It .•. 
MS. SULLIVAN: Assemblyman, I would like to make the point, we have not 
changed the rates charged by State Farm Mutual, or State Farm Fire and Casu-
alty. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: O.K. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: I understood that. It just ... 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Harvey did speak, because I know you wanted to have 
some ... 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: ..• followed them into another .•• 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: ... comments whenever you want to, you can ••• 
SENATOR ROBERTI: It strikes me that you still have ... 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: ... respondmSenator Roberti's question if you like. 
SENATOR ROBERTI: ... that you still have raised your rates, maybe not 
to the extent that the press reports have indicated, but your response 
really has been one of raising rates for a new policyholder and ... 
MS. SULLIVAN: We believe we've acted responsibly to provide them with 
a market. 
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SENATOR ROBERTI: Well, you also have a market many a 
ance in California. I think you sell s, 
MS. SULLIVAN: State Farm Mutual writes $1.6 billion of earned 
i automobile insurance, the only other premium written by State Farm Mutual 
California is for health insurance, and that amounts to about $42 million. 
SENATOR ROBERTI: So, you're only, you're only automobile insurance? 
MS SULLIVAN: State Farm Mutual is ... 
SENATOR ROBERTI: But what about State Farm Fire and Casua ? 
MS. SULLIVAN: State Farm Fire and Casualty is the largest writer of 
homeowners insurance in this State. 
SENATOR ROBERTI: Well, so I ... 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: It's about to become a very large writer of auto 
insurance. 
SENATOR ROBERTI: No, I think, I think, I think, I, I ... 
MS. SULLIVAN: It has, it has grown to be ... 
SENATOR ROBERTI: ... in all deference to you ... 
MS. SULLIVAN: ... one of the ten largest ... 
SENATOR ROBERTI: •.. in all deference to you I think State Farm Fire 
and Casualty makes a handsome profit. And you are the same company, it 
happens to be the company my homeowners is on, as is my automobile. So, 
I mean, all this is in my mind subterfuged where you're saying, you know, 








SULLIVAN: Well, State Farm Fire and Casualty did have a--State 
and Casualty had a profitable year in 1987. State Farm Fire and 
had a very unprofitable year in 1985. You may recall that about 
anes hit the country, in that particular year. And the State 
and Casualty Company is much more susceptible to the catastrophic 
ses. It is that company that wouldbear the loss of an earthquake 
1 It's that company whichbears the loss of major fires in the 
State. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Well, if those five hurricanes didn't shake you 
out of ng business, this hurricane of ... 
SENATOR ROBERTI: I don't, I don't think State Farm Fire and Casualty 
s fail to write new policies in homeowners because it's terribly profit-
to them. And since you •.. 
MS. SULLIVAN: State Farm Fire and Casualty ... 
SENATOR ROBERTI: ... are ... since you are writing policies where the 
prof is high and continuing and have done quite well in California, the 
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biggest insurer in California of automobiles, it strikes me as strange 
that with some kind of problem you've indeed raised your automobile insur-
ance now by roughly 40%. That is a quantum differential in my mind. 
MS. SULLIVAN: Senator, I--would you like to clarify with the 40% 
raise in automobile insurance ... 
SENATOR ROBERTI: Well, by switching 20-40% whatever figure has been 
given. By switching, by switching ... 
MS. SULLIVAN: We have not switched any policyholders. 
SENATOR ROBERTI: By switching your operation from one company to the 
other, I haven't noticed that you have switched, or you have referred •.. 
MS. SULLIVAN: We have over •.. 
SENATOR ROBERTI: ... profitable homeowners elsewhere. 
MS. SULLIVAN: ... nearly three and one-half million automobile policy-
holders in this State who have not had their rates changed or switched from 
one company to another. 
SENATOR ROBERTI: I'm talking about doing business in California. I'm 
not only talking about people who hold automobile insurance now, but people 
coming into the market. It's fine when you can milk the cream off the top 
on your homeowners, when somebody new comes into the market, but for the 
new Californian who wants to have a policy, which we represent too, you 
say "no, no". You only want to milk where you think the going is good, a 
good farmer I would say, but you don't really care about any obligation 
to a State where you have really done quite well. Probably better than 
any other insurer ... 
MS. SULLIVAN: Senator, I think that's unfair to suggest ... 
SENATOR ROBERTI: ... in the State . 
MS. SULLIVAN: .•• that we are doing nothing for people in California. 
We are providing the largest market of automobile insurance in this State. 
SENATOR ROBERTI: And that would have been my position until the day 
after election where your company seemed to show egregious amount of con-
tempt for the voters. 
SENATOR DAVIS: Mr. Chairman. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Senator Davis, and then I want to give Harvey 
Rosenfield a chance. 
SENATOR DAVIS: If Senator Roberti is, and I'm sure he is, insured by 
your company then doesn't that make Sen--it's a mutual company, therefore 




ROBERTI: I'll gladly return it so I 't 
Senator, if I could see State Farm reenter new pol lder 
ASSEMBLYMAN JOHNSTON: Senator, just--before you get to that--just so 
we stand it. You're certainly not telling the Members your 
in the same manner as your chief tors? 
MS. SULLIVAN: We think we are serving more Ca i ornia 
any our competitors. 
ASSEMBLYMAN JOHNSTON: Well, that, that doesn't answer question, 
does ? You happen to have a larger market share. But in fact, other 
large companies that testified, such as Allstate and Farmers and the Auto 
Clubs, and Mercury and others, testified that they were continuing to 
write new business on same basis that they did before the election, isn't 
correct? 
MS. SULLIVAN: That is what they've tes fied. 
ASSEMBLYMAN JOHNSTON: And have you not testified that you, State 
Farm are applying different criteria to new business now, then you did 
prior to the election? 
MS. SULLIVAN: With some of the new business, that is correct. We 
our marketing plans independently. We did not consult with our compe-
ASSEMBLYMAN JOHNSTON: We'll see ... 
MS SULLIVAN: ... with regard to our decisions. 
ASSEMBLYMAN JOHNSTON: Well, I'm not suggesting that you d 
ting that State Farm is not behaving in the same way after 
But I 
, as it did before, even though your competitors have seen fit to 
cent in business and take some risk by doing so, as they've testified. 
to minimize that risk by narrowing the scope or the focus of 
that you will write and taking people who would otherwise meet 
your underwriting criteria for State Farm Mutual, and putting them in your 
casualty company at higher rates. 
MS. SULLIVAN: I believe our competitors also have increased their 
ates California during this year, a decision which maybe our management 
ld have done also. So, they are writing those customers at higher 
rates they were writing them on January 1st, where as we are not. 
ASSEMBLYMAN JOHNSTON: So, it is your position that that is a variable 
somehow evens the score? 
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MS. SULLIVAN: We're not concerned with evening the score. And again 
those decisions are made by those companies independent of what's State 
Farm's doing, are decision is made independently of what they are doing. 
But I think ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN JOHNSTON: Haven't you noticed that at least among the 
legislators there is a view that companies ought to continue to do business 
as they have prior to/~~~ction, at least until the court acts? 
MS. SULLIVAN: I, I understand that sentiment. 
ASSEMBLYMAN JOHNSTON: Right. And while there may be a lot of dif-
ferent facts, and management decisions in 1988 then previously, with respect 
to a whole lot of things, basically we expect after November 8th, 1988, for 
companies to stay in place and in the market and not try and take advantage 
of a situation, to the detriment of their competitors in this interim. 
Since you are the largest actor in the market, how can we not conclude that 
State Farm is trying to take advantage of this situation by limiting its 
risk, different from all the major insurers that you compete with? 
MS. SULLIVAN: Again, I would hope that the Committee would take into 
consideration the number of Californians which we currently serve and are 
continuing to serve. 
ASSEMBLYMAN JOHNSTON: All right. Well, we've heard that speech many 
times, but it's non-responsive. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: O.K. Harvey, I've been promising you a moment to 
speak. 
MR. ROSENFIELD: Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Committee. Thank you 
for permitting me to make a couple comments. First, I want to commend you 
for starting to pull the veil of secrecy away from the insurance industry, 
actually permitting themselves in their inept way to pull the veil away 
from their own practices. On the State Farm point, it's our impression that 
I may have misunderstood this, but I think I heard pretty clearly that State 
Farm is taking people who would normally qualify as new customers for the 
preferred category and placing them in a different category. That's dis-
crimination under the current law, in my impression, but specifically under 
Prop. 103 when it goes into effect, there's a provision in there that pro-
hibits that kind of activity. Taking people who are justified in receiving 
the rollback for their particular risk and undercutting that by putting them 
in a different category. More to the point of what most of the witnesses 
have said here today. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Harvey, let me ask you a question on 103. 
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Since 
're required to take people who quali as good dr s anc} 
scount as of of 1989, them--from, 
fectively switch them from-- isn 1 t r word, we re 
about new applicants, put them into the State Farm Fire and Casualty 
rrttes, higher rate group, rather than the lower rate group now, wouldn't 
be required if the person wanted to go into State Farm Mutual and 
as a good driver after Noverr~er of '89 to allow son to 
? 
!V1R. ROSENFIELD: No, the way the initiative is wr the good iver 
scount would be permitted for that particular licy that person holds. 
itiative is silent on requiring a customer to be 
, or one branch of a company to another. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: O.K. O.K. 
one 
MR. ROSENFIELD: Let me make a couple comments I think/~g~td clarifv 
testimony of the witnesses with respect to losses. Because we've heard 
lmost unanimously from every single company, that they're los 
In fact, not only are they losing money this year, and not on will 
lose money on Prop. 103, but they claim they've been losing money for 
years. What they are asking us to believe, and of course lie 
s not believe this, because it's not true, is that they're a 
h . c.1ar:1 for us here in California. It's a non-prof , or a chari 
to us insurance because we want--because we need That's obviously 
not true. What's happening is, the companies are--what they're call a 
iting loss, includes the estimates of future losses. That's been 
with what's happened before the Committee today. Because when 
thev've--they've taken a loss, it's not just a loss out of 
year, they're talking about projections of future losses. And that 
the difference lies between saying that they lose $1.50 for every 
take in, and they only actually, as our data shows, 
out about 64¢ on the average, for every dollar they take 
actual 
On 
about costs, the gentleman from Aetna mentioned a willingness to 
ate with the Legislature, and I think what he was talking about when 
-the code words are tort reform. I want to point out to the Committee 
fasc ing event in Florida, when there was a rollback coupl with tort 
form, restrictions on victims' rights awards and lawsuits, the--Aetna 
tted a document, as it was required to, after the rollback went into 
ffect, the legislation required them to submit evidence of how much the 
tort reform so called, would actually lower their rates. The 
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document that they submitted showed that there would be no rate reduction, 
from the tort reform. I'll provide the Committee with these documents. 
After the fact, they stood before the Florida public and before the Legis-
lature and said there would be no cost reductions from the tort reforms 
they proposed. However, the Aetna person did suggest some things which I 
think would be,can be hopeful about. That is a commitment now that they 
are going to be forced to lower their rates. To really come to Sacramento 
and push for other kinds of things like, 
loss prevention practices. These are the kinds of things I think Prop. 103 
and particularly the irradication of the exemption from the antitrust laws 
will lead to, as competition creates a marketplace that forces these com-
panies to become more efficient. Finally, on the point about not enough 
time to--that the rollback is unacceptable in Prop. 103 because there is 
not enough time to prepare to have it implemented. One of the witnesses 
mentioned, "well, we just simply can't comply that fast with the rollback". 
The industry had enough time to hire enough--eighty lawyers to prepare a 
200 page lawsuit to bring the day of the election. And I have to believe 
that there's still enough lawyers remaining to the industry for them to 
prepare the guidelines or work with the Insurance Commissioner. The guide-
lines under which, if they could indeed open their books and prove that they 
need an exemption from the rollback, that they could have done so. Thank 
you very much. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Thank you. Thank you very much for testifying with 
us today. O.K. We have five other people that were on the agenda, Char, 
I presume with the Insurance Commissioner's office, gets to be put over to 
the December hearing, that you won't complain? And the Association of 
California Tort Reform, I think that's just too complex to try to deal with 
in a few minutes. Let me ask, we have three consumer groups, and let me ask 
each of them the question, if each of them would prefer to make/fhree minute 
statement to the Committee, or if they would prefer to make an extensive 
statement at--on either December 13 or 14. O.K. Come and have a seat. 
That's my kind of statement. 
SEN. McCORQUODALE: That'll be a new record if you do it in two minutes. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: We've got a--we have a time watch right here. O.K. 
Two minutes. Two and two is four. Have a seat. You want to do two minutes 
is that your? One-two minutes, two minutes, one minute. If we could please 
have everybody's cooperation in keeping it quiet for these witnesses. I 
happen to feel that the consumer organizations are a very important part of 
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s. have been a very important to to br 
cost the system. The Consumer's I were at last 
moment late last year, negotiating would if i 
the tiative number 6 that would have been on the bal that wou 
lanced initiative approach before Consumer 1 s Union ided we 
cou dn't--that it was too late in the game to be able to do that. But, 
certa your organization's been present Sacramento some 
and I must be honest with you, that somebody had me n to ten 
years ago my response would have been 11Well look, those groups--you know, 
don't really understand what's going on and you know, the naive." 
Then or four years ago I would have said "well, yes they're one of 
p ersn. And I have to tell you within the last few years I've come to 
regard it as the best objective voice that we have to deal with in--on many 
these consumer issues in Sacramento. Who would like to go first? 
You it. Two minutes. 
MR. WALTER ZELMAN: My name is Walter Zelman. I'm the executive 
ector with Common Cause. We supported both Propositions 100 and 103. 
I want to commend Senator Roberti for your press release this morning sug-
ing to consumer advocates and Department of Justice, we think that's 
a positive step ..• 
siz 
SENATOR ROBERTI: We didn't have a chance to raise that ... 
MR. ZELMAN: It was a, it was ... 
SENATOR ROBERTI: .•. it was this morning. But, thank you for empha-
point. 
. ZELMAN: It was in Proposition 100, we think would be a pos 
SENATOR ROBERTI: Yes, I know. 
MR. ZELMAN: I think we're here largely for two reasons today. The 
f t i the insurance industry flopped every effort to make reasonable 
to insurance reform in the State of California. Judith Bell with 
Consumer's Union and myself, many others, advocated before many of you for 
of modest, temperate, consumer reform proposals that were far 
103, the insurance industry frankly, beat back every one of them 
and we were never able to make any progress whatsoever. I think, however, 
lature has to assume some responsibility for the way we are today, 
Legislature was unable to effectively address what was clearly 
largest economic crisis that California faced in the 1980's. I think 
e to both those failures has been a very, very tough initiative 
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which we supported, and which has many strengths. But, in many cases, I 
think, it is possible that certain of the definitions, certain of the roll-
back provisions, may provide some real hardships for some companies in 
some lines. What I would suggest you do, as a Legislature, and I would sug-
gest the same to the regulators, is as quickly as you can, get the best 
evidence you can, get people in a room, get the companies to put on the 
table the data they have denied to us for many, many years, try to sort out 
where the problems are. If there are some real hardships, some real prob-
lems with some companies in some lines, and if in some cases the insolvency 
test is too steep, then you can make some modest adjustments in those--
maybe in some definitions, or the regulators can make some creative steps 
to try to adjust to make everybody live with this. So, I would try to urge . . 
you to work as agressive as you can to effect 103 to the greatest extent 
possible, to get the companies to go along and to try to recognize it in 
some extremely, in some cases there may be some really harsh impacts and 
they may have to be modified somehow. Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Thank you. Judith. 
MS. JUDITH BELL: Yes, I'm Judith Bell. I'm the director of special 
projects with Consumers Union. We're the publisher of Consumer Reports. 
And we also supported Proposition 100 and 103. I want to make two points 
here. The first is that, I think what was obvious from State Farm's comment . 
is that they are trying to essentially avoid the provisions of Proposition 
103. The Department of Insurance this week was quoted in the newspaper as 
stating that they saw State Farm and Geico's move as being one of unfair 
discrimination under current laws. And I would hope that both the Depart-
ment of Insurance and the Legislature would put pressure on these companies 
to not try and figure out creative ways to avoid the initiative, but rather 
to work creatively to implement it. The second point is, that there have 
been at least nine petitions to the Department of Insurance requesting an 
exemption for the rate rollback. Yesterday, we went to the Department of 
Insurance and asked for a copy of one of these petitions and was told we 
could not receive it. I would suggest that the Legislature might want to 
request copies of those petitions to see what's in them. To get ... 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: The request will be--the request from this Committee 
will be before the Commissioner's office by--in writing by 5:00p.m. Char, 
would you please consider this as an oral request and that we would prefer--
we would like to have the application made available to us by the afternoon 
if that's possible and/~6ur Xerox machine permits. 
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MS. BELL: These should be pub 
s s 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: You, you ... 
MS. BELL: ... about how the initiative should be 
f are actual problems with specific 
comment is that there are plenty of ways to 
i surprising not 
I think all of us can on, 




that in the long term there will 
strategies. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Jim. 
to some 
MR. FRANK SHUBERT: Very briefly, Frank Shubert. 
CHAI&~AN ROBBINS: I'm sorry. 
MR. SHUBERT: I am president of the As ation for 
And I'll keep my remarks brief. I agree with 





Cal a Tort 
Ms. Bell 
that is a 
to reduce costs. We are prepared to work with s Committee, 
Senate Judiciary Committee, and other parts of the Legislature on sides 
to those. I would only point out, however, that most the cost re-
ion items that have been mentioned would deal more al 
automobile area. And Proposition 103, as you know, appl s 
than automobile, professional liability, commercial 1 




across the board. We're prepared to work you on that. Because 
1 
matter whether 103 is upheld or rejected, or rnodif or 
st to do--occur today will continue to se. We do 
problem. We do have excesses in the 1 
to address those. We're happy to work with all the 
you. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: O.K. Let me thank each of you. Let me 
ttee Members for their participation--just a second-
from here. We will have a Committee hearing. We 
r 13 in Van Nuys, December 14 in--here in the State l 
you re going to have your choice of two dates. 
MR. JOHN NORWOOD: Senator Robbins, just for a couple 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: John, I would--my--1 apologize--we've s 
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run out of ... 
MR. NORWOOD: Give me--please give me at least two minutes. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: A minute and a half. 
MR. NORWOOD: O.K. That's fine. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: On the clock. 
MR. NORWOOD: John Norwood, with the Insurance Agents and Brokers 
legislative counsel. I think it's appropriate that we maybe appear with 
this part of the segment as insurance agents and brokers are probably the 
largest consumers of insurance products in this State, certainly, then 
to sell it to the consumer--the insurance buying public. I've got to tell you 
I'm probably no less than stunned at the development of this hearing. Your 
Committee, and your staff asked our Associations to prepare some rather 
extensive information about what the status of market was in California 
and what it is today. We probably could have saved you maybe three or four 
hoursfi%d~ing through that. We will certainly try to save your staff some 
time tonight because we do have the list of what companies are doing right 
now. I ... 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: If you could do that--go over it with our staff, 
that are--then our.staff can ... with you can prepare it ... 
MR. NORWOOD: That's fine . 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: ... for release to media ... 
MR. NORWOOD: Fine. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: ... and to the other legislators. 
MR. NORWOOD: If your staff, if a sergeant would like to distribute 
that to the Committee Members and, of course, we have some press kits here 
for the same information, if there's any press left here today to go through 
that. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: We will do what--we will release for you with our 
information in the morning. 
MR. NORWOOD: O.K. We'll be happy to participate in your later hearings 
on this. I just want to indicate that this initiative substantially effects 
insurance agents and brokers in California. We're very disappointed. We 
didn't get the opportunity today to express those effects and how they effect 
the marketplace. Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Yeah, we're disappointed too, John. It's just a 
matter of I've just only so much time and I'm trying to do justice to a lot 
of subjects and information that we need. I thank everyone, and I will see 
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Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: 
My name is Harvey Rosenfield. I am the Chair of Voter Revolt, the 
organization which led the citizen campaign for Proposition 103. 
Ten days ago, citizens California voted to approve Proposition 103, 
a comprehensive reform of the insurance industry designed to lower 
insurance and bring accountability and competition to the insurance 
marketplace. 
a $75 million campaign of false advertising and ad homonym 
of which were delivered _directly into the living rooms of 
voters through their television sets, the citizens of California 
rejected the insurance industry's anti-consumer initiatives and its baseless 
attacks on 103,joining Voter Revolt in a word of mouth campaign that 
involved over 175,000 volunteers and reached 1.1 million homes over the last 
months. Against the unlimited resources of the insurance industry, 
Voter Revolt, with some 150 staff, a budget of$2.3 million collected from 
individual contributions averaging $15 to $17, and the endorsement of the 
trusted consumer advocate Ralph Nader, won a major victory for California 
consumers. 
Yet today, California voters are startled and angry to find that Prop 103 
is, for the second time, the subject of a massive insurance industry assault 
which asks the coUrts to become a shield to protect the privileges and 
excessive rates of the insurance industry against the sovereign will ofthe 
people. 
Proposition 103 is "on hold," stayed by an order of the California 
Supreme Court in response to eleven lawsuits filed by some eighty lawyers on 
behalf of the entire national insurance industry. The legal attack comes as no 
surprise -- the insurance industry had promised it weeks before the election, 
once it became clear that Proposition 103 was likely to win. 
But what has shocked and outraged millions of voters is the post-election 
behavior of the insurance industry in defying the will of the people. In the days 
after the election, we have witnessed a stark portrait of the insurance 
industry, its supreme arrogance and contempt for the voters of California and 
the rule of law. 
We have seen, in fact, the insurance industry employ a strategy which it 
has attempted to use in every state in which consumers rise up to demand 
reform the insurance industry: the systematic creation of chaos and 
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disorder through threats made by dozens of insurance companies to 
withdraw from the California marketplace accompanied by efforts to evade 
the requirements of Prop 103 in anticipation of the Supreme Court's decision 
to permit Prop 1 to go into effect. 
the events of the last ten days: 
• Non-renewals, withdrawals. Within hours passage of Prop 103, 
Aetna, Fireman's Fund, Travelers, State Farm and other insurance 
companies began to cease operations, threatening to pull out of the California 
marketplace. Many consumers were informed by their insurance companies 
that would not be renewed; others were left in limbo. A number 
companies announced they simply would not obey Prop 1 03. 
• Evasion. Some companies have begun to implement plans to evade the 
required reforms of Proposition 103 by sending existing customers to 
subsidiary companies, or by shifting new customers to affiliated operations 
that just happen to charge 20% to 60% more than normal rates- the latter 
being State Farm's recently announced approach. These actions are unlawful 
-both under Prop 103 and even under existing law. 
Why are the insurance companies behaving in this fashion? What they 
could not win through a $70 million campaign of distortion the insurance 
companies now want to win by sheer intimidation and brute oppression-- the 
freedom to continue to plunder the pocketbooks of policyholders in California. 
What we have witnessed here is nothing less than political blackmail and 
extortion by the insurance industry. 
Experience in Other States 
Unfortunately, California is not the first state to be targeted by the rage 
and wrath of an industry which refuses to accede to reform. 
Consider this statement by William M. McCormick, chairman and 
chief executive officer of Fireman's Fund Insurance Company: "It's a 
disaster. And if it spreads ... to other states, it would be a catastrophe.'' 
Or 
affairs 
comment by Minor Carter, the Vice President for government 
USF &G Corporation: "This is a Draconian, onerous measure .... " 
the warning of a spokesperson for Continental Insurance: ''[It] has 
interfered our ability to adequately price our product, and we cannot 
justify on new business .... " 
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Or the thoughts of Aetna: ''The price rollbacks would force us into a 
money-losing position and that makes it impossible to write any new 
commercial policies .... " 
Sound familiar? Yes, but this isn't California in November 1988. These 
are the hysterical statements of insurance industry executives responding to 
a 40% insurance rate rollback ordered by the Florida legislature in 1986, as 
quoted in the June 10,1986 edition of the New York Times,. 
The Florida rollback passed a constitutional challenge by the insurance 
companies, went into law, and the industry learned to live with it. Despite the 
threats, virtually every insurance company continued to sell insurance in 
Florida. 
Threats by California Insurers May be Part of an Organized Boycott 
Californians may rightfully wonder whether the threatened 
withdrawals and disorder created by the California insurance companies 
are, indeed, part of a pre-arranged effort to punish California voters for 
approving Prop 103 and pressure the courts and/or the legislature to 
somehow protect the insurance industry from Prop 1 03's reforms. 
For example, the 200 page lawsuit against Prop 103 submitted on behalf 
of dozens of insurance companies, including Allstate, Farmers and State 
Farm, on November 9 contains the following paragraph, obviously written 
days if not weeks before the passage of103: 
"Proposition 103 will immediately and irreparably injure the insurance 
buying public. Because of the drastic rate rollback, reduction and freeze, 
many insurers may be expected to stop writing new policies. Thus, 
starting today, consumers may confront problems finding insurance for 
new cars, homes and businesses. New residents, persons who want to 
change insurance companies, and persons who are currently uninsured 
may find it difficult to purchase insurance. Persons currently insured, 
whose carriers respond to the passage of Proposition 103 by non 
renewing coverage, may also have no place to go." fPetition for Writ of 
Mandate, CalFarm, et.al., v. Deuk.mejian, p. 3]. 
This paragraph, the sworn statement of every major insurance 
company in California, is a blueprint for precisely what occurred the day 
after Election Day at the hands of these same companies. If it can be proven, 
an organized boycott of this nature would be a criminal violation of the law. 
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.. Can the Insurance Companies Reduce Their Rates? 
The insurance industry's public opposition to Prop 103 is based on the 
mandated reduction and freeze from November 1987levels. This 
provision of the proposition provides an immediate abeyance of the unjustified 
rates of the last years until the long term reforms of Prop 103 can begin to 
operate. 
The insurance companies claim Prop 103 would force them out of 
business. But Prop 103 specifically permits insurance companies to obtain an 
exemption from the rollback if the insurance companies can show that they 
would be substantially threatened with insolvency if they were forced to 
comply the :rate reductions. 
Have any of the insurance companies opened up their books to public 
inspection in to prove that they cannot afford to :reduce rates? Not one. 
Instead, they asked the Supreme Court to, in effect, keep their books 
closed through judicial intervention. 
Why? Because their books will show that the vast majority of companies 
- particularly the largest ones -- can afford the rollbacks. 
How do we know this? A look at the little data that is available to the 
public demonstrates that the insurance industry's claims of poverty are false. 
The insurance industry uses greatly inflated estimates of future claims in 
determining their "losses." These phantom future losses, though deducted for 
tax purposes~ are invested and earn still more profits for the companies. But 
they never materialize: 
• Between 1982 and 1986, auto insurance companies in the state of 
California paid out an average of 64 cents for every $1 of premium they took 
from customers. 
__ ., • Between~982 and 1986, other property-casualty insurers in 
California paid out only 56 cents, on the average, for every $1 of premiums 
they received. 
The figures above do not even take into account the fact that each 
premium dollar, when invested, produces $1.12 or more, depending upon the 
market. Most of the insurance companies in California can easily reduce 
their rates under Prop 103 without coming close to losing money in any year. 
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... Moreover, a huge portion of the premium dollar goes to waste and 
inefficiency on a massive level. For example, according to Best's Aggregates 
and Averages (1988), 23 cents of every dollar of auto insurance Fireman's 
Fund wrote in 1987 went to defense lawyers' fees and 28.9 cents went to 
agent's commissions, executive salaries, and other overhead expenses. 
Contrast that with USAA, a company which itself does exceptionally 
well in the insurance business and is appreciated by customers for its 
excellent service. It paid 12.3 cents per premium dollar to its lawyers, and 6.9 
cents per dollar to overhead. 
Finally, the insurance companies have failed to institute loss prevention 
practices which could easily reduce payouts by reducing the number of deaths 
and injuries . More rigorous safety standards would obviously reduce the 
number of claims. Why don't the insurance companies pay attention to loss 
prevention? Because insurance companies' profits are based on the gross 
amount of dollars they take in - the more the companies pay out, the higher 
the rates, the more premiums there are to invest. 
The insurance industry is always pleading poverty, claiming to lose 
money in every state. But its national profits are huge and increasing - up 
700% since 1985. 
Instead of accepting the insurance industry's propaganda, the 
committee should today demand that insurance companies answer these 
questions and provide the data in writing for the last five years: 
1) For auto, homeowner, business, non-profit, commercial and day care 
center insurance, provide the amount of losses which you estimated will occur 
in subsequent years, but had not actually occurred (ffiNR). 
2) For each such kind of insurance, provide the amount that was 
actually paid out on each year's policies in subsequent years. 
~ 
3) Provide your the breakdown of your expenses -- legal expenses and 
adjusters, agent and broker commissions, salaries, executive salaries, 
overhead -- as a percentage of each premium dollar for the above categories 
of insurance. 
4) Provide in writing your reserve policies. 
5) Provide a complete study of claims for each of the above categories of 
insurance, detailing the number of claims made, the number of lawsuits 
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brought, the number settled, the number which went to court, the number in 
which awards were given, the average amount of the award, the cost of 
defense, the kinds of awards and whether the case was appealed, or the 
award subsequently reduced. 
6) Provide a complete description of all loss prevention programs your 
company operates to reduce claims. 
Until the insurance companies open their books, no one in California 
will countenance their outlaw actions. The Wild West of pre-Prop 103 days is 
gone for good. A new sheriff has arrived: Prop 103. 
The Meaning of Prop 103 
Finally, I want to make it clear that credit for the passage of Proposition 
103 goes first to the people of the state of California. Despite more than $90 
million in campaign spending - including over $7 5 million from the 
insurance industry-- the voters of the state of California were able to sort 
their way past a blizzard of false advertising and four other initiatives to 
support Proposition 103. 
What does this tremendous victory tell us? 
First, the people of California waited too long for insurance reform. 
Since the legislature failed to implement even the modest consumer proposals 
put forth in Sacramento as part of our insurance reform coalition, the voters 
themselves passed their own reforms. 
Second, people want both immediate relief from years of high insurance 
rates and long-term, fundamental reform of the insurance system. 
Third, the voters are not interested in limiting consumer protection laws 
or victims' rights, at least not until the insurance industry opens its books and 
puts tangible proof oehind its continuing propaganda that the civil justice 
system is responsible for high and constantly increasing insurance rates. The 
so-called "tort reform" movement of unjustified restrictions on the rights of 
consumers- embodied in the insurance industry's three initiatives-- was 
decisively rejected by the voters on November 8. In our view, there is no room 
for such proposals, either under Proposition 103 or among the people of 
California, until there is proof that they are both necessary to lower insurance 
rates and fair to the long-standing rights of consumers. 
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. Fourth, and perhaps even more important in the long term, the passage 
of Prop 103 is a message from voters to the insurance companies and other 
special interests to stay out of the initiative process, which belongs entirely to 
the people of California. Prop 103 proved that no matter how much money is 
spent, the special interests cannot buy the vote of the citizens of this state. 
For the insurance industry, the choices today are two: you can either 
acknowledge the will of the people as represented by Prop 103, and join with 
consumers in a cooperative effort to fully implement the provisions of Prop 
103 in a reasonable and efficient manner, or you can continue the present 
course of defiance of the law, stonewalling and deliberately manufactured 
disorder. 
The insurance industry's choice in the coming weeks will determine 
whether the transition to a new system is a smooth one, or one which merely 
further fans the flames of the voter revolt which has already exploded in the 
state of California. 
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\ Top 10 California Auto Insurance Companies o/o of Premium Dollar Paid Out for Claims 
Compa:ny 1982 1983 1984 1S65 1986 TOTAL 
State Farm 63.90% 66% 71.60% 62% 64.90% c:? Farmers 71.70% 74.80% 68.30% 64.20% 67.40% 
Allstate 58.90% 67.40% 69.30% 62.30% 66.40% 65% 
Int. Auto S. Cal 70.40% 72.40% 72% 66% 60.20% 68% 
Ca St Auto Assn 48.10% 50.10% 53.101% 53.40% 58.40% 53% 
20th Century 63.60% 62% 65.90% 63.70% 62.50% 63% 
USAA 53% 54.70% 52.10% 63.60% 48.70% 54% 
Mercury 52.90% 53.10% 46.50% 35.70% 38.20% 4l.a:m 
CEICO 60.60% 64.90% 63.70% 57.90% 55.40% 59% 
Nationwide 53.90% 61.20% 59.10% 56.10% 63.30% 60% 
Source: Best's 
1'op 10 California Property /Casualty Insurance Companies 
Compa:ny 1982 1983 1.984 1985 1988 'TOTAL 
State Farm 60.80% 66.20% 65.20% 
. 
58.80% 59.50% 61% Fanners 65.50% 71.30% 66% 60.70% 55.80%. 62% ·Allstate 60% 65.80% 65.40% 66.10% 60.20% 63% Fireman's 58.10% 55.70% 55.40% 63.70% 40.30% 53 AIG 51.90% 63.50% 89.70% 46% 36.50% 50% Crum/Forster 49.50% 50.40% 48% 45.50% 48.40% 48% CIGNA 61.3()0,.f) 62.80% 67.30% 61.70% 46% 58% Ca St Auto Assn 53.90% 57% 54.30% 53.70% 58.40% 55% Int Auto S. Ca 68% 71.60% 71% 65.90% 59.20% 66% Hartford 54.70% 52.30% 61.70% 47.90% 45.80% 51% 
Source: Best's 
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By PETER VAN AARTRUK Jr. 
Florida Correspondent 
WALT DISNEY WORLD-One desper-
ate agent approacht:d Donald Duck. 
who was entertaining the trade show 
at the Flor!da Association of Insurance 
Agents· annual convention. "l):)n't sup-
pose you know anything about com-
mercial liability?" the agent asked. 
l):)nald's only response was a shrug. 
A lot of company executives are also 
shrugging these days when it comes to 
writing commercia! insurance in Flor-
ida. All agents could talk about at the 
meeting was what they perceived as 
an chaotic market getting 
worse. 
Florida U:lv. Bob Graham this ····eek is 
expected to sign legislation which 
orders premium rollbacks and strict 
commercial rate regulation. along with 
reforms in the state ·s civil justice 
system. In resPQnse. 15 to 20 insurers 
have said they .~ili-·nolOnger"w'i-Tte 
comme.rclarcoverage in Florida; others 
say they will-restrict writings ... 
The companies who have pulled out 
represent more than 25 percent of the 
general liability and pacKage premium 
written by FAIA members in Florida. 
the association said. 
Robert Treweek. FAIA's new ex-
ecutive vice president. told convention 
attendees that an agent on the Florida 
Panhandle said three of his four com-
panies were among those who had 
pulled out of the state. 
"You can't survive on renewals." Mr. 
Treweek said. "Agents must write 
new units of business.·· 
He criticized the legislature for pass-
ing a bill which he said did nothing but 
please the constituents of those who 
are campaigning for office in Novem-
ber. "Ninety percent of the legislature 
had no idea what was passed.'' he said. 
Insurance Commissioner Bill Gunter 
now has "more power than he's ever 
had before" in regulating commercial 
rates. Mr. Treweek said. "If he wanted 
to. he could do things that could cripple 
the industry." 
However. he said the commissioner 
is "anxious to cooperate" with the in-
dustry. FAIA will be seeking his "assur-
ance .. that the industry will be treated 
fairly under the new excess profits law. 
he said. 
As a result of a so-called "40 percent 
rate rollback" mandated by lawmakers. 
the industry may have a difficult public 
relations problem on their hands. Mr. 
Treweek warned. 
Rates won't be rolled back per se. he 
said: rather. it's a one-time premium 
credit. Policyholders won't be getting 
40 percent of their annual premium 
back. he pointed out. since the credit 
applies only to the policy period of Oct. 
1 to Dec. 31-a 10 percent credit when 
the policy is annualized. In addition. it 
applies only to commercial liability: it 
excludes workers· compensation and 
private passenger auto. 
For example. he said. on a package 
policy with a 53.000 premium-
52. 100 for property and 5900 for 
liability-the policyholder may think he 
vf) 0J . .'c.:."\ '1:&\ \.\;, \(~\U.11;.lu_ 
'~v..~ !t...f{) \ \C(~\.., 
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would get back40 perce:1t of the total. 
or S1.200. Actually. he'd receive only 
S90. or 10 percent. 
Mr. Treweek said he and FAIA lob-· 
byist Buddy McCue would be traveling 
to meet individually with several ex-
ecutives of companies who have left 
the state's commercial market. Their 
job will be to make sure the executives 
fully understand the bill. he said. 
In interviews with National Under-
writer. company representatives had 
nothing positive at all to say about the 
bill. One executive said privately at the 
FAIA convention. '"There's no market if 
there's no chance of a proftt ... 
When asked to describe what 
bothered him the most about the bill. 
he replied, '"The whole thing stinks ... 
As expected. commercial writers still 
in the market are being asked to pick 
up the slack. One company rl:'gional 
manager in Central Florida said he had 
to tell agents to back off on the grow-
ing number of applications. many of 
which weren't the kind of business the 
company wanted. "We had enough 
business given to us in four days than 
we had in one month:· he said. 
Meanwhile. the American Insurance 
Association released a statement this 
week calling the Florida bill 
"unreasonable and unproductive." 
Lawrence Zippin. executive vice presi· 
dent and chief operating offi:er of the 
AlA. said it ··makes no sense" to cut 
premiums "arbitrarily" when com-
mercial rates are returning to more 
"realistic" levelS. • 
Florida Insurers Assail 
Premium Rollback Bill 
By LESUE WAYNE 
The insurance industry sharply 
criticized yesterday a measure 
enacted by the Florida Legislature 
mandating a 40 percent rollback in 
commercial premiums and making 
future price Increases more difficult. 
Insurers say the law Would make un. 
derwrHlng in Florida unprofitable 
and they feared other states would 
follow suit. 
' "It's a disaster, "said William M. 
McCormick, chairman and chief ex-
ecutive of the Fireman's Fund Insur-
ance Company. "Ami• if It spreads 
Florida to other states, It would 
a catastrophe." W. Minor Carter, 
vice president tor government affairs' 
at the USF&G Corporation, a major 
insurance company, added, "This is a 
Draconian, onerous measure and I 
hope no other legislature would act as 
irresponsibly as the Florida Legisla-
ture. 
· Commercial insurers are particu-
larly irked because the Florida meas-
ure, for the first time in the nation, 
links a restriction on premium rates 
with enactment of tort reform. Insur-
ers have been staunch supporters of 
changes in the legal system to limit 
the amount of damages awarded in 
insurance settlements. The Florida 
measure would limit noneconomic 
::::: 
~ 
jury damages, such as pain and suf-
fering, to $450,000 and makes other re-
strictions on awards. 
"Other states have been more ra-
tional," said Maurice R. Greenberg, 
chief executive of the American In-
ternational Group. "They've enacted 
tort reform and let the market deter-
mine premium rates.'' 
•Fair Trade-Off' 
The Florida linkage, however, was 
praised by the National Insurance 
Consumers Organization, a public In-
terest group. "It's a fair trade-off to 
limit the amounts people can recover 
in Insurance cases In exchange for 
lower insurance rates, " said Jay 
Angoff, counsel to the organization. 
"J don't see how a state can consider 
tort rerorm without insisting on a 
quid pro quo from the insurance com-
panies." 
At least three major Insurance 
companies - Aetna Life and Casual-
ty, USF&G and Continental - have 
said they would write no more new 
property and casualty policies In 
Florida as a result of the legislation 
and others say they are trying to 
determine whether to continue busi-
ness, both new and old, In that state. 
"The Florida Legislature has Inter-
fered with our ability to adequately 
Continued on Page D2 
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Cont!nued From First Bmlness Page The measure must still be ap-
by Gov. Bob Graham, who Is 
expected to sign the measure into 
law. Florida is the nation's 
our product, and we cannot jus-
taking on new business in Flor-
est domestic market for orooert v 
. casualty insurance. 
said Cheryl a 
man for Continental, 
ever, continue to renew existing poli-
cies. Albert Abend, a spokesman for Backed by Commission 
Aetna, said, "Until Aetna While insurers the meas-
viewed Florida as a place ure, the Florida commis-
to write Insurance. pf'lce roll- sion does not. David Voss, a 
backs would force us Into money-
losing position and that makes it im-
possible to write any new commercial 
policies there." 
man for Bill Gunter, the stale's 
ancecommlssioner, said the measure 
would probably be a mcdel for other 
states and did not tbre.aten insurers' 
profitability. 
He noted that simllar legislation 
had been enacted for auto and work-
ers' compensation and that insurers 
continued to thrive in those lines. He 
added that the measure made U 
easier for· commercial customers to 
self-insure, by setting up their own re-
serves against liabilities, and that 
business the Insurance companies 
tum away today may be lost to them 
forever. 
"The industry will learn to live with 
this, although I am certain that the 
change will be difficult," Mr. Voss · 
said:" Ir the Industry decides to stop 
doing business, it will be a short-term 
gain versus a long-term loss. Once 
begin to self-Insure, they 
are to the Insurance companies 
forever. mmt balance 
that risk when whether to 
pull out." 
The Florida measure, enacted after 
midnight on Friday, would freeze 
current Insurance premiums until 
Oct. 1 and then reduce them by 4<l per-
cent through the end of the year. At 
that time, companies would have to 
file for new rates, which would go into 
effect Jan. 1, 1987, and would have the 
burden of showing why rates should 
not be further cut back to those in ef-
fect at the beginning of 1984, the low-
est premiums charged In recent 
years. 
On the tort side, the bill not only 
puts a cap on noneconomic jury 
awards, but also repeals the doctime 
of joint and several liability, which al-
lows an accident victim to collect 
from one party in a lawsuit if the 
others are unable to pay. 
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COMMENTS TO SENATE COMMITTEE ON INSURANCE. CLAIMS AND CORPORATi~~S 
By Donald R. Stewart, Executive Director of American Agents AI liance 
Senator Roberti, Senator Robbins and members of the Special Hearing Committee: 
The public, although they don't yet realize it, needs your help if this 
Initiative situation is to be kept from disintegrating into a total disaster. 
We are just a few insurance company heartbeats. or blinks if you'll haYe it, 
from a state superfund that could be the financial ruination of Califo;nia and 
its drivers. How is this possible? 
First. let's look at something nobody wants to talk about! Proc :03 is 
not only a bad law, it's a fiscal impossibi11ty. And it's about time someone 
tells the public they have been deceived by its SPOnsors-- perhaps "ripped-
off", the term its sponsors are so fond of using unjustly against the :ompa-
nies, is better. 
As agents, we reflect the consumers needs and I wi 11 not attempt t,o dea I 
(;t~ 
with all the bad aspects of Prop 103, but only with the premium and A:ability 
aspects. 
Under Prop 103 we see an increase of 20\ to 301. in auto rates statewide, 
and up to 501. in the inner-cities, during the next 12 months, regardless of 
what the Supreme Court does. Our members report a doubling of lawyers' TV ads 
and a 1001. increase 1n ffrst reports of claims made by lawyers. This triples 
the loss. While we aren't actuarial experts, everyone agrees losses are on 
the increase. 
Not a single company, that we know of, ca~ afford to reduce rates 31\ or 
321. as the prop exceptions "suggests". This threat has the companies in 
/17 
dtsarray. Senator Robbins requested we g1ve our best estfmate of the company 
avallabilfty. As you know, on Black Wednesday we listed nearly 50 companies 
wfth auto and personal lines new sales suspended or withdrawing from the 
state. Whf1e it could change quickly, this conditfon has stabilized somewhat. 
Still, some agencies statewide and all fnner-cfty agencies have nothing to 
offer drivers but the Assigned Risk. 
Volume-wise about: 5~ of companies quit state, 
5~ of companies withdrew from auto, 
20~ of companies withdrew from new preferred auto, 
60~ of compan1es tightened underwriting standards and 
10% of companies unchanged. 
Although the auto/personal marketplace is barely adequate for the moment, 
except in some areas, the harsh reality fs that we are already paying 5~ to 
JO% more on average for coverage than was paid for new policies on November 8. 
Unless this state of indecision is resolved quickly and favorably, the market 
could fall apart and most companies quit the state. legislation to force 
companies to stay in Calffornfa wf11 only injure our efforts to get needed new 
companies to enter our state. 
Destroying all of the California companies is one thing, but it's hard to 
believe that any court will require drivers and policyholders in other states 
to subsidize our drivers' premiums. We do not believe the insurance Commis-
sioner can force the rates down, without setting up a tax supported state 
superfund. We doubt anybody wants to spend the two billion or so this would 
cost taxpayers each }'ear. 
When the public finds out they not only ~ill not get a premium reduction, 
but will face higher increases, they will be furious, and rightfully so. They 
are paying 30% too much for their auto insurance. The only way to rectify 
I I 8 
thfs is to remove the fraud and the lawyers' claims bufldfng, by restricting 
or eliminating the "pain & suffering" except for major long term tnjurtes. 
The public needs and we ask -- your immediate help fn reducfng auto 
fraud loses if we are to have any premium reductfon. This fs necessary, no 
matter what the Supreme Court does on Prop 103. We believe there fs no other 
way. The public needs real premium reductions not phony ones. 
For additional information, contact Don Stewart, American Agents Alliance, 
213/684-2560 or 818/195-0519 or 11ark .Schrooekel, 916/423-3180. 
I /9 
LAWRENCE C. BAKER, JR. 
TESTIMONY 
BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON INSURANCE CLAIMS AND CORPORATIONS 
NOVEMBER 18, 1988 
My name is Lawrence c. Baker, Jr. I am Vice President and 
Manager of ACSC Management Services, Inc., Attorney-In-Fact for 
the Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club of Southern 
California. 
The Exchange is a non-profit unincorporated association that 
engages in the insurance business as an interinsurance exchange. 
We do not engage in business for profit and we do not have 
stockholders. The Exchange was formed in 1912 in order to afford 
automobile insurance to the members of the Automobile Club of 
Southern California at a fair price and at lower prices than 
generally prevailing in the marketplace. The Exchange's 
continuing objective is to provide quality insurance to the 
members of the Automobile Club at as low a cost as possible. 
But, at the same time, the Exchange must be able to meet its 
financial obligations to our policyholders and the public. 
Under Proposition 103r insurers are required to reduce their 
rates to a level 20% below those in effect in November of 1987. 
For the Exchange, this would mean a reduction in auto rates of 
29% from the current level. The measure requires that rates 
remain at that level until November 8, 1989. There is an 
-2-
implication in this mandated reduction that companies offering 
auto and other insurance can afford a rate roll back of this 
magnitude without impairing their financial stability. We can 
assure you that in the case of the Exchange this rate roll back 
is not a feasible or reasonable action. 
The Proposition further provides that an insurer may raise its 
rates after a hearing by the Insurance Commissioner if it is 
"substantially threatened with insolvency". If the Exchange were 
forced to write at this "rolled back" rate level, it would, in 
fact, become insolvent prior to November 8, 1989. We estimate 
that our loss would average over $25 million a month for every 
month we operated at the rolled back rate level. This estimate 
takes into consideration all Exchange income from all sources 
including investments. 
That we cannot afford to roll our rates back is demonstrated by 
the fact that our average rate of return on total revenue from 
all sources has been 1.7% per annum over the past five years. 
For the first nine months of 1988, the Exchange's net income 
after taxes was $3.4 million for a return of 1/2 of 1% on our 
total revenue from all sources. We have learned during the 75 
years we have operated an insurance business that the nature of 
the business can best be characterized as volatile. Some years 
you have a gain, some years you lose substantially. This is one 
of the reasons that government regulators and others require 
companies to have a substantial surplus which keeps a company 
I:LI 
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financially solvent in those years it loses money. 
Principally because the costs of bodily injury claims have been 
steadily rising over the past several years, it has been 
necessary for us to increase rates at an average of about 12% a 
year. Notwithstanding these rate increases, our rate of return 
is insufficient to support continuing at the same level of 
business without eroding the financial strength required by sound 
management and regulatory guidelines. 
In order to prevent irreparable financial harm, we have filed an 
action in court to restrain the Insurance Commissioner and the 
Attorney General from enforcing the roll back and rate freeze 
provisions of Proposition 103. In addition, we think aspects of 
Proposition 103 are unconstitutional and that the initiative 
should be declared void in its entirety. We have also filed with 
the Insurance Commissioner an application for relief from the 
roll backs on the grounds that we meet the criteria specified in 
Proposition 103 for such relief in that the Exchange is 
"substantially threatened with insolvency". 
Our motivation in taking these actions is simply to ensure 
survival of the Exchange so that it may continue to serve its 
policyholders. Obviously, our first obligation must be to our 
existing policyholders. Assuring the Exchange's ability to 
continue their coverage for as long a period as possible and 
12-2-
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assuring that it can meet the financial obligations imposed by 
those policies must come before new obligations are assumed by 
writing new policyholders. When it became apparent that 
Proposition 103 had passed, we continued to take new applications 
for insurance but suspended binding coverage on those 
applications until we could be assured through court or 
regulatory action that rate roll backs would not have to be 
immediately implemented. 
We suspended binding new coverage because we would sustain a very 
substantial loss on any new business written at rolled back 
rates. After learning of the Supreme Court stay of the 
implementation of Proposition 103 we resumed binding coverage and 
honoring those applications taken during the suspension period. 
Even though Proposition 103 has apparently been adopted by 
California voters, it is clear to us that it is unlikely to 
achieve their expectations. We so advised our members and 
insureds before the election, and the vote does nothing to change 
this. Under its very terms, we expect the Interinsurance 
Exchange to be relieved of the roll back requirements because of 
threatened insolvency. In addition, because it does nothing to 
address the underlying costs of insurance in general and 
automobile insurance in particular, its promise of lower rates 
for Californians is hollow. 
During the year we communicated the fact that fundamental changes 
/23 
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in the automobile ~ccident reparations system would be required 
to achieve motorists' expressed desire to have lower auto 
insurance rates. We have supported the "no fault" auto insurance 
principle since 1971 as the best way to accomplish this result. 
We will continue to advocate this and other responsible reforms 
in the future. 
We believe the public will soon recognize that Proposition 103 
will not achieve lower rates because of its fundamental failure 
to address the real causes of increasing rates. Failure to make 
the kind of change required to do this will only add to public 
frustration. 
FARMERS INSURANCE GROUP 
OF COl-1PANIES 
STATEMENT 
JOINT LEGISLATIVE HEARING 
NOVEMBER 18, 1988 
LOS ANGELES 
FARMERS, SINCE ITS INCEPTION IN los ANGELES 60 YEARS AGO, HAS 
OBLIGATED ITSELF TO PROVIDE FOR THE INSURANCE NEEDS OF THE 
PEOPLE IN THE STATES WHERE IT DOES BUSINESS, DEPENDABLY, DAY IN 
AND DAY OUT, ToDAY WE SELL INSURANCE IN 27 STATES, INCLUDING A-Teb 
1Af /li-'1-r 7"HC -!tttt:.I\LUS IS ~p}7t.ll'l2/ £:1~WSfl/4{Ly 
CALIFORNIA, OUR INSUREDS OW~HE INSURANCE EXCHANGES~ND WE AS ~Q~ 
'/t' ..,.p-.:: 
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, OR MANAGER, HAVE A FIDUCI Y RESPONSIBILITY TO~~~ 
PRESERVE THE FINANCIAL INTEGRITY OF THEIR EXCHANGES FOR ALL THE /l:Jc.i'y/la-(Ji• 
~[) (.128)i~IZ 
POLICYHOLDERS - NOT JUST THOSE IN CALIFORNIA, 
FARMERS' EXCHANGES, IN SELLING AUTO, DWELLING AND COMMERCIAL 
POLICIES, HAVE ALWAYS EMPHASIZED INSURING SAFE, RELIABLE 
DRIVERS, PRIDEFUL HOMEOWNERS AND RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS PEOPLE. 
WE GOT OUR START BECAUSE OUR FOUNDERS RECOGNIZED SOMEONE OUGHT 
TO PROVIDE CAR INSURANCE AT A LOWER COST TO FARMERS AND OTHERS 
IN RURAL AREAS WHO HAVE LESS INCIDENCE OF ACCIDENTS, To THIS 
DAY, WE FOLLOW THE CONCEPT OF OFFERING THE VERY BEST POSSIBLE 
COVERAGE AT THE LOWEST POSSIBLE COST, 
PROP 103 IRRESPONSIBLY CALLS FOR, AMONG OTHER THINGS, A ROLL 
BACK OF ALL OUR INSURANCE RATES WITHOUT ANY CONSIDERATION 
WHATSOEVER TO THE FACT THAT OUR RATES HAVE BEEN VERY CAREFULLY 
TAILORED TO ATTRACT AND HOLD THE GOOD DRIVER AND THE OTHER 
RESPONSIBLE RISKS WE INSURE, OUR RATES HAVE BEEN AND ARE AT THE 
VERY LOWEST COST LEVEL CONSISTENT WITH OUR FIDUCIARY 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PRESERVE THE FINANCIAL INTEGRITY OF THE 
POLICYHOLDERS' EXCHANGES, WE ARE CONFIDENT THE CALIFORNIA 
1 
SUPREME COURT WILL REDRESS THIS WRONG AND OBVIOUSLY INTEND TO 
CONTINUE TO FULFILL OUR OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE FOR THE INSURANCE 
NEEDS FOR ELIGIBLE INSUREDS IN CALIFORNIA UNTIL THE COURT 
DECIDES. 
ANY FUTURE ACTIONS WE MAY HAVE TO TAKE WILL BE MOTIVATED BY OUR 
COMMITMENT TO KEEPING THIS MARKET ONE IN WHICH WE CAN SERVE OUR 
CUSTOMERS, PRESERVE OUR ABILITY TO PROVIDE PREFERRED INSURANCE 
-
RATES QUALIFYING PEOPLE, AND MOST IMPORTANTLY, PRESERVE THE 
FINANCIAL INTEGRITY OF OUR POLICYHOLDERS' EXCHANGES, FUTURE 
ACTIONS, SHORT TERM OR LONG TERM, ARE IMPOSSIBLE TO PREDICT 
TODAY, WE MUST CONTINUE TO ASSESS THE SITUATION ON AN ONGOING 
BASIS AS MORE INFORMATION BECOMES AVAILABLE, 
So AS TO BE PREPARED FOR ALL EVENTS, WE ALSO CONTINUE LOOKING 
HARD FOR WAYS TO SATISFY THE PEOPLE OF CALIFORNIA'S DESIRE FOR 
LOWER INSURANCE RATES. AND THOUGHTFUL PEOPLE FAMILIAR WITH HOW 
INSURANCE RATES ARE DERIVED, UNDERSTAND, AS WE DO, THAT LOWER 
RATES MAY NOT BE ACHIEVED MINDLESS OF CLAIMS COSTS, 
THERE IS NO DOUBT IN MY MIND THAT CLAIMS COSTS CAN BE CONTAINED 
AND LOWERED IN A RESPONSIBLE MANNER TO THE BENEFIT OF ALL AND 
THE DETRIMENT OF ONLY THOSE TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF CLAIMS 
SITUATIONS FOR PERSONAL GAIN, IN SO DOING, INSURANCE RATES 
WOULD BE CONTAINED AND LOWERED IN A MEANINGFUL WAY, 
2 
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THERE HAS BEEN AN ARRAY OF CLAIMS COST CONTAINMENT PROPOSALS 
DISCUSSED IN DETAIL BEFORE THE LEGISLATURE AND OTHER FORUMS, 
THESE ARE IN THE POSSESSION OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON 
INSURANCE, THESE MUST BE PART OF ANY CONTINUING DIALOG ON THE 
ISSUE, So WE CALL ON YOU - REPRESENTATI S OF THE CALIFORNIA 
LEGISLATURE, WE CALL ON THE GOVERNOR, CONSUMER GROUPS, LAWYERS, 
MEMBERS OF THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY AND ALL OTHER INTERESTED 
PARTIES TO WORK TOGETHER IN GOOD FAITH NOW TO COME TO SOME 
CONCLUSIONS ON THE ISSUE FOR THE PEOPLE OF CALIFORNIA, 
WE SHOULD ALL REMEMBER, IF THE COURT DECIDES - AS WE BELIEVE -
THAT PROP 103 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, THE PEOPLE OF CALIFORNIA 
STILL WANT LOWER RATES, THOSE OF US HERE TODAY, AND OTHERS WHO 
SHOULD HAVE DONE THIS COMPLICATED JOB WITHOUT INVOLVING THE 
INITIATIVE PROCESS, STILL HAVE THE OBLIGATION TO DELIVER A 
PROGRAM TO LOWER CALIFORNIA INSURANCE RATES AND COSTS, 
THE PEOPLE OF CALIFORNIA WILL ONLY GET LOWER INSURANCE RATES IN 
THE LONG RUN IF ALL OF US FIND WAYS TO PRESERVE THE FINANCIAL 
INTEGRITY OF THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY, AND LET'S FACE IT, THIS 
CAN ONLY BE DONE BY LOWERING CLAIMS COSTS, AND WE MUST STRIVE 
I 
TO FASHION A PROGRAM TO DO THIS, 
MERELY DEFEATING PROP 103 IN THE CoURT IS NOT A SOLUTION, BUT 
ENFORCING, OR TRYING TO ENFORCE, PROP 103 ALSO IS NOT A 
SOLUTION. A SOLUTION CAN ONLY COME FROM OUR WORKING TOGETHER TO 
LOWER BOTH RATES AND COSTS, 
3 
(November 18, 1988. A statement from 20th Century Insurance Company by 
Rick Dinon, vice president, corporate relations. Statement offered to the 




Members of the legislature: 
Subject to final count, It appears that California voters have given their 
approval to prop 103 by a close margin. We think voters generally approved 
-this measure with two objectives mind: 
0 
0 
contain automobile ranee rates, and 
tighten up the regulatory system. 
We do not think voters wished to: 
0 
eliminate California insurers, or 
disrupt the California economy. 





92% of our business is automobile insurance; all in California, 
20th Century is known as a very efficient and low-cost insurer, 
our customers are generally urban & excellent risks, and 
20th Century is a for-profit company owned by shareholders. 
In anticipation of prop 103's passage, we considered many options. We 
retained legal counsel. We selected a course of action which we consider 




continue to renew existing customer's policies at pre-prop 103 
rates, 
continue to accept a normal volume of applications for new 
policies at pre-prop 103 rates, 
track premiums subject to prop 103's cuts, and 
refund premiums with reasonable interest to customers as 
applicable and to the extent we are able if prop 103's 
cuts become law and no exception is made in our case. 
In essence, we are making a bet. We believe the cuts mandated under 103 
will not go into effect. But, the stakes are huge. So large, in fact, that 
we cannot and will not wait long for a resolution. 
We are in a room with no doors. The legal challenge is made. Regulatory 
response is only pending. The clock started running on this bet 
November 8, 1988. There must be a resolution by the Court, or we are 
a corporation in serious financial peril. Let me explain why. 
/2:1 
The statement attached the actual financial performance of 20th Century 
over the last 12 months period. It Includes a very good third quarter 
result. We lost million on the insurance operations but made $40 million 
bottom-line. 
To the right is the effect of prop 103 if overlayed on 12 months. We 
now lose $91 mi Ilion rather than posting a $40 million gain. 
In the second year of enactment, prop 103 requires "good drivers" to receive 
an additional 20% cut. That's most of our auto policyholders. We now have a 
loss of $160 mill ion in the second year. 
$91 million and $160 mill totals $251 million of financial loss in 
two years. That can only come from our policyholder surplus. We have $205 
million in policyholder surplus. We can continue only a short period of time being 
uncertain as to the outcome of this matter, as should be obvious. 
On the other hand, scenario is so radically bad that we have reason to be 
guardedly optimistic. As it relates to 20th Century, our counsel believes 










It mandates a taking of property and business without just 
compensation. 
It may without any rational basis compel 20th to remain in 
business. 
It is arbitra and discriminatory on its face. 
It does not provide even an administrative remedy unless a Company 
is "substantially threatened by insolvency" - after a hearing. 
It does not define procedures for the insolvency 
"hearing" which, if not immediate, could be too late. 
It provides for an increase in the gross premium tax without two 
thirds approval of both houses of the legislature. 
It violates and impairs existing contract rights of parties. 
It does not provide for a fair rate of return whereas even 
AB 4325 permits a five percent underwriting profit. 
Other provisions relating to severability, creation of a private 
corporation to perform a "function", etc, are also flawed. 
Therefore, we think that the legal issues surrounding prop 103 would be resolved 
in our favor. Stilt, time is critical. As a result, we have requested a 
hearing for an exemption from the rate-cut provisions through the Department of 
Insurance as provided for in prop 103. Because many voters cast their vote 
for 103 with good intentions does not remove the fact that it is a bad law, 
sloppy in construction and likely unconstitutional. Prop 103 is a good 
reason to have a constitution in the first place. 
/30 
If prop 103's mandated cuts do not become law - how can premiums be reduced? 
We must find a way to lower the cost of claims. Where ? Bodily injury first. 










A strict, cost - cutting, no-frills no-fault (obviously not 104). 
If not: 
Remove or cap punitive damages 
Aggressively prosecute frauds. 
Bar multiple sources of payment for the same bills. 
Change pure comparative liability to something like the Wisconsin 
type. · 
Remove medical diagnostic and wage loss from general damages 
consideration. 
Install a medical review process. 
Implement a balanced, speedy alternative dispute resolution 
system. 
Get the lawyers, insurance companies, legislators and consumers 
together to find a way to really cut claim costs - fairly. 
Representing 20th Century, I hope this statement provides some 
insight to what we think is a reasonable basis for our decisions. I also 
trust that it graphically portrays what is at risk and why that risk is 
enormous. Finally, I hope our suggestions to contain claim costs are considered 
and we pledge to do what we can to correct the situation. 
Respectfully submitted 
Richard A. Dinon 
Vice President, Corporate Relations 
20th Century Insurance 
Woodland Hills, CA 91367 
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ADDENDUM 
This statement is the actual financial performance of 20th Century 
over the most recent 12 month period. We had premiums of $572 million from 
insurance policies. Claims consumed $431 million and it cost $70 million 
for the people, facilities and services to handle the claims. It cost $36 
million to pay for the people who service and sell the policies and provide 
administrative functions. The state received most of the $13.5 million in 
premium taxes and o~her fees. 
So, we lost $9 million in a year's time on the insurance operations. 
We made $5.2 million from the sale of some of our investments and made $52 
million on other investments, nearly all from bond interest. Bottom line, 
we made $40 million after $8 million of federal tax. The ratios below that 
simply restate on a percentage basis the insurance - only results. 
lets' now look at exactly the same period, adjusted for prop 103's 
first year rate-rollback and 20% cut. A $40 million gain becomes a $91 
million loss. Taking the scenario one step further, beginning in the second 
year, prop 103 mandates a rate cut of an additional 20% for "good drivers". 
Under that scenario, we now have a net loss of $160 million. That's a $251 
million dollar financial loss in two years. We have $205 million of capital reserves. 
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20TH CENTURY INSURANCE COMPANY 
STATUTORY STATEMENT OF INCOME 
9 MONTHS 1988 COMBINED WITH 4TH QUARTER 1987 
SEPTEMBER 30, 1988 
---------------------------------------------------------
PREMIUMS WRITTEN - NET 
PREMIUMS EARNED 
LOSSES INCURRED 
LOSS EXPENSE INCURRED 
UNDERWRITING EXPENSES 
TAXES, liCENSES, AND FEES 
UNDERWRITING PROFIT (LOSS) 
CAPITAL GAINS AND OTHER 
NET INVESTMENT INCOME 
NET INCOME (LOSS) 
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION 
LOSS AND EXPENSE RATIOS 































20.92% LOSS EXPENSE RATIO (E) 
UNDERWRITING EXPENSE RATIO (W) 
COMBINED RATIO 
8.60% 11.36% 13.53% 
--------------------------------------------101.18% 135.93% 164.07% 
============================================ 
*GOOD DRIVER DISCOUNT (20%) 
APPLIES TO 80% OF OUR BUSINESS 
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DRAFT JOHN NORWOOD TESTIMONY 
SENATE INSURANCE, CLAIMS AND CORPORATIONS COMMITTEE 
On Behalf of: THE INDEPENDENT INSURANCE AGENTS AND 
BROKERS LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL 
MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE CO~~ITTEE, MY NAME IS 
JOHN NORWOOD, I AM APPEARING TODAY ON BEHALF OF THE INSURANCE 
AGENTS AND BROKERS SLATIVE COUNCIL WHICH REPRESENTS FIVE 
STATEWIDE ASSOCIATIONS OF INSURANCE AND AGENTS AND BROKERS 
WRITING PROPERTY CASUALTY INSURANCE IN THIS STATE. 
WE ARE APPEARING HERE TODAY IN RESPONSE TO THE 
COMMITTEE'S REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON THE STATUS OF THE 
CURRENT INSURANCE MARKETPLACE FROM THE VIEW POINT OF THE 
INSURANCE AGENTS AND BROKERS AND THEIR CUSTOMERS. WITH THE 
PERMISSION OF THE COMMITTEE, HOWEVER, I WOULD LIKE TO PREFACE 
OUR TESTIMONY ON THIS SUBJECT WITH A FEW INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
WHICH I THINK WILL HELP EXPLAIN THE CONDITION OF THE INSURANCE 
MARKET AND RESPOND TO OTHER POINTS WHERE THE COMMITTEE HAS 
REQUESTED INFORMATION. 
FOR INSURANCE AGENTS AND BROKERS AND MANY OF THEIR 
CUSTOMERS SEEKING INSURANCE, THE PASSAGE OF PROPOSITION 103 WAS 
NOTHING SHORT OF A DISASTER FROM THE STANDPOINT OF AVAILABILITY 
OF INSURANCE. AFTER THE ELECTION, MANY AGENTS RETURNED TO 
THEIR OFFICES TO FIND THAT MOST, AND IN SOME CASES, ALL OF THE 
INSURANCE COMPANIES WITH WHOM THEY HAD AGENCY APPOINTMENTS 
SUSPENDED OPERATIONS IN CALIFORNIA, AT LEAST ON A TEMPORARY 
~~~ 
BASIS. THE EFFECT OF SUCH SUSPENSIONS ARE OBVIOUSLY 
SIGNIFICANT IN RELATION TO THE ABILITY OF AGENTS AND BROKERS TO 
KEEP THEIR OWN DOORS OPEN FOR BUSINESS. BUT BEYOND THAT, MANY 
OF OUR CUSTOMERS IN NEED OF INSURANCE FOR THAT NEW CAR, HOME, 
CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT, ETC., WERE, AND IN SOME CASES, ARE STILL 
BEING DELAYED. 
THE DAY AFTER THE ELECTION, SEVERAL OF OUR 
ASSOCIATIONS CALLED ON INSURERS THROUGHOUT CALIFORNIA TO 
CONTINUE TO WRI'rE INSURANCE UNTIL THE ELECTION WAS CERTIFIED 
AND THE SUPREME COURT REACHED A DECISION ON WHETHER TO STAY THE 
ENFORCEMENT OF PROPOSITION 103. WE ARE ENCOURAGED THAT THE 
. 
COURT DECIDED TO STAY THE EFFECTS OF PROPOSITION 103 AND THAT 
MANY COMPANIES HAVE RESPONDED BY CONTINUING TO WRITE NEW AND 
RENEWAL BUSINESS IN THIS STATE. HOWEVER, WE WOULD CAUTION THAT 
EVEN WITH THE STAY, IT IS LIKELY THAT SOME INSURANCE MARKETS 
WILL REMAIN IN STAGES OF DISARRAY FOR A NUMBER OF REASONS. 
EVERY DAY THE COURT WAITS TO DECIDE THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PROPOSITION 103, INSURERS THAT REMAIN IN 
THE MARKET BUILD UP A CONTINGENT LIABILITY FOR PREMIUM 
ROLLBACKS WHICH MIGHT WELL AVERAGE 30% to 35% OF PREMIUMS IN 
EFFECT TODAY. AT SOME POINT, IF THE COURT DOES NOT ACT 
QUICKLY, COMPANIES WHO CANNOT OR WILL NOT RISK ANY FURTHER 
LOSSES, WILL AGAIN SUSPEND WRITING INSURANCE AND THE INSURANCE 
MARKETPLACE WILL BE FURTHER RESTRICTED. 
SECONDLY, THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL CONFUSION AMONG 
INSURERS AND AGENTS AND BROKERS STEMMING FROM THE MANY GRAY 
AREAS CONTAINED IN PROPOSITION 103. DESPITE THE BALLOT 
l~s-
ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF PROPOSITION 103 THAT IT WAS WRITTEN IN 
PLAIN LANGUAGE, THAT THERE WERE NO LOOPHOLES OR FINE PRINT, AND 
THAT NON-LAWYERS COULD READ IT, PROPOSITION 103 WAS POORLY 
DRAFTED, IS DEVOID OF ALMOST ANY DEFINITIONS, AND INCLUDES THE 
REPEAL OF MANY SECTIONS OF THE INSURANCE CODE WHICH ARE 
INCONSISTENT WITH EVEN THE INTENT OF THE INITIATIVE. WE 
ESTIMATE IT WILL TAKE LITERALLY MONTHS, AND PERHAPS YEARS, TO 
FIGURE OUT THE APPLICATION AND EFFECTS OF THIS INITIATIVE. 
FOR INSTANCE, WHAT DO THE TERMS, "RATES, CHARGES, AND 
PREMIUMS 11 MEAN WHEN USED INTERCHANGEABLY; OR WHAT IS THE 
MEANINGS OF TERMS SUCH AS "SUBSTANTIALLY THREATENS THE 
SOLVENCY"; OR "SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN HAZARD"; OR "FURTHERANCE 
OF THE PURPOSES"; WHAT IS THE EFFECT, IF ANY, ON NON-ADMITTED 
CARRIERS OR AFFILIATES OF CARRIERS ADMITTED IN CALIFORNIA 
BEFORE NOVEMBER 1987 WHICH HAVE NOT WRITTEN BUSINESS AND NOW 
ENTER THE MARKET: HOW ARE WE TO CONTROL UNREGULATED REBATING 
PRACTICES SO AS TO NOT BECOME MISLEADING OR INJURIOUS TO 
CONSUMERS? 
EVEN SOMETHING SO SIMPLE AS HOW INSURERS PRICE THEIR 
PRODUCT IS IN QUESTION AT THIS TIME. FOR EXAMPLE, IN 
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE, SHOULD INSURERS APPLY A 20% REDUCTION TO 
ALL RENEWALS AND, IF SO, HOW? WHAT IF DURING THE POLICY PERIOD 
AND INSURED HAS ONE MOVING CITATION AND TWO ACCIDENTS WHERE HE 
OR SHE WAS AT LEAST PARTIALLY AT FAULT BUT NOT CITED. SHOULD 
THAT PERSONS PREMIUM BE 20% LESS THAN LAST YEAR'S? SHOULD THAT 
PERSON FURTHER GET ANOTHER 20% REDUCTION A YEAR FROM NOW UNDER 
THE GOOD DRIVER DISCOUNT WITH ONLY ONE MOVING CITATION? OR 
SHOULD THE INSURER CALCULATE THE BASE PREMIUM RATE 20% LESS 
13( 
THAN THOSE RATES IN EFFECT IN 1987 AND THEN ADD A CHARGE FOR 
ADVERSE EXPERIENCE? THIS IS JUST ONE OF THE MULTIPLE 
SCENARIOS, AND THERE ARE MANY MORE PARTICULARLY IN COMMERCIAL 
LINES, WHICH CANNOT BE ANSWERED. 
THE PRACTICAL EFFECT OF THESE MANY UNCERTAINTIES IS 
THAT THE COMPANIES WHO DECIDE TO STAY IN CALIFORNIA WON'T BE 
ABLE TO WAIT FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE TO CLARIFY ALL THE 
TERMS AT APPLICATIONS OF PROPOSITION 103. THE DEPARTMENT WILL 
LIKELY BE BOGGED WITH ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS ON NEW RULES 
TO IMPLEMENT PROPOSITION 103 AND THE MANY REQUESTS BY COMPANIES 
FOR RELIEF FROM THE MANDATED REDUCTIONS REQUIRED BY THIS 
STATUTE. AS A RESULT, EACH COMPANY WILL HAVE TO MAKE ITS OWN 
DETERMINATION OF HOW TO IMPLEMENT THIS STATUTE AND TAKE THE 
RISK THAT THEY HAVE DONE IT RIGHT. IN MANY CASES, COMPANIES 
WILL NOT KNOW FOR SURE WHETHER THEY HAVE IMPLEMENTED 
PROPOSITION 103 CORRECTLY UNTIL SUCH DETERMINATIONS ARE 
CHALLENGED AND LITIGATED IN COURT. THESE UNCERTAINTIES AND 
DELAYS WILL NO DOUBT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE MARKETPLACE AND THE 
DECISION BY SOME CARRIERS AS TO WHETHER TO STAY IN CALIFORNIA. 
LASTLY, THE CONSEQUENCES OF PROPOSITION 103 ON THE 
INSURANCE AGENCY FORCE IN CALIFORNIA ARE SUBSTANTIAL. IF 
PROPOSITION IS HELD CONSTITUTIONAL, ALL EVIDENCE SUGGESTS THAT: 
- MARKETS FOR ALL LINES OF INSURANCE WILL BE REDUCED 
THEREBY LIMITING THE ABILITY OF AGENTS TO FIND 
AVAILABLE COVERAGE AND REDUCING THEIR CUSTOMERS 
OPTIONS; 
/37 
- AGENTS AND BROKERS WILL HAVE TO UTILIZE MORE 
NON-ADMITTED CARRIERS TO WRITE CALIFORNIA BUSINESS 
WITHOUT THE ASSURANCES OF A GUARANTEE FUND TO PROTECT 
POLICY HOLDERS. THIS WILL SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASE 
AGENTS AND BROKERS OWN PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY 
INSURANCE AND ADVERSELY AFFECT THE PROTECTIONS THE 
CUSTOMERS NOW ENJOY; 
- AGENTS INCOME WILL BE SLASHED TO THE SAME EXTENT AS 
INSURANCE IES - SOME 30% TO 50% - WITHOUT ANY 
CHANGE IN THE COST OF RENT, LIGHTS, STAMPS, PAPER, OR 
SALARIES; 
- INSURANCE COMPANIES ATTEMPTING TO CUT COSTS WILL NO 
DOUBT UNILATERALLY REDUCE AGENT COMMISSIONS WHICH 
CURRENTLY AVERAGE 12% TO 14% IN ALL LINES OF PROPERTY 
CASUALTY INSURANCE; 
- PRESSURE WILL INCREASE FROM CUSTOMERS ON AGENTS TO 
KICKBACK PART OF THEIR COMMISSION THEREBY FURTHER 
REDUCING AGENT INCOME AND CAUSING RATES PAID BY 
CUSTOMERS TO BE ARBITRARY, AT BEST: 
- LASTLY, AGENTS WILL BE FORCED TO COMPETE WITH MAJOR 
MONEY CENTER BANKS WHO WILL BE ABLE TO UTILIZE THEIR 
FINANCIAL WHEREWITHAL, ACCESS TO FEDERAL DISCOUNT 
FUNDS, FDIC INSURANCE AGAINST FAILURE, AND THEIR 
ABILITY TO TIE THE SALES INSURANCE TO THE ISSUANCE OF 
A LOAN TO COMPETE WITH SMALL BUSINESS PERSONS 
THROUGHOUT CALIFORNIA. 
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THE LOGICAL AND LONG RANGE CONSEQUENCES OF THESE 
' 
FACTORS WILL BE A CONSTRICTION OF THE OUTLETS TO PURCHASE 
INSURANCE WHICH WILL LIKELY LEAD TO FEWER OPTIONS AND LESS 
COMPETITION FOR CONSUMERS TO PURCHASE INSURANCE PRODUCTS. 
WE DO NOT AT THIS TIME HAVE A SPECIFIC AGENDA WE CAN 
OFFER THE COMMITTEE WHICH THE LEGISLATURE COULD IMPLEMENT TO 
KEEP INSURANCE AVAILABLE AND AFFORDABLE GIVEN THE PASSAGE OF 
PROPOSITION 103. OUR ASSOCIATION WILL CONTINUE TO STUDY 
PROPOSITION 103 AND WILL ADVISE YOU AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE AS TO 
OUR SUGGESTIONS IN THIS REGARD. I THANK YOU FOR THE TIME TO 
PRESENT THESE COMMENTS AND WOULD LIKE TO END MY STATEMENT BY 
INTRODUCING ROY TAYLOR, WHO IS A MEMBER OF THE INDEPENDENT 
INSURANCE AGENTS AND BROKERS OF CALIFORNIA. I BELIEVE MR. 
TAYLOR HAS A STATEMENT AND INFORMATION REQUESTED BY THE 
COMMITTEE ON THE CURRENT STATUS OF VARIOUS COMPANIES STILL 
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Good morning, my name is Roy H. Taylor. I am President of 
Goldware and Taylor Insurance Service of Riverside, California. I 
am here today representing the Independent Insurance Agents and 
Brokers of- California, with more than 12,000 members representing 
more than three million California consumers and businesses. 
On the day following the election, the Independent Insurance 
Agents and Brokers of California conducted an insurance market 
survey to determine the impact of Proposition 103 on private 
passenger auto insurance policyholders and their agents or brokers. 
The results indicated that immediately following passage of 
Proposition 103, sixty-seven of the insurance companies we 
contacted, representing 75.6% of the total private passenger auto 
insurance market in California, announced plans to temporarily 
suspend accepting new business andjor processing renewal policies. 
Moreover, several insurance companies announced their intention to 
withdraw from the California market permanently. 
Following the issuance of a stay order on all provisions of 
Proposition 103~ by the California Supreme Court on November 10, 
1988, IIABC conducted a follow-up survey to determine the effect of 
the stay order on the insurance marketplace. The survey was 
broadened to determine the insurance companies accepting new 
business andjor processing renewal policies for homeowners insurance 
and commercial multi-peril insurance, as well as private passenger 
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insurance. This survey has continued to be updated each day 
since. 
Results as of this morning, November 17, are: 
PRIVATE PASSENGER AUTO: 37 companies representing 89.5% of the 
auto insurance capacity in California are writing new auto business; 
62 companies representing 97.7% of the auto insurance market are 
renewing policies. 
HOMEOWNERS: 46 companies representing 81.7% of the homeowners 
market insurance capacity in California are accepting new business; 
63 carriers representing 92.1% of the homeowners market are renewing 
policies. 
COMMERCIAL MULTI-PERIL: The commercial market is somewhat less 
certain. 49 companies representing 69.4% of the total commercial 
multi-peril capacity in California are accepting new commercial 
multi-peril business; 61 carriers representing 90.3% of the total 
commercial multi-peril market are renewing existing commercial 
multi-peril policies. 
With no provision for a transition period, Proposition 103 had 
a dramatic and immediate effect on the availability of 
propertyjcasualty insurance in california, particularly private 
passenger auto insurance coverage. It is also apparent the stay 
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order issued by the Supreme Court helped restore temporarily a 
substantial portion of this market. 
The Independent Insurance Agents and Brokers of California 
believes it's important that insurance consumers know their rights 
in the wake of Proposition 103, as carriers pull out of existing 
markets by cancelling or non-renewing their customers' policies. 
Therefore, the association is releasing statewide today a concise 
Guide to Policyholders 1 Rights, which provides this vi tal 
information. We hope this information will further calm the 
situation while the Supreme Court deliberates. 
However, consumers, as well as agents and brokers, are likely 
to find the availability of some insurance coverages limited by 
Proposition 103 despite the stay order. Moreover, should all 
provisions of Proposition 103 be implemented, the initial survey 
demonstrates a severe availability crisis is likely to occur in 
virtually all lines of property and casualty insurance. 
Independent insurance agents and brokers have been asked 
whether they felt insurance carriers acted in collusion when so many 
decided to turn off the flow of business after passage of 
Proposition 103. We say emphatically NO. We believe the reaction 
of insurance carriers who had analyzed 103 and decided to withdraw 




Now is not the time for intemperate action or punitive 
measures. The court stay only provides breathing room. To avert a 
rush for cover by the carriers, it will be necessary for the 
Legislature to deal with the costs that drive up the price of 
insurance. - Yes, the people want more regulation. Yes, the people 
want greater control over pricing. But price controls, without 
regard to costs, will not reduce prices. They will only reduce the 
supply of insurance. Carriers cannot provide coverage if premiums 
do not cover costs. 
Once the Supreme Court has acted, we look forward to working 
with this Committee in a forum for calm deliberation where all 
aspects of the insurance crisis can be examined carefully. We will 
be there with ideas for solutions which will serve the public well, 
and with due consideration of the interests of other groups 
concerned. 
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The National Association of Independent Insurers (NAII) is a trade 
association composed of more than 500 property/casualty insurers. 
NAII member companies write approximately 25 percent of all 
California property/casualty insurance premiums. 
NAII does not monitor or collect information on rates or marketing 
strategies used by our member companies in California. Therefore, 
we are not able to explain or even comment on the activities of 
insurance companies in California preceding or since the vote on 
Proposition 103. 
NAII has been asked to testify on actions that can be taken to keep 
insurance both available and affordable "given the full enactment 
.. 
and enforcement of Proposition 103. 11 An answer to this request at 
this time would be speculative. NAII believes that Proposition 103 
is unconstitutional. Some of our member companies have filed 
petitions to the California supreme court which ask the court to 
strike down Proposition 103 in its entirety. NAII itself has filed 
an amicus brief in support of these petitions. Therefore, any 
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comment on Proposition 103's enforcement would be contrary to our 
firm conviction that Proposition 103 is unconstitutional. We 
believe that the supreme court will not allow the proposition to 
be put into effect. 
The essential flaw in Proposition 103 is that it does nothing to 
control the costs that have been driving up insurance premiums. 
Mandated rate cuts and new government regulation merely paper over 
fundamental problems. 
The problems causing high automobile insurance rates have been 
examined in great detail. Last year the Department of Insurance 
issued a study on the availability and the affordabili ty of 
automobile insurance in Los Angeles County. That study put forward 
several considerations to lower the cost of automobile insurance. 
These suggestions deserve serious examination. The Department's 
recommendations include: 
1) Lower financial responsibility limits. 
2) Coordination of benefits and elimination of the 
collateral source rule. 
3) A no-fault law with a verbal threshold. 
Pl6 
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4) A minipolicy which provides payment for personal injury 
protection only and limited property damage liability. 
5) A limited liability policy that provides payments for 
economic damages only. 
Because of the confusion and uncertainty surrounding the California 
election, NAII bas not yet developed its California legislative 
proposals for 1989. However, the cost savings proposals in the 
Department of Insurance's study will surely be given our serious 
consideration. 
While a legislative program is being developed, NAII and its member 
companies continue to work to hold down the cost of automobile 
insurance. we are working to protect the continued use of 
aftermarket auto parts. We are working with law enforcement 
agencies to reduce auto theft and auto insurance fraud. We are 
working for greater auto safety by monitoring auto crash worthiness 
and advocating drunk driving laws and mandatory seatbelt laws. 
NAII hopes for an early court decision on the validity of 
Proposition 103. once that issue is resolved there will be an. 
opportunity for all interests to reach a consensus on a responsible 
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Good morning. 
I'm John Martin, President of Aetna Life & Casualty's 
Personal Financial Security Division, responsible for Aetna's 
private passenger automobile & homeowners insurance 
I'm glad you invited me to this hearing. ~ 
want to explain to you and the voters of California our 
reaction to Proposition 103. 
First, let me summarize our current position. We believe 
Proposition 103 is fundamentally flawed, as a matter of law. 
We believe that it will be overturned in its entirety by the 
courts. 
Because there is a constitution and because we believe so 
strongly in the correctness of our legal position, we are 
continuing to renew and write new business in California 
including private passenger automobile business. 
We are not going to be run out of this business, We are not 
willing to turn our backs on ~lmost one-half of this state•• 
electorate who. when offered a free lunch. said; "no thank 
you," 
All that said, I'd like to devote my remaining comments to an 
explanation of why we do so poorly out here, particularly in 
our auto lines of business. 
I~ 
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But I want to say we don't consider ourselves above the fray 
or below the fray. We have common Qause with our customers. 
~¢ 
our agents our~California employees and the citizens of 
California on these issues. We have always wanted to reach 
common ground. Unfortunately, the noise got too loud and the 
voices have been blurred. Therefore, I start with a message 
of regret from Aetna to our customers, our agents and the 
voters of California. Obviously, we have been unsuccessful 
in explaining fully what makes the automobile insurance 
product we sell so expensive, how it can be made less so and 
why Proposition 103 is not the answer to the problem. Let me 
do that now. 
Like any other business, the price of the insurance product 
is determined by the underlying costs--the cost of medical 
care, auto repair, legal fees, etc. Those costs for Aetna 
are increasing more rapidly in California than the rest of 
the country. 
Mr. Nader's assertions of exorbitant profits are iust not 
correct, 
Let me show you Aetna's experience with private passenger 
auto insurance in California since 1984. 
[Exhibit I - California auto net losses last 4 years.] 
I ';)tJ 
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If you look at our experience in California over the last 
four years, you will note that we lost over $12 million, ~ 
after including all investment income we realized on our 
ynearned premium, loss reserves and tbe shareholder money 
invested in this business. 
[Exhibit II - California auto total revenues 
(including investment income): total costs (losses including 
claim settlement expenses: general expenses: commissions: 
premium taxes).] 
The next chart shows our California revenues and how costs in 
California are distributed. Again, the investment income 
U.f\t!Qff'\<.. G. I OSlo r~Je. ~ 
derived from premiums; and surplus is included. 
II II 
[Exhibit III - loss costs per policy - California vs. 
countrywide.] 
The major impetus for auto insurance rate increases has been 
the rapidly increasing cost of claim settlements, not only in 
California but nationally. 
You will see on this chart that Aetna claim costs per policy 
have been increasing each year since 1984. 
Aetna's California loss costs increased by 60t per policy 
/')/ 
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between 1984 and 1987. 
In 1987 Aetna paid an average of $9,700 for each bodily 
injury claim in California versus $5,850 nationally. 
We experience 30% more auto theft claims in California than 
nationally. 
As you can see, Aetna has consistently lost money on private 
passenger auto insurance in California. 
Bottom line, there is no exorbitant profit--the facts are 
there is no profit at all. 
Proposition 103 does nothing to reduce the costs that are 
driving up insurance rates. If those costs are not brought 
under control then rates must continue to increase. We can 
only go to the well so often before it runs dry, 
Californians are dependent on automobiles. If the price of 
cars becomes too high, is the precedent of Proposition lOl a 
viable solution? Do we simply cut the price of cars by 
initiative? [If that is to be the case, then the result .may 
be that you may have to go outside the borders of California 
to purchase a car.] 
What we really need is not more "initiatives" by public 
/)2 
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referendum, but rather more legislative initiative. 
Aetna strongly believes that a no-fault system as it exists 
in other states will have the greatest impact on costs and 
thus the greatest benefit for the consumer. 
Other avenues need to be explored such as mediation of bodily 
injury claims, reducing unnecessary use of the health care 
system, and ways to better uncover and prevent insurance 
fraud and automobile thefts. 
This is a flexible and fluid legislative agenda. We're 
prepared to work with you and your colleagues to develop a 
consensus and an agenda that addresses the cost issues and 
puts this system back on its feet. 
Thank you and I hope you have questions for me. 
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LEGISLATIVE HEARING ON THE IMPACT OF THE PASSAGE OF PROPOSITION 103 
My name is Weldon Wilson. I am President of Century-National Insurance 
Company. Century-National is a California company doing business in eight 
of the western states with approximately 95% of its premiums written in the 
state of California. We had 1987 direct premiums written of $171,000,000 
with net after reinsurance ceded of $140,000,000. 
Century-National is what is sometimes referred to as a residual risk 
writer or a niche company. We specialize in auto physical damage programs 
for banks, finance companies, credit unions and automobile dealers. A portion 
of our auto physical damage business originates through brokers and is frequently 
written as a companion policy to a automobile assigned risk policy. 
Our 1987 net premiums written are broken down by line as follows: 
Auto Physical Damage 
Commercial Auto Liability 






We write no private passenger automobile liability coverage in any state. 
For the record, Century-National has not discontinued any of its product 
lines or altered its business plan either leading up to or after the passage 
of Proposition 103. We do have a strong sense of responsibility to our insureds, 
our four hundred plus employees and the agents and brokers with whom we do 
business. California is our home state and accounts for substantially all of 
l~o/ 
our business. : 
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In continuing to do business, we have both put our faith in the Calif-
ornia Supreme Court and our resources on the line in the belief that regardless 
of how well intended or great the need for insurance reform may be, our 
Constitution will not allow the majority to gang up on any person or business 
to deprive them of life, liberty or property without due process. 
Proposition 103 is confiscatory and does not afford us an opportunity 
to receive a fair return. In fact, it does not allow us any return at all, 
but would rather transfer our entire net worth to our policyholders in the 
form of reduced premiums in less than two years. 
If, for example, we were mandated to return to our policyholders 25% 
(i.e., the rate rollback plus 20%) of our 1987 earned premiums, it would 
represent a transfer out of our capital account to our insureds in an amount 
in excess of 58% of our net worth. The arithmetic is rather simple and goes 
like this: 
25% of $114,026,556 earned premiums = 
Less agents' commissions (estimated 
average 17i%) (probably not recoverable) 
Less Federal Income Tax (carry back amount) 






Obviously, Century-National Insurance Company cannot survive Propo-
sition 103 in its present form nor do we believe that the California insurance 
industry can survive Propositon 103 in its present form. 
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Under the "Substantially Threatened With Insolvency" provision of 103, 
it appears that companies writing primarily in California have a greater 
opportunity for rate relief than other companies if the Commissioner were 
to interpret that clause on an anticipatory rather than an after the fact 
basis. However, even in that event, the capacity of such companies to accept 
new business would be insignificant in comparison with the overall demand 
if the larger multi-state insurance companies withdrew. 
In our opinion, there are only two viable solutions to the problem 
created by Proposition 103. Either the Supreme Court or the Legislature 
by a two-thirds majority must invalidate all or part of Proposition 103. 
If the Supreme Court invalidates Propositon 103, there will no doubt be a 
rush to implement some of its provisions by legislation. In our opinion, 
before any insurance reform acceptable to both the people of the State of 
California and to the insurance industry can take place, the false premise 
on which Proposition 103 was presented to the voters must be exposed for the 
big lie that it is. The big lie to which I refer is contained in the preamble 
of Proposition 103 which states "The existing laws inadequately protect consumers 
and allow insurance companies to charge excessive, unjustified and arbitrary 
rates". 
I have provided you with a consolidated financial statement for the 
total fire and casualty industry for the five year period ended December 31, 
1987 as published in Best's Aggregates & Averages, an independent financial 
rating organization. The five year average return on capital was only 9.14%. 
This is considerably less than most of us pay on our home mortgages. 
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You will also note on Schedule T that the loss ratio for all California 
business was 3.31 percentage points higher than the loss ratio for the remaining 
states combined. 
Any contention that the insurance industry is making an excess profit 
in California is simply not true and someone outside the insurance industry 
has got to tell the public it is just not true. 
With regard to any future legislation, I would encourage you to keep 
in mind that the California system of open rating has served the consumer well. 
The insurance system may have problems; however, those problems do not result 
from a lack of competition in the pricing structure of insurance. In this 
regard, I would suggest to you that the good old fashionedfree enterprise 
system of competition will provide the consumer with more protection than 
all the consumer advocates, politicians and regulators combined. Rigid 
price controls have never worked well, if at all, and it is very unlikely 
that they ever will. 
Further, with regard to price controls, just in case you haven't seen 
them, I have attached a copy of the November 15th Wall Street Journal editorial 
captioned "California Smashup" and an article written by Benjamin Zycher, 
a visiting associate professor of economics at U.C.L.A. captioned "Shot in the 
Foot cy Prop. 103 - By Voting for Price Controls, Californias Have Ensured 
Chaos" which apepared in the November 16th issue of The Los Angeles Times. 
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If, however, the Legislature feels compelled to regulate rates, I 
would then suggest you exempt small companies who write less than 4 or 5% 
Page 5 
of the State total in any particular line of business. It is the small company 
such as ours that fill the gaps. It is generally the small companies that 
provide the innovations. It would also allow new companies to be formed and 
the smaller out of state companies to come into California. It would allow 
the 20th Centuries and the Mercury Casualties of our industry to emerge. Such 
an arrangement will enhance competition and help to eliminate scarcities 
generally created by price controls. 
One final note about profits. Commissioner Gillespie testified before 
your Committee on September 16, 1988 regarding the various insurance initiatives. 
She attached to her statement Exhibit I captioned "Comparative Return on Average 
Net Worth Ratios". This Exhibit, which has been widely circulated, shows an 
average return on net worth of 11.2%. The material I have provided shows an 
average return of 9.1%. This difference results in part from my using just 
the most recent five year period shown on the statement published by Best 
but mostly from my using a weighted average as opposed to what appears to be 
an averaging of the averages on the Commissioner's Exhibit. What I am suggest-
ing here is that the methodology used in preparing the Exhibit used by the 
Commissioner was incorrect and that the industry is making a 2.1% lesser return 
on net worth than it might otherwise appear. I have attached a copy of Exhibit I 
for your convenience. 
Thank you for providing me with the opportunity to express my views. 
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CONSOLIDATED INDUSTRY TOTALS 
ANNUAL STATEMENT FOR THE YEAR 1987 OF THE 
(Name) 
(000 omitted) 
ASSETS 1987 I 1986 
1. Bonds (less S liability for asset transfers witn put op· 
tions) 253,171.683 214.400,849 
2. Stocks 
2.1 Preferred stocks 9 636,265 7.889,918 
2.2 Common stocks 55,432,911 53,218,775 
3 Mortgage loans on real estate . 5,184,248 4,504,349 
4. Real estate: 
4.1 Properties occupied by the company 
(less $ .. encumbrances) 3,408,933 3,044,685 
4.2 Other properties (less $ . encumbrances) 972.147 817,596 
5. Collateral loans 190,775 161,694 
6.1 Cash on hand and on deposit . 5,525,756 5,606,942 
6.2 Short-term investments 24.619,164 22,397,278 
7. Other invested assets 2,462,205 2,047,000 
8. Aggregate write-ins for invested assets. 148,237 183,817 
8a. Subtotals, cash and invested assets (Items 1 to 8) 360.752.329 314,272.903 
9. Agents' balances or uncollected premiums: 
9.1 Premiums and agents' balances in course of collectiOn 14,804,619 13,190,978 
9.2 Premiums. agents' balances and installments booked 
but deferred and not yet due . 18.553,711 16,749.753 
10. Funds held by or deposited with reinsured companies 2.861,491 2,834,793 
11. Bills recmvable, taken for premiums 2,292,525 1,915,514 
12. Reinsurance recoverable on loss payments . 8.480,128 7,117,464 
13. Federal income tax recoverable . 1,228,841 2,210.059 
14. Electronic data processing equipment . 1,312.122 1,118.294 
15. Interest. dividends and real estate income due and accrued 6.398,591 5,520.985 
16. Receivable from parent, subsidiaries and affiliates . 4,087,173 3.471,442 
17. Equities and deposits in pools and associations. 1,542,409 1,283,169 
18 Amounts receivable relating to uninsured accident and hea~h plans 14,906 24,167 
20 Aggregate write-ins for other than invested assets . 4,381,696 4,378,561 
21. TOTALS (Items 8a through 20) 426,710,547 374.088,083 






0898. Summary of remaining write-ins tor Item 8 from page 69 
0899. TOTALS (Items 0801 thru 0805 plus 0898) (Page 2. Item 8) 
DETAILS OF WRITE-INS AGGREGmll Jll mM 211 FOR OTHER THAIIIIMmD ASSETS 
2001. Future investment income on loss reserves . 217,877 57,3n 
2002. Other write-ins tor assets other than investment assets .. 4,163,818 4,321,184 
2003. . ... 
2004. . ..... 
2005. 
2098. Summary of remaining write-ins for Item 20 from page 69 
2099. TOTALS (Items 2001 thru 2005 plus 2098) (Page 2. Item 20) 4,381,696 4,378,561 
NOTE: The items on this page to agree with Exhibit 1, Col. 4. 
The Notes to Financial Statements are an integral part of this statement 





















































































































CONSOLIDATED INDUSTRY TOTALS 
ANNUAl STATEMENT FOR iliE YEAR 1!la7 OF THE 
(Name) 
(000 omitted) 
liABILITIES, SURPLUS AND OTHER FUNDS 
1987 1986 
Losses (Part 3A. Column 5. Item 32) 186,845,617 158.941,209 
Loss adJustment expenses (Part 3A, Column 6. Item 32) 30,800,554 25.635,507 
Contingent commisswns and other s1mJiar charges 1,661.271 1,230.513 
Other expenses (excluding taxes. licenses and fees! 2,105,682 1.700.551 
Taxes. licenses and lees (excludmg federal and foreign income taxes) 1,931,626 1,988.571 
Federal and foretgn income taxes (excluding deterred taxes) 1,435,436 1,232.385 
Borrowed money 907,436 390,667 
!merest, inciudmg $ . , .. ,on borrowed money 39,797 38,266 
Unearned premiums (Part 2B, Column 7, l!em 32) 72,301,978 67,374,355 
Dividends declared and unpaid. 
Stockholders 219,313 231.017 
Policyholders 1,161,417 991,911 
he'd company under reinsurance treatu;s 4,388,534 4,067,947 
Amounts or retamed by company for account of others 1,542,532 1,144,014 
Unearned premiums on reinsurance m unautnonzed compantes 
Remsurance on pa1d losses $ and on unpa~d rePOrted losses $ 
ana on mcurred but not reponed losses $ recoverable 
from unauthorized compames $ 
Pa!(i and unpaid aHocatea ioss adjustment expenses 
recoverable frorn unauthorized companies S 
Less funds held retained by company for account of such 
unauthonzed compames as per Schedule F. Pa~ 2. Column 6 $ 
ProviSIOn lor unauthorized reinsurance (Items 13a + 13b + 13c • 13di 2,121,828 1,712.836 
Excess of statutory reserves over statement reserves 
(Schedule P, Parts 1A. 18, 1C, 1D and Schedule I() 569.807 280.787 
Net ad)ustments on assets anll liabtlities due to foretgn exchange rates 444.981 471.750 
Ora"s outstanding 3,396,380 2,825.291 
Payabl• to parent, subsid~anes and affiliates 2.805,269 2.589,346 
Payable tor securities 872,035 1,239,950 
Uab1iity tor amounts held under uninsured accKJent and health plans 1,801 -1,054 
Aggregate write-ins for liabilities 7,161.043 5.713.675 
Total liabtilties (Items !through 211 322,714,346 279.799,693 
Aggregate •mte,ins tor spectal surplus funds 8.333,880 7,sn.879 
Common cap1tal stoc> 5.048,711 5,137,590 
Preferred capttal stock 1,385,930 1,264,888 
Aggregate wnte·ins tor other than spec•al surpius funds 1,317.887 1,073,816 
Gross pa1d in and contnbuted surplus 39,695,119 35.761,312 
UnasSigned funds !surplus) 48,596,693 43,195,866 
Less treasury stock, at cost 
(1) shares common lvaJue included in Item 24A $ 168,945 72,949 
12) shares preferred (value included m Item 248 $ ). 213.on 50,014 
Surplus as regards policyllolders (Items 23 to 258, less 25C) (Page 4, nem 32) 103,996,200 94,288.390 
TOTALS (Page 2. Item 21) . 426.710,547 374.088,083 
M1sc conditional reserves 650.445 762,546 
Other remsurance balances 784.801 822.442 
Loss portfolio transfer -132,341 -213,806 
D1scount on Loss Reserves -292,289 -391.575 
Other wnte~ms for 1tabifit1es .. 6,170,627 4,734,067 
Summary of remaining write,ins for Item 21 from Page 69 
TOTALS {Items 2101 thru 2105 plus 2198) (Page 3. Item 21) 7,161.043 5.713,675 
DETAILS Of WRrTE·INS AGGREGATED AT ITEM 24C fOR OTHER THAN 
SPECIAl SURPlUS FUNDS 
Guar.ln!y Mnl 445.569 447.~ 
Oltler1M1t!H11fO'Oltlerlhanspecia!$U!llllSiurds 872.318 626,767 
ot remaming wnttHns 1or Item 24C from page 69 
24C01 thru 24C05 plus 24C98) (Page 3. Item 24C) 1,317.667 1.073.616 

















































































CONSOLIDATED INDUSTRY TOTALS 
BEST'S AGGREGATES & AVERAGES 
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CONSOLIDATED INDUSTRY TOTALS 
ANNUAL STATEMENT fOR THE YEAR 1987 Of THE 
SCHEDULE T- EXHIBIT OF PREMIUMS WRITTEN 
AUocaled by States and Territories 
(000 omitted) 
l I• C."''~ P<tm·~"'\ !n{I,!!H>f Pn;.u ~"lllll~~bt<>~>Ditn 
\t~! ~H~•n l'ot•"'vm; .!I'd i";~''W"'\ 1.'~ P,1H>r!l'f!l114>t~ 
• s 6 
St<1h~~ l!c i,l:P~:l;, 1 3 ic,,!j~i~,r~~~~~~~"' Om;·ctlosses Paid DneC! LOSU'S ();rec; PrettHU'IYIS Wntti!n 0Jt!KI P~tt!IIUMl hrMil 
l Aiaoama 
Al I 2,546,429 2,445,925 2 Ala>!u A' 671.827 602,674 
l Anton; AI 2.648.754 2,577.763 
4A•J.ansa'> AR 1,491,442 1,455,294 
5 Cih!Ofl\11 CA 28,504,827 27,756,259 
6 CviOt4iJO co 2.534.705 2,516.443 
7 Connecbcut C! 3,957,434 3,883.848 
B Oeia•are 0£ 611,475 591,296 
9 01s! Culumbli DC 702,722 678.396 
lOFlonda fl 10,046,423 9.648.872 
11 Georg>a GA 4,986.710 4,600.842 
l2 Hi!iffolE Ki 980,183 956,314 
l3!ctaho lO 563.747 500,299 
14 mmms ll 9,538,618 9,433.064 
15 lrn:hana IN 
I 
4 4,401,147 
l61owa lA 1,810,634 
Kansas ., 1,757,219 
18 Kentuc~y " 2,117,142 2,005,010 l9lows;ana lA 3,197,500 3,141,233 
ZO Mamt ME 946,864 897,803 
21 Maryland MO 3.620,593 3,704,734 
Mass#C!HJsetts MA 6,267,781 6,075,562 
ZJM1Ch1gan Ml 7,605,232 7,595,737 
24 Mmnesota MN 
I 
3.636.568 3,618.432 
zs MtS$lS$!pp: MS 1.526.893 1,477,790 
26 M!SSO!.m MO 3,860.384 3,783,767 
27 Montana MT 552,847 543,077 
28 Nebraska HE 1,107,685 1.091,576 
29 Nevada NV 824,855 796,309 
30 New Hampstme NK 1,099,165 1,029,481 
31 New Jer1ty NJ 7,202.785 6,972,896 
32 Nftll ~X!CO HM 945,324 932.375 
33 Hew York NY 16,861,475 16,549.891 
34 No Caro!ma NC 3,757,633 3,649,357 
35 No Dakol! NO 426.646 423.613 
36 OhiO OH 6.667,236 6,520.579 
37 Oklahoma OK 2.059,874 2.053,186 
38 Oregon OR 2.308,566 2,284.113 
39Pennsylvama PA 10,034,860 9,697.505 
40 Rhode Island Rl 927,665 916,258 
41 So Carolml sc 2.401,175 2,328,943 
42 So Dakota so 420.623 411,325 
HTennessee TN 3,174,730 3,038.251 
UTuu TX 12,751,384 12,553,480 
45 U!ih UT 875,345 853,816 
<46 Vermont vr 474,861 446,091 
47 1/ngm~a VA 4,115,020 3,983.846 
48 Wastung!on WA 2,998,600 2,954,292 
49 Wes1 Vug1111a '1('1 912,978 883,494 
50 WISCOftS!II WI 3.240,857 3,161.9611 
51 Wyommg wv 288.204 314,335 
52 Arnenun Samoa_ AS 1,734 1.985 
53 Guam GU 13,189 10.975 
54 P!.iertoRu:o ?R 584,881 562,229 
55 US Vii'ftn Is VI 21,771 22.080 
56Cdnada CN 1.899,312 1,855,145 
57 A9Weqale ottlef or 2 833 955 2,723 310 (IJ!ef\"' 
98'"Totals tt 202,659,126 
197.827,754 
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To!al lor Column 6 !o agret wfll'l the sum ol to!a!s !or Coiumos 5 ana J 1t1 the {>fevlQI.I$ innuat sta.!emen! 
Total lor Column 7 lo t!!ual Part 3A Page 10. !o!a!s lor Columns Ia and 4a To!al lo1 Coh1mn 81o a~1ee fWllh Item I J Pagt 4 
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Smashup 
tain losses of their insurer's opera-
tions in California.) 
All that's kept the in· 
surers in place is the belief that the 
courts will reject the 
103, which the state Supreme 
Court immediately stayed. Both the 
U.S. and California constitutions have 
provisions aimed at just this kind of 
assault: the clause (no prop· 
can be taken a purpose 
miithtY!1f the government paying com· come 
tiff 
"We consider it 
California Trial 
and the contract clause 
can't interfere with 
contracts). The newly more 
" conservative California Supreme 
Court will have to work out how much 
if any of the proposition is legal. President Ralph 
a big booster of Prop. 103, 
"Now we're calls from 
states and groups inter· 
ested in the same thing." Be· 
fore any more states let Mr. Nader 
and his trial-lawyer friends do to 
them what they've just done for the 
people of California, they'd better 
watch closely the unfolding story of 
Prop. 103. 
As written, it would slash an prop· 
erty and casualty insurance back to 
November 1987 rates, less 20%. 
Drivers with records (80% of 
Surely it is no coincidence that 
auto rates are highest in states with 
the wildest tort systems: California, 
New Jersey and Massachusetts. These 
states have spent the past 30 years un· 
dermining traditional rules of liabil· 
ity, with the predictable result of 
higher premiums, state intrusion into 
the rate-setting process and eventu· 
the kind of political gridlock and 
, California's would an· 
that produced Prop. 103. (All· 
state isn't waiting for a Nader-spon-
sored Prop. 103 in Massachusetts; it 
announced yesterday that it was pull· 
ing out of Massachusetts, where the 
state insurance commissioner sets 
rates.) 
' other 20% oft It would become a 
crime to cancel or refuse to sell 
-
cies under these new rules. 
So far, the bill's voters aren't get· 
the rose garden that its Naderite 
sponsors promised. Insurance rates 
this week are not falling. At 
least 40 insurers stopped writing poli-
and others, such as Travelers 
and Fireman's Fund, are pulling out 
of the state auto-insurance market. In-
surers are leaving the state before 
losses begin to accumulate at an esti-
mated $4 billion a year. Under Prop. 
103, the state insurance commissioner 
would allow increases from the rolled-
back rates only if an insurer is other-
wise "substantially threatened with 
" (What this means, of 
course, people with more mar-
ket-based insurance policies in other 
states will end up subsidizing the cer-
Led by the same Naderites who 
helped set off the litigation explosion 
in the first place, these states tried to 
wave away underlying actuarial pres· 
sures on premiums with the magic 
wand of state regulation. They die· 
tated prices and terms and outlawed 
policies based on claims history or ex· 
pectations in a liability-happy world. 
They made it hard to raise rates on 
unsafe drivers, forcing better drivers 
to bear the added burden. Compulsory 
assigned-risk plans to cover all 
drivers became actuarial disasters. 
Prop. 103 is the latest sign that the 
tort and insurance regulation schemes 
need major overhauls. To borrow a 
famous phrase, the legal and regula· 
tory system for cars in California is 
now unsafe at any speed. 
the Foot by Prop.l03 
for Price Controls, Californians Have Ensured Chaos 
ZYCHER Carter Administrations learned to their 
sorrow when they attempted to maintain 
price controls in the energy market. If 
Nader tells you that insurance 
can be from "evading the 
bear in mind the story of the emperor who 
ordered his throne brought to the seashore, 
whereupon he climbed onto it and com-
manded the tides to stop. The companies 
already are operating through subsidiaries 
and are preparing defensive rate increases. 
It is impossible to prevent firms from 
ways to defend themselves. 
Since the insurance companies bolted for 
the door immediately, it is not surprising 
that the politicians have demanded for 
themselves a place at the publicity 
Accordingly, Roberti and others have 
announced their intention to force the 
presence of insurance company executives 
at a star chamber proceeding in Sacramen-
to, to be held soon for the benefit of the 
television cameras. Let us hope that the 
businessmen can summon the courage to 
educate our honorable solons with respect 
to the following Eternal Truths: 
Price controls do not reduce prices or help 
consumers and the poor. Controls reduce 
only reported prices, which exclude the 
costs caused by the unavailability of cover-
age, or those borne in attempts to find 
coverage at artificially low prices. By 
reducing the amount of insurance supplied 
by the industry, controls must raise the 
true cost of obtaining coverage. Moreover, 
the uniform 20% cut in rates will impose 
the greatest penalties on the most efficient 
companies. In short, the controls can only 
reduce the total productivity of the econo-
my. Can anyone believe that lower aggre-
gate wealth will serve consumers or the 
poor? 
Price controls are not "fair." The expan-
sion in government regulatory power ne-
cessitated by price controls inevitably 
placates some existing consumers of insur-
ance and other important interest groups 
whose voices are heard in the Legislature. 
In what sense can it be said that these 
interests are more deserving than others? 
The controls are "fair" from the viewpoint 
of those able to get "cheap" insurance; for 
others, numerous four-letter words could 
be used to describe the system of controls, 
but "fair" is not one of them. 
Overall "profits" have nothing to do with 
the supply of insurance. Firms are in 
business to earn profits, not merely to avoid 
bankruptcy. Insurance companies cannot 
provide coverage if premiums do not cover 
costs, regardless of whether some account-
ant says that the company is "profitable" 
overall. Proposition 103 assumes that con-
sumers of insurance not subject to controls 
will happily subsidize consumers in Cali-
fornia. The world does not work that way. 
Nader is fond of arguing that insurance-in-
dustry profitability is unknown because the 
/C.' 
books are not part of the public record: and 
t.he rate roll-backs will not affect the 
availability of insurance because the com~ 
panics are so profitable. Nader's ability to 
take diametrically opposed positions and be · 
wrong on both is nothing short of amazing. 
Read the Constitution's lips. "Nor shall 
pnvate property be taken for public usc 
without just compensation." Translation: If 
the politicians want to subsidize consumers 
of insurance, they must use public funds 
rather than booty stolen from insurance 
company shareholders. "No state shall pass 
any law impairing the obligation of con-
tracts." Translation: If any individual and 
an insurance company choose to enter into 
a voluntary contract at some price, the 
government has no right to prevent them 
from doing so. "Neither slavery nor invol" 
untary servitude ... shall exist within the 
United States." Translation: If insurance 
companies choose not to operate in Califor~ 
nia, no one has the right to force them to do 
so. The Founding Fathers understood that 
such restrictions on government are need-
ed to prevent political majorities from 
violating the rights of unpopular minori· 
ties; insuran;-:e companies arc an unpopular 
minority par excellence. Do we want a. 
nation in which the unpopular are subject· 
to thew hims of lynQh-mob maJorities? -
Roberti and others ought to ponder the 
possibility that judges appointed by conser-
vative governors and Presidents might be 
inclined to believe that the Constitution 
means what it says. They ought also to 
consider the likelihood that if the private 
sector is prevented from providing insur-
ance services. the voters might demand. 
that the state government step into the 
void. Imagine for a moment the political. 
pressures on insurance rates. Imagine the · 
inefficiency with which government can be· · 
expected to operate such a firm. Imagine 
the horrors awaiting ordinary people· 
forced to deal with a slow, cumbersome and·· 
indifferent bureaucracy. Imagine living in · 
the Soviet Union. 
Which brings us back to Nader. None of 
the predictable consequences of Proposi-
tion 103 is news to him. Ignore his , . 
propaganda-he is not interested in con- . 
sumers or the poor or any other lofty ideal. .' ' 
He is interested in emasculation of the ' 
private sector and an increase in the~ '·· 
coercive authority of government, which is •: 
to say, in his own political power. Proposi~ r; · 
tion 103 serves that end beautifully. Alter;.. . 
native measures-such as ending the as-. 
s1gned-risk subsidy from good to bad '·. 
drivers, and reform of the tort system-r-~'· 
would reduce the impetus for governme'nt ~. 
intrusion. Would Nader favor the market . , 
over government? Don't bet on it. ', , , 
\ . 
Benjamin Zycher is an economist\ in • ·-
Canoga Park and a visiting associate prolfs· ·· 
sor of economics at UCLA. 1 
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COMPAiATIV! l!TOi!f ON AVERAGE NET WOiT! iATIOS 
Prop./Cas. Diversified 
.!.!!.r. Insuraace(a) P'iaancia1(b) laaks(b) 
197 3 13.3 11.2 12. s 
1974 4.8 7.5 12 .a 
197.5 2.8 8.9 12.1 
1976 11.7 12.1 11.5 
1977 20.4 16.7 11.6 
1978 19.8 17.3 12.9 
1979 16. s 17.S 14.1 
1980 14.8 14.0 13.4 
1981 13.2 11.4 13 .o -
1982 9.6 10.0 12 .o 
1983 8.8 12. J 12.3 
1984 1.3 8.1 9.1 
198S 2.8 s.o 11.6 
1986 15.0 16.0 10.4 
1987 13.9 1.5.2 -.5.2 
Average 11.2 12.4 11.0 
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Testimony by Los Angeles City Attorney James K. Hahn 
before the California Senate Insurance Committee 
For decades the insurance industry in California had one 
hand around our throat and the other one in our pocket. We kicked 
and we struggled. Some of us fought for reform through the courts 
and legislative process. Year after year, about 200 
insurance-related bills would be introduced each session in 
Sacramento, with 40 or more of them calling for some type of actual 
reform. Year after year, nothing of any consequence ever happened. 
Redlining continued. High rates continued. The exploitation 
continued. 
But 10 days ago that came to an end. Ten days ago, the 
people of California took matters in their own hands through the 
initiative process. They made it clear once and for all that they 
finally have had enough, that they want meaningful reform, and that 
they want it now. It is now up to all of us who serve as public 
servants in California -- and the Legislature in particular as it 
enacts the enabling legislation -- to make sure that the will of 
the people is carried out. It is time to prove that a greedy, 
exploitive industry cannot thwart the will of the people; that big 
bucks cannot defeat a good idea whose time has come. 
We spend the past four months listening to $75 million 
worth of insurance industry campaign commercials telling us about 
1 
2 
the disaster that will result if Californians try to regulate 
insurers. Now we just spent an entire morning listening to the 
insurance i ustry tell us how it will be destroyed if Proposition 
103 is implemented. 
You cannot let them get away with crying wolf again. 
The fact is that the reform measures contained in 
Proposition 103 can be easily implemented, given the bloated 
insurance industry profits. 
According to the National Insurance Consumers 
Organization, California insurers paid out only 61¢ from each $1 of 
premiums collected. That leaves almost 40 percent for overhead 
expenses -- including executive salaries that often exceed $1 
million a year -- and profits. 
But that is not where most of the money is. We all know 
about floats. The insurance companies do it, too, by investing our 
premium dollars and reaping the financial benfits of that 
investment. 
I do not have any quarrel with that. It is a standard good 
business practice. What I do have a quarrel with is the constant 
whining by a greedy industry that reaps millions of dollars in 
profits, pays its executives more in one year than most people will 
2 
3 
make in a lifetime and then does everything it can to circumvent 
the will of the people. 
Insurance companies run around crying wolf about how 
Proposition 103 will ruin them, but I have yet to see any of them 
really opening their books to prove that -- and I suspect that is 
with good reason. What they do is crack open their books just 
enough for us to see the figures on their underwriting and then 
claim that those numbers show that they are losing money. Take 
State Farm Mutual, for example. They claim to have lost money in 
California the past four to five years and point to a $207 million 
underwriting loss last year. But they refuse to show us their 
figures on California investment income -- the profits from their 
float. I wonder why? 
A look at the figures of the California State Automobile 
Association Inter-Insurance Bureau might tell us why. They do all 
their business in California, so we can get an accurate picture of 
how they are doing -- and last year they did very well, indeed. 
They also posted an underwriting loss-- a big one totalling $29.7 
million. But they also reported an investment income of $120.8 




Insurance Commissioner Roxani Gillespie was quoted last 
month as s~ying that insurers in California sted an average 
return on net worth of 10.3 percent during the past five years and 
11.7 percent just last year alone Last year, the California 
insurance industry had a total profit of $868 million. Then, in a 
move clearly designed to pre-empt the will of the people, the 
state's six biggest auto insurers with their 
let's-stick-it-to-consumers attitude-- all raised their rates 
during the nine-month period prior to the first of September when 
the public began focusing on the campaign. 
Does all this sound like the insurance industry is losing 
money in California? Does it sound like the insurance industry is 
lying to us? And, of course, we know that industry's level of 
intellectural integrity after watching their outrageously 
disceptive and downright untruthful television advertising against 
Proposition 103 during the campaign. 
It is obvious that the insurance industry has no intention 
of respecting the will of the people. It is obivious that the 
industry has eve!Y intention of fighting tooth and nail through the 
courts and the legislative process, while also trying to intimidate 




That is why is is vital that the Legislature resist this 
pressure and implement Proposition 103 in a 
with the obvious will of the people. 
that is consistent 
One factor in that that I want to make special mention of 
is the way that the power and authority of the elected insurance 
commissioner is structur . That office and the way it is designed 
to fuction will be the foundation on which long-term insurance 
reform will be built in this state for years to come. Eleven other 
states have elected insurance commissioners and their influence has 
been to stablize the insurance industry and the rates being charged 
in those states. The key to maintaining the will of the people as 
ressed in the spirit of Proposition 103 is to structure the 
duties of the insurance commissioner -- who will be elected by the 
people and directly accountable to them as the ultimate watchdog of 
the insurance industry -- in a way that gives that office clear 
powers and authority to regulate the industry. Instead of the 
bare-bones staff of the present commissioner, the new office should 
be adequately staffed with qualified actuaries, auditors and other 
professional staff who can wade through the different sets of books 
kept by insurance companies. I urge you to make California the home 




I also urge you not to be swayed by unsubstantiated cries 
of wolf from the insurance industry as it fights to undermine and 
circumvent the will of the people in this state. They are coming 
dangerously close to proving they are in violation of anti-trust 
and anti-boycotting laws. 
And, finally, I urge the people to fight back against this 
insult to the democratic process by paying close attention to the 
conduct of the companies involved in fighting their will and then 
make their future choices accor~ingly when it comes to buying 
insurance. 
E~D 
November 18, 1988 
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